Matter of Antoine

13 Citing cases

  1. People v. Hollman

    79 N.Y.2d 181 (N.Y. 1992)   Cited 803 times   4 Legal Analyses
    In Hollman and the simultaneously issued affirmance of Antoine W., the Court of Appeals rejected the analysis of this Court's Antoine W. majority, and (while nonetheless affirming this Court's Antoine W. result on other grounds [ see 79 NY2d at 889]) reiterated that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances, make a level I inquiry in carrying out the law enforcement function.

    The dissenting Justice, on the other hand, argued that Canale's encounter with the defendant was a common-law inquiry that had to be supported by a founded suspicion that criminality was afoot, something that was lacking under the facts present in this case. The dissenter also argued that the result was inconsistent with prior decisions in People v Irizarry ( 168 A.D.2d 377, affd 79 N.Y.2d 890 [decided today]) and Matter of Antoine W. ( 162 A.D.2d 121, affd 79 N.Y.2d 888 [decided today]), in which the Appellate Division had labeled police-initiated encounters similar to the one at issue here common-law inquiries that had to be supported by a founded suspicion of criminality. The dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division granted defendant Saunders' application for leave to appeal.

  2. People v. Thomas

    19 A.D.3d 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 42 times
    In Thomas, a police officer observed the defendant seated in driver's seat of a vehicle parked next to a fire hydrant and the police officer testified at the suppression hearing that he blocked the defendant's vehicle by parking the police vehicle directly in front of the defendant's vehicle.

    Our reversal of the suppression order is, of course, based on the view that no unlawful police conduct occurred in this case. Justice Ellerin evidently reads Hollman's statement that "[the] public service approach for information is not the focus of De Bour" ( 79 NY2d at 189) as a holding that the exercise of the public service function can never serve as the basis for a level I inquiry. This misstates the meaning of the quoted language, which the Court of Appeals intended as a correction of erroneous dicta in an earlier decision by this Court ( Matter of Antoine W., 162 AD2d 121 [1990], affd 79 NY2d 888 [1992]). Specifically, in the course of reversing the delinquency adjudication in Antoine W., the majority of a panel of this Court asserted that De Bour, in discussing the first level of police inquiry, "has reference only to an `informational' approach to a citizen by the police" ( 162 AD2d at 122), meaning that a level I inquiry could be justified only in the exercise of the public service function, and never in the exercise of the law enforcement function. In Hollman and the simultaneously issued affirmance of Antoine W., the Court of Appeals rejected the analysis of this Court's Antoine W. majority, and (while nonetheless affirming this Court's Antoine W. result on other grounds [ see 79 NY2d at 889]) reiterated that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances, make a level I inquiry in carrying out the law enforcement function.

  3. People v. Bordeaux

    182 A.D.2d 1095 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)   Cited 6 times

    Judgment reversed on the law, motion granted and indictment dismissed. Memorandum: Even if the police had an "`objective credible reason'" to approach the defendant, "the pointed questioning regarding the ownership of the bag * * * was improper because it was not based on a founded suspicion of criminal activity" (Matter of Antoine W., 79 N.Y.2d 888, 889-890; see also, People v Saunders, 79 N.Y.2d 181; People v De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 215, 223). The police officers' interest in defendant and her companion was initially sparked by information from an unidentified informant regarding the conduct of two Black women at Syracuse Airport. Initially, the women were seen standing in separate parts of the baggage claim area.

  4. People v. Newson

    155 A.D.3d 768 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)   Cited 4 times

    Significantly, the arresting officer never asked the defendant for his consent to search the vehicle (cf. People v. Irizarry, 79 N.Y.2d 890, 892, 581 N.Y.S.2d 649, 590 N.E.2d 234 ; Matter of Antoine W., 79 N.Y.2d 888, 890, 581 N.Y.S.2d 648, 590 N.E.2d 233 ). Instead, the defendant immediately responded to the officer's question about whether he had anything illegal on his person or in the vehicle, "No, officer. You can check."

  5. People v. Newson

    2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 7752 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)

    Significantly, the arresting officer never asked the defendant for his consent to search the vehicle (cf. People v Irizarry, 79 NY2d 890, 892; Matter of Antoine W., 79 NY2d 888, 890). Instead, the defendant immediately responded to the officer's question about whether he had anything illegal on his person or in the vehicle, "No, officer. You can check."

  6. People v. Valerio

    274 A.D.2d 950 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 20 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that the People met their heavy burden of proving that defendant's consent to that search was voluntary ( see, People v. Barreras, 253 A.D.2d 369, 373-374; People v. Guzman, supra, at 323-324). Defendant's consent was the product of improper police inquiry ( see, People v. Hollman, supra, at 194; Matter of Antoine W., 79 N.Y.2d 888, 890) followed by an unlawful inventory search. "[U]nder no rational view of the evidence at the suppression hearing can it be concluded that [defendant's] consent was acquired by means sufficiently distinguishable from the taint" of that illegality ( People v. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d 558, 563, cert denied 516 U.S. 868).

  7. People v. Fields

    257 A.D.2d 387 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 8 times

    " (People v. Hollman, supra, at 191-192.) In short, the question of whether anyone asked defendant to carry anything on the bus for him was improper because at the time the officer asked it, he lacked a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot (Matter of Antoine W., 79 N.Y.2d 888; People v. Irizarry, 79 N.Y.2d 890; People v. Owens, 206 A.D.2d 303). The officer's inquiry went beyond a permissible inquiry such as whether an individual had brought any luggage onto the bus or whether he had checked the bag (People v. Hanson, 195 A.D.2d 408). Even if the question posed by the police officer to defendant, as to whether anyone asked him to take the bag onto the bus, could be correctly characterized as a Level-I type question, the repeat of the same question by the officer, as well as the officer's request to defendant to conduct a search of his own bag, was clearly unjustified, considering the predicate information the officer had at that point.

  8. People v. Suncar

    66 Misc. 3d 672 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019)   Cited 3 times

    Utilizing the DeBour analytic framework, it is clear that the approach in this case was a wholly justified level one intrusion. While valid traffic related issues are widely regarded as the less intrusive level one inquiry [ People v. Ocasio , 85 N.Y.2d 982, 629 N.Y.S.2d 161, 652 N.E.2d 907 (1995) ; seePeople v. Hollman , 79 N.Y.2d 181, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 590 N.E.2d 204 (1992) ], the common-law right to inquire focuses on the citizen as a suspect and whether there is "founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot" People v. DeBour , 40 N.Y.2d at 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562. Courts have described this level two inquiry as one that closes in on a defendant as a "suspected law breaker" In re Antoine W. , 162 A.D.2d 121, 122, 556 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1st Dept. 1990], affd 79 N.Y.2d 888, 581 N.Y.S.2d 648, 590 N.E.2d 233 (1992). Although this level of intrusion entitles an officer to interfere with a citizen "to the extent necessary to gain explanatory information," it may not involve a forcible stop and seizure.

  9. People v. DeBellis

    65 Misc. 3d 1203 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019)

    The second level, the common-law right of inquiry, permits officers "to gain explanatory information, ... short of a forcible seizure" upon a "founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot" Id. Courts have described this level-two inquiry as one that closes in on a defendant as a "suspected law breaker". In re Antoine W., 162 AD2d 121, 122 (1st Dept 1990), affd 79 NY2d 888 (1992). Although this level of intrusion entitles an officer to interfere with a citizen "to the extent necessary to gain explanatory information," it may not involve a forcible stop and seizure.

  10. People v. Goethe

    63 Misc. 3d 1222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019)

    While valid traffic related issues are widely regarded as the less intrusive level one inquiry ( People v. Ocasio, 85 NY2d 982 [1995] ; seePeople v. Hollman, 79 NY2d 181 [1992] ), the common-law right to inquire focuses on the citizen as a suspect and whether there is "founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot" DeBour, 40 NY2d at 223. Courts have described this level two inquiry as one that closes in on a defendant as a "suspected law breaker" ( Matter of Antoine W., 162 AD2d 121, 122 [1st Dept 1990], affd 79 NY2d 888 [1992] ). Although this level of intrusion entitles an officer to interfere with a citizen "to the extent necessary to gain explanatory information," it may not involve a forcible stop and seizure.