Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b). See also Bankr.R. 9017; Annis v. First State Bank of Joplin (In re Annis), 78 B.R. 962 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1987); Pruitt v. Gramatan Investors Corp. (In re Pruitt), 72 B.R. 436, 440 n. 4 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1987) (relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c)). The Court will also take judicial notice of the Order of Discharge, dated May 5, 1988.

The Plaintiff has not met his burden of proof by relying upon schedules filed 2 1/2 years after the date of the transfer to recreate the Debtor's financial condition on the date of the transfer. In Annis v. First State Bank of Joplin (Matter of Annis), 78 B.R. 962, 967 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987), the bankruptcy court for the Western District of Missouri stated, although in dicta, that schedules filed six months after the purportedly fraudulent transfer were insufficient, without more, to demonstrate insolvency as of the date of the transfer under the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent transfer provision. It observed that during the six-month period between the transfer and the filing of the bankruptcy petition, "the debtors may have had a dwindling of their cash deposits or of other assets that may have had to be expended for living or other expenses.

He offered a Summary of Schedules, Exhibit 9, which shows an excess of liabilities over assets for the Debtor Corporations as of the Petition Date. However, schedules and statements of financial affairs filed with a bankruptcy petition which show liabilities in excess of assets as of the date of filing do not, without more, constitute prima facie evidence of insolvency as of the date of an alleged fraudulent transfer. Annis v. First State Bank (In re Annis), 78 B.R. 962, 967 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1987). The financial documents offered by the Trustee to prove insolvency refer to either OMG or ORC. Because OMG is the parent of the remaining four Debtor Corporations, the parties have treated these documents as describing the financial status of the Debtor Corporations as a whole.

A court, however, should not take judicial notice of the truth of the facts set forth in the bankruptcy schedules. See, e.g., Burdick v. Lee, 256 B.R. 837, 840 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (bankruptcy schedules showing liabilities in excess of assets do not constitute prima facie evidence of insolvency as of the date of an alleged fraudulent transfer); Annis v. First State Bank of Joplin (In re Annis), 78 B.R. 962, 967 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987). 237.

The reported cases cited by Defendant in support of its argument do not persuade the court otherwise as each involved a determination regarding admissibility in connection with a trial or evidentiary hearing. See Leslie v. Leslie (In re Leslie), 181 B.R. 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995)(trial); In re Harmony Holdings, LLC, 393 B.R. 409 (D.S.C. 2008)(evidentiary hearing); Manix Energy, Ltd. v. James (In re James), 300 B.R. 890 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2003)(ruling on motion to take judicial notice and receive documents into evidence); Annis v. First State Bank of Joplin (In re Annis), 78 B.R. 962 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987) (trial); see also French v. Diller (In re Stauffer), No. 92-3313, 1994 WL 115914, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 1994)(trial). Although Plaintiff has not included copies of Debtor's bankruptcy schedules in support of her Motion, as noted earlier, the court finds it proper to take judicial notice, as requested by Plaintiff, of the contents of its case docket and the Debtor's schedules. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9017; Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); In re Calder, 907 F.2d 953, 955 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990); St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1171-72 (6th Cir. 1979) (stating that judicial notice is particularly applicable to the court's own records of litigation closely related to the case before it). The statements of value on Schedule B were made by Marks, Debtor's sole shareholder and president, under penalty of perjury.

But, the court cannot take judicial notice of the "truth" of the contents of the Debtor's Schedules. See, In re Leslie, 181 B.R. 317, 322 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995)(Krasniewski, J.)("the actual truth of the assertions contained in a Debtor's bankruptcy schedules cannot readily be ascertained and such assertions are not the proper subject of judicial notice."); In re Harmony Holdings, LLC, 393 B.R. 409, 413 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008); In re James, 300 B.R 890, 895 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2003); In re Scarpinito, 196 B.R. 257, 267 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996)("While a bankruptcy judge may take judicial notice of a bankruptcy court's records ... we may not infer the truth of facts contained in documents, unfettered by rules of evidence or logic, simply because such documents were filed with the court."); In re Blumer, 95 B.R. 143, 147 (9th Cir. BAP 1988); Matter of Annis, 78 B.R. 962 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987)(Statements in bankruptcy schedules relating to issue of debtors' insolvency were not admissible, in order to establish debtors' insolvency at time of alleged fraudulent transfer); In re W.P. Hickman Systems, Inc., 2012 WL 2905446 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. July 16, 2012)("A distinction is recognized between taking judicial notice of the filing and existence of the documents and the truth of the factual assertions contained in the documents."); Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Evidence Manual, §201:5 (2013-2014 ed.).

Schedules filed with a bankruptcy petition showing liabilities in excess of assets do not, without more, constitute prima facie evidence of insolvency. Id. at 840 (citing Annis v. First State Bank (In re Annis), 78 B.R. 962, 967 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987)).

No evidence in the record demonstrates that the debtor's financial condition was exactly the same in July, September, and November 2004 as it was on January 5, 2005, the date of the petition filing. See Burdick v. Lee, 256 B.R. 837, 840 (D.Mass. 2001) (stating bankruptcy schedules showing liabilities in excess of assets on filing date are not prima facie evidence of insolvency on the date of the an alleged transfer) (citing Annis v. First State Bank (In re Annis), 78 B.R. 962, 967 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987)). However, insolvency was proved with regard to the transfer of $1000.00 from Pennywise, Inc. to Talley one day prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, which shows assets of $392,010.00 and liabilities of $790,189.56. While the Court is convinced that the Pennywise, Inc. petition is inaccurate in many respects, Talley will not be allowed to shield himself from liability for a fraudulent transfer by filing a confusing or inaccurate petition for his corporation.

In an Adversary Proceeding involving a Chapter 13 debtor's complaint to set aside an alleged preference, the Court stated that the "wildcard" exemption under § 513.430(3) could not, as a matter of law, be allowed against a second automobile when the Missouri statutory scheme permitted an exemption for only one vehicle. See In re Annis, 78 B.R. 962, 967 n. 15 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1987). The Missouri exemption statute exempts from attachment and execution to the extent of any person's interest "any motor vehicle, not to exceed one thousand dollars in value".

"(P)arties may offer evidence after trial has been completed and after judgment only if they demonstrate, on a timely served motion for new trial, that they have discovered new and material evidence which, in the exercise of due diligence, they could not have discovered in time for use at trial." Matter of Annis, 78 B.R. 962, 968 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1987). Nevertheless, even if the court could assume that the trustee's accountant bore the primary responsibility for the trustee's not being able to gather the documents which evidenced the existence of accounts receivable which may have been property of the estate, the fact remains that such documents were not gathered and that, accordingly, no benefit to the estate resulted from any of the efforts of counsel.