The important and sensitive work of the ACJC has been recognized as being "of extreme significance to the administration of justice in this [S]tate." In re Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 94, 494 A.2d 1014 (1985). And, although we certainly are aware of the high responsibility that is entrusted to the carefully selected members of the ACJC, see R. 2:15-2, we are also mindful that, as a result of our disciplinary processes, "[m]ost of [the ACJC's] work is never mentioned or known, for the overwhelming proportion of charges against judges have been found by the [ACJC], after investigation, to be unsubstantiated, indeed often frivolous," Alvino,supra, 100 N.J. at 94, 494 A.2d 1014.
See R. 1:18. The Code “is a general statement of standards and goals, admirably serving the purpose of providing guidance to judges in all matters precisely because of the generality of its provisions.” In re Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 102, 494 A.2d 1014 (1985). While judges are expected to adhere to the Code, every breach “does not mean, however, that judicial misconduct has occurred, or that discipline ... is appropriate.”
As our Supreme Court has recognized, it is "absolutely essential that the public have confidence" in the integrity of our system of judicial discipline. In re Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 107, 494 A.2d 1014 (1985). [T]he greatest assurance of public confidence is the status, the prestige, and the composition of the ACJC. . . . Those appointed [to the ACJC] have traditionally been of such quality as to remove all doubt concerning their absolute independence and integrity.
While not disputing the Commission's position, we note that: "not every failure of a judge to conform to the standards of the Code amounts to judicial misconduct or merits formal discipline." Matter of Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 494 A.2d 1014 at 1016 (1985). We further note that:
In keeping with that high purpose, we do not discipline for "mere error[s] in judicial activity or professional activities." In re Mattera, 34 N.J. 259, 270, 168 A.2d 38 (1961); seealso In re Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 494 A.2d 1014 (1985) (holding that omission of certain administrative duties, when no willfulness was involved and judge sincerely thought matters unimportant, did not warrant judicial discipline). Rather, the disciplinary power is ordinarily reserved for conduct that "is marked with moral turpitude and thus reveals a shortage in integrity and character.
Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly so concluded. In re Long, 244 Kan. 719; 772 P.2d 814 (1989), where the Supreme Court of Kansas imposed a public censure for failing to file reports of matters taken under advisement; In re Alvino, 100 N.J. 92; 494 A.2d 1014 (1985), where the judge had failed to timely and accurately file reports of undecided matters for eighteen years — no sanction was imposed because the rule had not been generally enforced. VI
We conclude that Canon 3A(5) is violated where there is a pattern of unreasonable delay or where a particular instance is so lacking in legitimate justification that it is willful. See In re Long, 244 Kan. 719, 724, 772 P.2d 814, 818 (1989) (Canon 3A(5) violated where delay is "significant, extensive, and unjustified"); Sommerville, 364 S.E.2d at 23 n.3 (sanctions appropriate under Canon 3A(5) where there is a pattern of delay resulting from either willful neglect of, or manifest inability to effectively perform, judicial duties); In re Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 97 n.2, 494 A.2d 1014, 1016 n.2 (1985) (delay can violate Canon 3A(5) if "willful" or "typical of the judge's work"); Weeks, 134 Ariz. at 524, 658 P.2d at 177-78 ("unnecessary, unwarranted delay" violates Canon 3A(5); Starnes, 680 S.W.2d at 923 ("chronic and pervasive" delays violate the Canon). Our resolution of the second argument also resolves the last one.
If, for example, an individual engages in numerous instances of unnecessary delay in deciding cases or persistently fails to adequately perform administrative functions, disciplinary sanctions will be imposed. See, e.g., In re Weeks, 134 Ariz. 521, 658 P.2d 174 (1983); In re Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 494 A.2d 1014 (1985); In re Greenfield, 76 N.Y.2d 293, 557 N.E.2d 1177, 558 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1990); Sommerville, 178 W. Va. at 697, 364 S.E.2d at 23. As the Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized in Alvino, "[n]ot every failure of a judge to conform to the standards of the [New Jersey Judicial] Code [of Ethics] amounts to judicial misconduct or merits formal discipline."
Generally any violation of the judicial canons, such as those dealing with honesty and integrity, call for disciplinary measures (Matter of Boulanger, 61 N.Y.2d 89), without consideration of whether the Judges conduct in many, most or all other matters may be above reproach (Matter of Sardino v State Commn. on Judicial Conduct, 58 N.Y.2d 286). However a Judge's failure to promptly dispose of pending matters generally does not warrant "judicial discipline but rather administrative correction" (Matter of Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 98, 494 A.2d 1014, 1016; see also, Overton, Grounds for Judicial Discipline in the Context of Judicial Disciplinary Commissions, 54 Chicago-Kent L Rev 59, 65). As the Supreme Court of New Jersey observed in the Alvino case (at 96-97, at 1016): "Not every failure of a judge to conform to the standards of the Code amounts to judicial misconduct or merits formal discipline.
However, the Court characterized an earlier version of the Code as "a general statement of standards and goals, admirably serving the purpose of providing guidance to judges in all matters precisely because of the generality of its provisions." In re Alvino, 100 N.J. 92, 102, 494 A. 2d 1014 (1985) (emphasis added). "While judges are expected to adhere to the Code, every breach ‘does not mean ... that judicial misconduct has occurred, or that discipline ... is appropriate.’ "