Opinion
Submitted September 26, 2000
October 24, 2000.
In a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate parental rights based upon abandonment, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Adams, J.), dated December 15, 1998, which, after fact-finding and dispositional hearings, found that he had abandoned the subject child, terminated his parental rights, and transferred custody and guardianship of the subject child to the Commissioner of the Administration for Children's Services for the purposes of adoption.
Betty A. Rugg, Baldwin, N.Y., for appellant.
Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Larry A. Sonnenshein and Kathleen Alberton of counsel), for respondent .
Monica Drinane, New York, N.Y. (Tracy Yosten and Selene D'Alessio of counsel), Law Guardian for the child.
Before: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., ANITA R. FLORIO, HOWARD MILLER, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The respondent established at the fact-finding hearing that the father had failed to communicate with the subject child during the six-month period preceding the filing of the petition, thus creating a presumption that he intended to forego his parental rights (see, Social Services Law § 384-b[a]). The father did not carry his burden of proving that he had been unable to maintain contact with his child, or that he was discouraged or prevented from doing so by the agency or someone united in interest with it (see, Matter of Anthony M., 195 A.D.2d 315, 316; Matter of Jasmine T., 162 A.D.2d 756, 757; Matter of I.R., 153 A.D.2d 559, 560; Matter of Trudell J.W., 119 A.D.2d 828; Matter of Ulysses T., 87 A.D.2d 998, 999, affd 66 N.Y.2d 773).
Contrary to the father's contentions on appeal, his failure to carry his evidentiary burden was unrelated to any evidentiary rulings by the Family Court. The Family Court afforded him great latitude in testifying and in cross-examining the foster mother regarding her facilitation of his visitation. The mere fact that the foster mother did not like him, which caused him to feel uncomfortable in her presence, does not rise to the level of agency discouragement or prevention of contact (see, Matter of Chaka F., 220 A.D.2d 310; Matter of L. Children, 160 Misc.2d 512).
The Family Court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is supported by the record (see, Matter of Irene O., 38 N.Y.2d 776, 777-778; Matter of Christine S., 203 A.D.2d 367; Matter of Samantha V. (Richard W.), 200 A.D.2d 796; Matter of Milagros P., 187 A.D.2d 282; Matter of Jasmine T., supra).
Finally, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in refusing to grant the father's midtrial request for an adjournment so that he could examine the agency's case records from 1991 through 1994 (see, Matter of Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270; Malhotra v. Gupta, 226 A.D.2d 682). When the court asked counsel for an offer of proof as to the relevance of those early records to an abandonment petition encompassing the period of December 22, 1996, through May 22, 1997, counsel speculated that he "might find" evidence of prior attempts by the foster mother to prevent or discourage contact between the father and child. Counsel's hopeful conjecture did not rise to the level of "good cause" sufficient to warrant an adjournment of the fact-finding hearing (Family Ct Act § 626[a]).