Matter of Abrams v. New York St. Bd. of Parole

9 Citing cases

  1. Richards v. Travis

    288 A.D.2d 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 6 times

    The Board's decision contained sufficient detail to inform petitioner of the reasons for the denial of his request for release on parole, as required by Executive Law § 259-i (2) (a) (see, Matter of Fuller v. New York State Bd. of Parole, supra). Contrary to Supreme Court, we conclude that 9 NYCRR 8001.3 (c) does not impose an additional requirement regarding the details to be contained in the Board's decision where, as here, the decision involves the denial of a parole release request and not the imposition of a minimum period of imprisonment (see,Matter of Abrams v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 88 A.D.2d 951; see also, 9 NYCRR 8002.3 [d]). Petitioner failed to demonstrate that respondent's determination was affected by "a `showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety'" (Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77) and, therefore, there was no basis to disturb the Board's discretionary determination that petitioner was not an acceptable candidate for parole release (see, Matter of Fuller v. New York State Bd. of Parole, supra). Cardona, P.J., Spain, Carpinello and Mugglin, JJ., concur.

  2. Matter of Hall v. N.Y. State Executive Dept

    188 A.D.2d 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)   Cited 13 times

    We affirm. Parole release is a discretionary decision which, if made in conformity with statutory requirements, is not reviewable (see, Matter of McKee v New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944). Petitioner has failed to make a convincing showing that respondent considered erroneous information in making its decision (see, People ex rel. Thomas v Superintendent, 124 A.D.2d 848, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 611; Matter of Abrams v New York State Bd. of Parole, 88 A.D.2d 951). In any event, respondent's decision was based upon the severity of the offense for which petitioner was imprisoned and his prior criminal history, facts admitted by petitioner at the hearing.

  3. People ex rel. Thomas v. Superintendent of Arthur Kill Correctional Facility

    124 A.D.2d 848 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)   Cited 20 times

    Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. In the absence of a convincing demonstration to the contrary, it is presumed that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory requirements (see, People ex rel. Herbert v New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 133, appeal withdrawn 62 N.Y.2d 617; Matter of Mackall v New York State Bd. of Parole, 91 A.D.2d 1023, 1024, lv denied 58 N.Y.2d 609; Matter of Abrams v New York State Bd. of Parole, 88 A.D.2d 951). Here, the petitioner failed to make a convincing showing that the Board relied upon incomplete and erroneous information in rendering its determination (see, Matter of Rice v Hammock, 99 A.D.2d 644, appeal withdrawn 62 N.Y.2d 804; Matter of Abrams v New York StateBd. of Parole, supra), or that it failed to consider each of the factors enumerated by statute (see, Executive Law § 259-i [c]) as it was required to do in making its parole release decision (see, Matter of Davis v New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 412). Moreover, the Board's written statement setting forth its reasons for denying parole, i.e, the "extraordinarily serious and bizarre nature of the present offenses", was, on this record, sufficient (see, Executive Law § 259-i [a]; Matter of Harris v New York State Bd. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 897; Matter of Ristau v Hammock, 103 A.D.2d 944, lv denied 63 N.Y.2d 608; People ex rel. Herbert v New York State Bd. of Parole, supra; People ex rel. Feliciano v Waters, 99 A.D.2d

  4. Matter of Rock v. New York St. Bd. of Parole

    124 A.D.2d 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)   Cited 4 times

    The serious nature of the crime for which the petitioner was incarcerated and his unsatisfactory performance on a prior parole release constituted sufficient grounds for parole denial (see, Matter of Harden v New York State Bd. of Parole, 103 A.D.2d 777). The papers submitted in support of the petitioner's present application failed to make a convincing showing that the respondent Board did not exercise its discretion in conformity with the law when it denied him parole release. Consequently, the instant CPLR article 78 proceeding was properly dismissed because such discretionary decisions of the Board, when made in accordance with the law, are not judicially reviewable (see, Executive Law § 259-i; Matter of Abrams v New York State Bd. of Parole, 88 A.D.2d 951). Mollen, P.J., Bracken, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.

  5. Matter of Davis v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole

    114 A.D.2d 412 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)   Cited 27 times

    Judgment affirmed, without costs or disbursements. It is well established that the Division of Parole's release decisions are discretionary, and if made in accordance with the statutory requirements, such determinations are not subject to judicial review (see, Matter of Ristau v Hammock, 103 A.D.2d 944; Matter of Harden v New York State Bd. of Parole, 103 A.D.2d 777; Matter of Ganci v Hammock, 99 A.D.2d 546, 548; Matter of Delman v New York State Bd. of Parole, 93 A.D.2d 888; Matter of Abrams v New York State Bd. of Parole, 88 A.D.2d 951). The reasons set forth by the Division of Parole for denying parole release to petitioner (the serious nature of the offense, the circumstances surrounding his conviction, the fact that petitioner was a persistent and serious past offender, the fact that at the time of the offense petitioner had been on parole from a sentence for a prior offense for only eight months, and the fact that petitioner had previously violated parole conditions) were all supported by the record and satisfied its obligation under the statute (Executive Law § 259-i [a]; [2] [c]; Matter of Harden v New York State Bd. of Parole, supra; Matter of Delman v New York State Bd. of Parole, supra: Matter of Lynch v New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012; Matter of Qafa v Hammock, 80 A.D.2d 952; Matter of Shapiro v Hammock, 67 A.D.2d 713). Petitioner's claim that the Division of Parole failed to consider his institutional record and release plans failed to overcome the presumption that it properly complied with

  6. Matter of Harden v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole

    103 A.D.2d 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)   Cited 5 times

    ¶ Upon this record, the factors stated by the Board of Parole in its decision denying petitioner release on parole, namely, the nature and seriousness of the offenses of which he was convicted, his previous violation of parole and his absconding from furlough, constituted sufficient reasons for such denial (see, e.g., Matter of Bacon v. Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 557; Matter of Shapiro v. Hammock, 67 A.D.2d 713, mot for lv to app den 47 N.Y.2d 710). Further, discretionary decisions of the Board of Parole are deemed to be judicial functions and are not reviewable "if done in accordance with law" (see Executive Law, § 259-i, subd 5; Matter of Bacon v. Hammock, supra; Matter of Briguglio v New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21; Matter of Abrams v New York State Bd. of Parole, 88 A.D.2d 951; Matter of Shapiro v Hammock, supra). Thomas, J.P., Bracken, Rubin and Boyers, JJ., concur.

  7. People v. Bd. of Parole

    97 A.D.2d 128 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)   Cited 39 times
    Noting broad discretion of parole board

    ( Greenholtz v Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra; Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, supra.) The rule is that so long as the board's discretion is exercised in accordance with the statutory requirements, its discretion in matters of parole release is not judicially reviewable. ( Matter of Delman v New York State Bd. of Parole, 93 A.D.2d 888; Matter of Abrams v New York State Bd. of Parole, 88 A.D.2d 951; see, also, Matter of Briguglio v New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21.) Section 259-i (subd 2, par [c]) of the Executive Law provides that parole "shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law."

  8. Matter of Bacon v. Hammock

    96 A.D.2d 557 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)   Cited 11 times

    Judgment affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Upon this record, the factors enunciated by the board in its decision denying petitioner parole, namely, the nature and seriousness of the offenses of which he was convicted, constituted sufficient reason for such action (see, e.g., Matter of Shapiro v Hammock, 67 A.D.2d 713; Matter of Consilvio v New York State Bd. of Parole, 57 A.D.2d 955). Further, discretionary decisions of the Board of Parole are deemed to be judicial functions and are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (see Executive Law, § 259-i, subd 5; Matter of Briguglio v New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21; Matter of Abrams v New York State Bd. of Parole, 88 A.D.2d 951; Matter of Shapiro v Hammock, supra). Brown, J.P., Niehoff, Rubin and Boyers, JJ., concur.

  9. Matter of Delman v. New York St. Bd. of Parole

    93 A.D.2d 888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)   Cited 4 times

    Judgment reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, proceeding dismissed on the merits and determination reinstated. Appellant's discretion in matters of parole release decisions is not judicially reviewable if made in accordance with statutory requirements ( Matter of Abrams v New York State Bd. of Parole, 88 A.D.2d 951). The reasons set forth by appellant for denying parole release to petitioner — the serious nature of the offense, the fact that at the time of the offense petitioner was on parole from a sentence for murder in the second degree, that his release at the time would have diminished the seriousness of the offense, and that the sentencing court was opposed to release — were all supported by the record and satisfied appellant's obligation under the statute (Executive Law, § 259-i, subd 2, pars [a], [c]; Matter of Collins v Hammock, 52 N.Y.2d 798). Accordingly, petitioner's exercise of discretion in denying parole release based upon those factors should not have been interfered with by Special Term. Thompson, J.P., Gulotta, O'Connor and Brown, JJ., concur.