te and whether the structural value of the subject building may be added to the value of the land * * * Accordingly, the income produced in the operation of this `specialty property' is academic and irrelevant." The sole income of each of the structures involved in the Paramount, Rego Props. and Federated cases was that produced by the business conducted within each of them. Each was judicially designated a specialty and valued by the depreciated cost method even though none of these structures fit any one of the other definitions of a specialty discussed by Special Term, to wit: (1) A structure designed for "unique purposes" as the private school in Matter of Semple School for Girls v. Boyland ( 308 N.Y. 382, 389); or (2) A "`building or buildings constructed or peculiarly adapted to the conduct of the owner's business which cannot be converted to general industrial use without the loss or expenditure of very substantial amounts of money'", such as the giant food processing plant in Matter of Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co. v. Kiernan ( 49 A.D.2d 99, 100) and the industrial structures in Matter of Sperry Rand Corp. v. Board of Assessors, County of Nassau ( 10 A.D.2d 720). It does not require expert opinion to recognize that just as the subject property was not unique in that it could be used by another department store or converted to other uses, the transient hotel in People ex rel. Hotel Paramount Corp. and the owner-operated department stores in the Rego Props. and Federated cases were not unique and could be similarly used by another owner for the same purpose or converted to other uses. Special Term's opinion neither acknowledges the definition enunciated by Judge Fuld in the Paramount case, nor does it suggest that this definition has been overruled or modified and, therefore, is not a prevailing opinion or definition. Neither does that opinion make any reference to Matter of Rego Props. or Federated Dept. Stores, or allude to any factual distinction between the subject department store and the department stores involved in thos
petitioner before trial concerning its business operations, operating income, profits and losses, etc. Petitioner appeals from the order denying its motion for a protective order. Because business profits depend upon many factors apart from the value of the real estate whereon the business is conducted, evidence thereof is not directly admissible on the question of its value and assessment (see People ex rel. Hotel Paramount Corp. v Chambers, 298 N.Y. 372, 374-375), unless such profits, by the terms of a lease, are the measure of the rentals payable for use of the land (Matter of Woolworth Co. v Commission of Taxation Assessment of City of Plattsburgh, 45 Misc.2d 701, mod and affd 26 A.D.2d 759; Matter of Hilton Inns v Board of Assessors of Vil. of Tarrytown, 39 Misc.2d 792, 793). If the property is a "specialty", the method of evaluating it is to use the cost of reproduction less depreciation (Matter of City of New York [Kramer Realty Corp], 16 A.D.2d 148, 150, affd 12 N.Y.2d 1094; Matter of Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co. v Kiernan, 49 A.D.2d 99, 102). That is recognized as the maximum basis for evaluation and tax assessment (see G.R.F. v Board of Assessors of County of Nassau, 41 N.Y.2d 512; People ex rel. Hotel Paramount Corp. v Chambers, supra; People ex rel. Parklin Operating Corp. v Miller, 287 N.Y. 126, 130; Matter of Federated Dept. Stores v Podeyn, 51 Misc.2d 555, 556, affd 32 A.D.2d 823). The record does not reveal whether petitioner's property has been assessed as a "specialty" or whether petitioner claims that it has been. If upon the trial petitioner takes that position, it will have the right to introduce evidence of the profits of its business to establish that the structural improvements on the land are not fully suited thereto, that they do not contribute enough value thereto and that their full value (cost of reproduction less depreciation) should not be included in the assessment (People ex rel. Hotel Paramount Corp. v Chambers, 298 N.Y. 372, 375, supra; People ex rel. Parklin Operating Corp. v Miller, 287 N.Y. 1