Opinion
November 25, 1997
It is not disputed that, while the notice of petition was filed within the four-month limitations period, the petition itself was not filed until much later. Filing of the bare notice of petition in this case was insufficient to commence the special proceeding within the meaning of CPLR 304, such that the proceeding is time-barred ( see, Perdum v. Michael, 193 A.D.2d 440). Were we to reach the merits, we would confirm the Tribunal's determination, deny the petition and dismiss the proceeding since the determination is supported by substantial evidence ( see, e.g., Matter of Lakeview Futures v. Department of Fin., 210 A.D.2d 31).
Concur — Milonas, J. P., Rosenberger, Rubin, Williams and Colabella, JJ.