By virtue of the provisions of § 10-9.1-1, "the remedy of postconviction relief is available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated the applicant's constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice." Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896, 901 (R.I. 2008); see also Washington v. State, 989 A.2d 94, 98 (R.I. 2010); Lamgar v. Wall, 918 A.2d 850, 855 (R.I. 2007). We note that an applicant for postconviction relief must bear "the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that postconviction relief is warranted in his or her case."
Pursuant to the provisions of G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1, "the remedy of post-conviction relief is available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated the applicant's constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice." Page v. State, 995 A.2d 934, 942 (R.I. 2010) (quoting Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896, 901 (R.I. 2008)); see also Washington v. State, 989 A.2d 94, 98 (R.I. 2010). An applicant for postconviction relief bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such relief is warranted in his or her case. Page, 995 A.2d at 942; Mattatall 947 A.2d at 901 n. 7.
We have repeatedly stated that "judicial officers are obligated to recuse if they are unable to render a fair or an impartial decision in a particular case." Mattatali v. State, 947 A.2d 896, 902 (R.I. 2008) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Mlyniec, 15 A.3d 983, 998-99 (R.I. 2011); Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 185 (R.I. 2008); In re Antonio, 612 A.2d 650, 653 (R.I. 1992) ("It is axiomatic that judges are obligated to recuse themselves in the event that they are unable to render fair and impartial decisions in their cases."). We have also recognized the "equally great obligation not to disqualify * * * when there is no sound reason to do so."
Post-conviction relief also is available in situations where "the existence of newly discovered material facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice." Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896, 901 (R.I. 2008). Section 10-9.1-1(a) sets forth the statutory right to post-conviction relief. It provides:
"(6) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy[.]" Section 10-9.1-1(a). In pursuing such claims, a petitioner "bears 'the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such relief is warranted' in his or her case." Brown v. State, 32 A.3d 901, 907 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896, 901 n.7 (R.I. 2008)). The action is civil in nature and all civil rules and statutes apply.
As discussed in the April Decision, our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a judicial officer must recuse only if he or she is unable to render a fair or an impartial decision. See, e.g., State v. McWilliams, 47 A.3d 251, 260 (R.I. 2012); State v. Mlyniec, 15 A.3d 983, 998-99 (R.I. 2011); Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896, 902 (R.I. 2008); Kelly v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 740 A.2d 1243, 1246 (R.I. 1999); State v. Cruz, 517 A.2d 237 (R.I. 1986). It is equally well settled that a judge has as great an obligation not to disqualify himself or herself when there is no sound reason to do so as he or she has to do so when the occasion does arise.
"[A]n application for postconviction relief is civil in nature, " and the applicant has the burden of proving that "relief is warranted" by a preponderance of the evidence. Ouimette v. Moran, 541 A.2d 855, 856 (R.I. 1988); Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896, 901 n.7 (R.I. 2008). B
Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896, 902 (R.I. 2008) ). This Court consistently has recognized that "[n]atural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children."
The party who seeks to have a justice recuse himself or herself "bears the burden of establishing that the judicial officer possesses a personal bias or prejudice by reason of a preconceived or settled opinion of a character calculated to impair his [or her] impartiality seriously and to sway his [or her] judgment." McWilliams , 47 A.3d at 260 (internal quotation marks omitted); see alsoMattatall v. State , 947 A.2d 896, 902 (R.I. 2008). In meeting his or her burden, a "defendant's subjective feelings and unsupported accusations are not sufficient grounds for recusal."
In so doing, the “applicant who files an application for postconviction relief bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such relief is warranted.” Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896, 901 n. 7 (R.I.2008). In 2015, subsequent to the filing of this appeal, the General Assembly amended G.L. 1956 § 10–9.1–9, as amended by P.L. 2015, ch. 92, § 1, to provide that an aggrieved party may seek review of an order denying postconviction relief “by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in accordance with the [S]upreme [C]ourt rules of [A]ppellate [P]rocedure within sixty (60) days of the entry of the final judgment.”