Mattar v. Community Memorial Hospital

Full title: AHMED MATTAR, M.D., Plaintiff, v. COMMUNITY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division

Date published: Aug 18, 2005

Cause No. 1:04-CV-95 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 18, 2005)

Opinion

Cause No. 1:04-CV-95.

August 18, 2005

OPINION AND ORDER

ROGER COSBEY, Magistrate Judge

I. Introduction

On July 14, 2005, Plaintiff Dr. Ahmed Mattar filed a motion (DE # 48) asking the Court to appoint him counsel in this case against his former employer, Community Memorial Hospital, wherein he alleges national origin and religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. The Court took the motion under advisement and issued a Questionnaire to Dr. Mattar for him to complete and file. (DE # 49.) The completed Questionnaire was filed on August 12, 2005. (DE # 50.)

Dr. Mattar reveals in the Questionnaire that within the last year he has been self-employed as an emergency room physician, and is currently earning $3,166.67 per month working in a family practice. (See Questionnaire ¶ 1.) In addition, Dr. Mattar indicates that he has $5,000 in cash and over $80,000 in equity in a home in Hicksville, Ohio. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 4.) Although the home in Hicksville carries a mortgage, Dr. Mattar does not tell us the monthly payment, or for that matter, about any ongoing expenses. ( Id.)

Dr. Mattar also indicates that he contacted three attorneys who refused to take his case. ( Id. ¶ 6.) At least one attorney ventured the opinion to Dr. Mattar that the case has a "number of difficulties." (Id., Attachment.) The other two attorneys, both experienced in employment discrimination cases, simply turned him down. ( Id. ¶ 6.)

II. Background and Discussion

When Dr. Mattar filed his complaint on March 18, 2004, he was represented by counsel. ( See DE # 1, 3.) Eventually, however, on November 23, 2004, some six months after the initial scheduling conference, his counsel withdrew. (DE # 36.) This led the Court to stay the case to give Dr. Mattar time to secure other counsel (DE # 45); when that proved unavailing some months later, the Court set August 19, 2005, as the deadline for dispositive motions and allowed discovery to proceed (DE # 46). Consequently, Dr. Mattar has been representing himself in this suit for over eight months, responding to discovery, and filing motions and responses to motions.

It should be remembered that Dr. Mattar does not have a right to court-appointed counsel. See Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 288 (7^th Cir. 1995). Rather, in the context of Title VII, district courts are empowered to appoint an attorney to represent a plaintiff without charge, "in such circumstances as the court may deem just." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see Jones v. WFYR Radio/RKO Gen., 626 F.2d 576, 577 (7th Cir. 1980), overruled on other grounds by Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981). The Seventh Circuit has enumerated three factors to be weighed by the district court when determining whether appointment of counsel is warranted in a Title VII claim: (1) the merits of the plaintiff's claim; (2) plaintiff's own efforts to secure legal representation; and (3) plaintiff's financial ability to retain private counsel. See Darden v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 497, 500-501 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting Jones, 626 F.2d at 577)).

At present, it is difficult to assess the merits of Dr. Mattar's claims, although it should be noted that he and his former counsel apparently had some disagreement about the case, and the one other attorney who "seriously considered representing" Dr. Mattar chose not to do so, given some unspecified "difficulties" with the case. (See Questionnaire, Attachment.) Moreover, two other attorneys, both well-known employment counsel, have chosen to pass up the opportunity to represent Dr. Mattar. Of course, the merits of Dr. Mattar's case will soon be addressed via the anticipated motion for summary judgment.

Moreover, although Dr. Mattar has at least made some minimal effort to secure counsel, apparently on a contingent fee basis, he does not say that he informed those attorneys he had the means to pay them a retainer. Had Dr. Mattar told these lawyers that he had $5,000 for an initial retainer, for example, it is likely that he would have secured counsel by now. Consequently, the Court believes Dr. Mattar has the financial ability to secure counsel.

Finally, Dr. Mattar is certainly capable of representing himself in what appears to be a straightforward Title VII case, at least through what is left of discovery ( e.g., although discovery is closed, he just filed a motion to compel), as well as the summary judgment process. Indeed, Dr. Mattar has knowledge of the legal process, as demonstrated by the motion practice to date, and certainly has personal knowledge of much of the factual basis for his claims. In short, Dr. Mattar appears to be competent to represent himself, and it does not appear that appointing counsel will make a difference in the outcome. See Zarnes, 64 F.3d at 299; see also Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 658 (7^th Cir. 2005).

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the motion for appoint of counsel (DE # 48) is DENIED. If, however, this case proceeds to trial because the anticipated motion for summary judgment is denied, then Dr. Mattar can renew his motion. In the meantime, Dr. Mattar can continue in his efforts to secure his own counsel.