Under Colorado law, all causes of action survive death except slander and libel. See§ 13–20–101(1), C.R.S.2012; see alsoMatson v. White, 122 Colo. 79, 83–84, 220 P.2d 864, 866 (1950) (stating that claims involving matters of personal trust or confidence or for personal services are not assignable). ¶ 19 Furthermore, the fact that a claim is conditional or is to be paid in the future from a fund not yet in existence does not defeat assignability.

The only assignments Colorado does not allow are for claims involving matters of personal trust or confidence or for personal services. See Matson v. White, 220 P.2d 864, 866 (Colo. 1950) (noting exception and upholding assignment of claim for specific performance); Scott v. Fox Bros. Ent., Inc., 667 P.2d 773 (Colo.App. 1983) (holding real estate option contract to be assignable so long as optioner did not rely on personal integrity, credit, or responsibility of original optionee). Denver relies heavily on Roberts v. Holland Hart, 857 P.2d 492, 495 (Colo.App. 1993), which held that public policy discourages the assignment of legal malpractice claims.

We note the taxpayers' reliance on Par. 15 of the July 14, 1954, agreement but that does not help them. If it be taken that the July 14 agreement was in effect in November, and we think it was not, the escape provision in Par. 15 does not cover a partial purchase. Matson v. White, 122 Colo. 79, 83-84, 220 P.2d 864, 866; Davis v. Miller, 103 Colo. 586, 588-589, 87 P.2d 492, 493. Affirmed.

I. Standing to Sue PIP alleges defendant Jackson does not have standing to sue on claims arising from the 317 franchise because Jackson has assigned all interest in it to Postal Instant Press of Colorado Springs, Inc. Both parties agree that contract and tort rights are assignable. Matson v. White, 122 Colo. 79, 220 P.2d 864 (1950); Micheletti v. Moidel, 94 Colo. 587, 32 P.2d 266 (1934); Scott v. Fox Bros. Enterprises, Inc., 667 P.2d 773 (Colo.App. 1983). Once an assignment is made, all interests and rights of the assignor are transferred to the assignee.

4. CAI's standing re the Confidentiality Agreement. Defendants argue that CAI lacks standing to assert a claim for breach of the Confidentiality Agreement between Debtor and MRS. Their argument is that this was a "personal" contract and therefore the rights under that contract cannot be assigned. Scott v. Fox Bros. Enterprises, Inc., 667 P.2d 773 (Colo.App. 1983); Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Min. Co., 127 U.S. 379, 8 S.Ct. 1308, 32 L.Ed. 246 (1888); and Matson v. White, 122 Colo. 79, 220 P.2d 864 (1950). However, those cases stand for the proposition that a party to a "personal" contract may not assign the contract such that the assignee can demand performance from the other party to the contract.

The survival of actions is governed by section 13-20-101, C.R.S. (2003), which provides: Cf. Matson v. White, 122 Colo. 79, 84, 220 P.2d 864, 866 (1950) (indicating, without analysis of survivability, that contracts involving matters of personal trust or confidence, or for personal services, are not assignable). All causes of action, except actions for slander or libel, shall survive and may be brought or continued notwithstanding the death of the person in favor of or against whom such action has accrued, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged after the death of the person against whom such punitive damages or penalties are claimed. . . .

Contract rights generally are assignable, except where assignment is prohibited by contract or by operation of law or where the contract involves a matter of personal trust or confidence. Matson v. White, 122 Colo. 79, 83-84, 220 P.2d 864, 867 (1950); Scott v. Fox Bros. Enterprises, Inc., 667 P.2d 773, 774 (Colo.App. 1983). Where the contract in question specifically prohibits the assignment of rights or interests under the contract without the consent of one or more of the contracting parties, any purported assignment without such consent will not be enforced.

It must be remembered that it is the court's function to pass upon the rights of the parties as it finds them in the agreement. Matson v. White, 122 Colo. 79, 220 P.2d 864 (1950). In this case the unsuccessful attempt to sell the realty during the sixty day period constituted a failure of condition precedent.

In making this statement they rely upon the importance of the assignability clause hereinabove treated, which, as we have shown has no applicability to the case at hand, and the clause is not at all pertinent to the facts or the law now material. Plaintiffs rely upon a recent case in this Court ( Matson v. White, 122 Colo. 79, 220 P.2d 864), which, instead of being in point and favorable to their position, is squarely decisive in principles against their contention. In that case the contract was executory and a continuing one for service, not at all involved in the present action.

We reject the designer's contention that the confidentiality clause cannot be assigned. Cf. People v. Adams, 243 P.3d 256, 261 (Colo. 2010)(Colorado law "disallows assignments involving matters of personal trust and confidence"; a claim to treble damages under the Trust Fund Statute was not assignable because it was in the nature of a penalty); but see Matson v. White, 122 Colo. 79, 84, 220 P.2d 864, 866 (1950)(contracts not involving personal skill, trust, or confidence are generally assignable without consent). The confidentiality clause did not involve matters of personal trust or confidence; it merely constrained the designer's disclosure of information.