Opinion
01 C 50068.
October 15, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintift Matrix Service Mid Contiment, Inc. ("Matrix"), filed a four-count complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Count I alleges breach of contract against defendant Area Rigging and Millwright Service, Inc.("Area Rigging"). Count II alleges quantum meruit against Area Rigging. Count III is for an action on bond against defendants Area Rigging and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company ("Fidelity"). Lastly, Count IV alleges a violation of the Illinois' Mechanics Lien Act ("the Act"), 770 Ill. COMP. STAT. 60/1 et seq. defendants Area Rigging, Gemma Power Systems, L.L.C. ("Gemma"), Indeck-Rockford, L.L.C.("Indeck") and Rock River Valley Industrial Park, Inc. ("Rock River"). Gemma, Indeck and Rock River (collectively referred to as defendants) have filed a motion to dismiss Count IV pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which Area Rigging has not joined. This court has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).
The court will dismiss a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if a plaintiff has failed to allege all the elements of a cause of action or it is clear the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief under the allegations. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322, 327 (7th Cir. 1998). Federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 720 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). Thus, when addressing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a federal court typically follows liberal notice-pleading requirements, see, e.g., Veazey v. Communications Cable of Chicago, Inc., 194 F.3d 850, 854 (7Th Cir. 1999), unless Illinois has elevated certain pleading requirements regarding the Act to a substantive level. See S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir.) (outlining tests for determining when a state's procedural rule is "substantive" for purposes of deciding whether Erie requires that it be enforced in federal diversity litigation), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1010 (1995); cf Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying Illinois' pleading requirement of physician's certificate of merit and accompanying report to state law medical negligence claim); Boland v. Engle, 113 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying state pleading requirement that shareholder must make a demand before bringing derivative law suits). Defendants have not contended that the Illinois Mechanics Lien Act incorporated substantive pleading requirements. Defendants only argue Count IV should be dismissed because Matrix has not included all of the requirements of section 11 of the Act in its complaint. See 770 ILL COMB. STAT. 60/11, 60/28. As Count LV of the complaint complies with the liberal notice requirements of Rule 8 and defendants' reading of the complaint seems to be hypertechnical, the Motion to Dismiss is denied.