Oklahoma common law has consistently referred to a court clerk as an officer or arm of the court, whose primary function is ministerial in nature.Matney v. King, 20 Okla. 22, 93 P. 737, 745 (1908), (clerk of the district court is an officer of the court, to be recognized as such); Ramsey v. King, 20 Okla. 67, 93 P. 754 (1908), (clerk of the district court is an officer of the court); Hirsh v. Twyford, 40 Okla. 220, 139 P. 313 (1913), (court clerk, whose duties are ministerial, is the arm of the court, subject to its control); Moroney v. Tannehill, 90 Okla. 224, 215 P. 938 (1923), (functions of the clerk of the court are purely ministerial); Barrett v. Barrett, 207 Okla. 234, 249 P.2d 88 (1952), (clerk is the court's arm; he acts ministerially, under the court's exclusive jurisdiction and direction). Hereinafter, the term "ministerial" is used to mean "That which is done under the authority of a superior; . . . That which involves obedience to instructions, but demands no special discretion, judgment or skill."
) 71 P. 50; Seymore Water Co. v. Seymore, 163 Ind. 120, 70 N.E. 514; State v. Gracey, 11 Nev. 223; Perez v. Barber, 70 N. Mex. 223; In re Epley et at., 10 Okla. 631, 64 P. 18; People v. Lueders et al. (III.) 122 N.E. 374; Marshall County Judge v. Sitton, 68 Oklahoma, 172 P. 964; Matney v. King, 20 Okla. 22. 93 P. 737. As to whether the Criminal Court of Appeals would have had jurisdiction to determine the question at bar, as a part of and in aid of its appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, had the action been brought in that court, it is unnecessary to decide.
Mr. Justice Turner, proceeding, says: "As plaintiffs, by virtue of their certificates of election and the allegation that they in effect had qualified according to law, showed prima facie title to the office ( Cameron v. Parker, 2 Okla. 277, 38 P. 14), and it appeared by proper allegation that respondents refused to recognize them as members of the board and permit them, as such, participation in its affairs, mandamus was the proper remedy to compel such recognition ( Matney v. King, 20 Okla. 22 [ 93 P. 737]; Eberle v. King, 20 Okla. 49 [ 93 P. 748]; 26 Cyc. 257)." Adopting the foregoing language, which is equally applicable to the case at bar as it was to the case in which it was applied, our duties in this case are very much simplified.
1907; * * * that Charles H. Eberle was the Democratic candidate at said election for the office of register of deeds of Muskogee county, and that L. E. Smith was the Republican candidate for register of deeds at said election for Muskogee county, and that each claims to have received the larger number of votes, and each claims to hold title to said office by a certificate of election, signed by the county clerk in and for Muskogee county; * * * that he has taken no action in regard to said register of deeds in and for Muskogee county, and has recognized neither L. E. Smith nor plaintiff, Charles H. Eberle, as register of deeds; * * * that the facts set up in his answer to the petition filed by Toney Matney against him in this court are equally applicable to this case; * * * that both these matters grew out of the same election, and same court proceedings, and he now asks that this cause be consolidated and heard with the case of Tony Matney against himself (reported in this volume and 93 P. 737), in so far as his response in that case is applicable in this case; * * * that he has no records in his possession which the plaintiff is entitled to possession of, whether he be the legally elected register of deeds or not; * * * that there is no law in the state of Oklahoma, either in the enabling act or in the Constitution, requiring the district court, as successor of the United States Court in the Indian Territory, to turn over to the register of deeds for any county the books, papers, and records received by the court from the clerk of the United States court, or deputy clerk of the United States court, as ex officio recorder, for the respective district of the Indian Territory." J. E. Wyand, Thomas H. Owen, and Baker Pursel, for relator.
. . . The jurisdiction, powers, duties and procedures of intermediate appellate courts shall be as provided by rules of the Supreme Court until otherwise provided by statute. . . .See also Ingram v. Oneok, Inc., 1989 OK 82, 775 P.2d 810, 812; Wimberly v. Buford, 1983 OK 25, 660 P.2d 1050; Matney v. King, 20 Okla. 22, 93 P. 737, 744 (1908). IVCERTIORARI MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE PETITIONS PRESENT NO VIABLE OPINIONS FOR REVIEW
The Court of Civil Appeals is a tribunal which is constitutionally inferior to the Supreme Court. See LCR, Inc. v. Linwood Properties, 918 P.2d 1388 (Okla. 1996); Ingram v. Oneok, Inc., 775 P.2d 810, 812 (Okla. 1989); Wimberly v. Buford, 660 P.2d 1050 (Okla. 1983); Matney v. King, 20 Okla. 22, 93 P. 737, 744 (Okla. 1908). Oklahoma's fundamental law and our extant jurisprudence preclude this court's decisions being overruled โ impliedly or otherwise โ by an inferior court's holdings.
"The jurisdiction, powers, duties and procedures of intermediate appellate courts shall be as provided by rules of the Supreme Court until otherwise provided by statute. . . ." See also Ingram v. Oneok, Inc., Okla., 775 P.2d 810, 812 (1989); Wimberly v. Buford, Okla., 660 P.2d 1050 (1983); Matney v. King, 20 Okla. 22, 93 P. 737, 744 (1908), where the court observed: "Section 2, art. 7, of the Constitution . . . practically places the Supreme Court in the same relation to the inferior courts of the state as the court of King's Bench bore to the courts of England, under the common law.
where the court observes that since the power to create the fund lies in the Legislature, its control is a legislative function.Petuskey v. Cannon, Okla., 742 P.2d 1117, 1125 (1987); Barrett v. Barrett, 207 Okla. 234, 249 P.2d 88, 90-91 (1952); Hirsh v. Twyford, 40 Okla. 220, 139 P. 313, 315 (1913); Matney v. King. 20 Okla. 22, 93 P. 737, 745 (1908).Court Fund of Tulsa County v. Cook, Okla., 557 P.2d 875, 878 (1976).
The King's Bench used prerogative writs to exercise superintendence over inferior courts and to keep the latter tribunals within the proper bounds of their jurisdiction. Matney v. King, 20 Okla. 22, 93 P. 737, 744 (1908). See J. Koffler and A. Reppy, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING ยง 321 (1969); see also infra notes 12, 14 and 15.
" [Emphasis added.]State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Com'n v. Daxon, Okla., 607 P.2d 683, 688-689 [1980]; Draper v. State, Okla., 621 P.2d 1142, 1146-1147 [1980]; State v. Mathews, 134 Okla. 288, 273 P. 352, 358-359 [1929]; and Matney v. King, 20 Okla. 22, 93 P. 737, 744 [1908]. See Stone v. Johnson, Okla., 690 P.2d 459, 463 [1984]; Draper v. State, supra note 6; Oklahoma Ass'n of Mun. Attys. v. State, Okla., 577 P.2d 1310, 1315 [1978]; Halstead v. McHendry, Okla., 566 P.2d 134, 139 [1977]; Stone v. Hodges, Okla., 435 P.2d 165 [1967]; and Schuman v. Sternberg, 179 Okla. 118, 65 P.2d 413, 414 [1937].