Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-CV-1232
April 17, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In this employment case, the plaintiff seeks payment for unused vacation days which he accrued in 1999. After removing the case from the Philadelphia Municipal Court, the defendant now moves to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint because it is preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Because plaintiff's cause of action implicates the collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff's union and his employer, defendant The University of Pennsylvania, the claim is preempted; and, the complaint must be dismissed for the plaintiff's failure to pursue his remedies under the labor contract.
The correct name of the defendant is The Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania.
Considering the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all allegations pled in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 796 (3d Cir. 2001). The inquiry is confined to the complaint, its attachments, and authentic documents attached to the motion upon which the plaintiff's claims are based. Steinhardt Group, Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 145 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). The complaint can be dismissed only where it is clear that under no set of facts drawn from the plaintiff's complaint relief can be granted. Brown, 250 F.3d at 796.
According to the complaint, the plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for 20 years before he was injured on the job in 1999. Plaintiff's Complaint, ¶ 1. At the time of his injury, the plaintiff had accrued unused vacation days. Id. Despite plaintiff's demand, defendant refused to pay plaintiff for his unused vacation days. Id., ¶¶ 2-4.
Plaintiff originally filed his complaint, styled "Statement of Claim," in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County on January 31, 2003. Defendant removed this action to this Court on February 27, 2003. All citations to the complaint refer to the Municipal Court Statement of Claim attached to Defendant's Notice of Removal (Document No. 1).
During his employment with the defendant, the plaintiff was a member of Teamsters Local 115, a labor union ("union"). The union is the exclusive bargaining representative for the defendant's employees pursuant to a written collective bargaining agreement. CBA, Art. II. The agreement governs any employment differences between the defendant and its employees "as to the interpretation or application of any of the provisions of [the] Agreement." CBA, Art. XII.
The collective bargaining agreement, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A to the defendant's motion, is referred to as "CBA."
The LMRA grants federal jurisdiction over "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce. . . ." 30 U.S.C. § 185(a). Congress vested exclusive jurisdiction of the resolution of disputes under a collective bargaining agreement in the federal courts. Beidleman v. Stroh Brewery Co., 182 F.3d 225, 231-32 (3d Cir. 1999); see also, Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985); Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
Accordingly, where the resolution of a state law claim depends on the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the state law claim is preempted by federal labor law. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988). The gravamen of the plaintiff's claim is that the defendant breached its employment contract with the plaintiff by failing to pay him for unused vacation time. In its motion to dismiss, the defendant attached a copy of the collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff's union and the defendant. Because a court can consider the agreement as an official document, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993), we shall examine the labor contract as it applies to this case.
Article XII of the collective bargaining agreement contains an exclusive grievance process for the resolution of disputes. The parties are required to submit their disputes to the process "within thirty days from the date of occurrence," or the grievance "will not be recognized." CBA, Art. XII, ¶ 1. A grievance may be raised by the union steward with the employer's representative in an attempt to reach a resolution. Id., ¶ 2. If a resolution cannot be reached, the steward may refer the matter to the business agent, who may then take the matter up with the employer. Id. If an agreement cannot be reached, the Union, in its discretion, may submit the matter to arbitration. Id., ¶ 3. The arbitrator's decision is final and binding upon the parties. Id., ¶ 6. Vacation entitlement is covered in Article XVII of the collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the plaintiff's dispute over vacation pay is subject to the grievance process.
The plaintiff did not pursue his claim through the grievance process as required by the labor contract. Even if he had, the decision of the arbitrator would have been final and binding. Therefore, because the plaintiff's present claim is barred by the express terms of the agreement, this Court is without authority to ignore the agreement and to consider the plaintiff's claim which is covered by it.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of April, 2003, upon consideration of the Motion of Defendant The Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania to Dismiss the Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rule 56 (Document No. 3), and plaintiff's response, it is ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED.