It is worth noting that the First DCA, in an opinion issued on Petitioner's direct appeal, expressed its belief that a “reasonable attorney” might have abandoned the statute of limitations defense in order to provide the jury with an option other than capital sexual battery or acquittal. Mathis v. State, 204 So.3d 104, 105-06 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (explaining that defense counsel “might have strategically determined that [Petitioner] could fare better if the jury had a third option- convicting him of a sex crime that would not result in mandatory life imprisonment”). As the First DCA put it: “[Petitioner] stood comparatively less to lose with convictions on counts two and three, and perhaps much to gain.” Id.

Our analysis of the ineffective-assistance issue requires us to determine whether there could have been any reasonable tactical explanation for counsel's failure to seek a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. SeeMathis v. State , 204 So. 3d 104, 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (noting that a direct-appeal claim of ineffective assistance requires a showing that there was no conceivable tactical explanation for counsel's conduct).

The prejudice is apparent in the fifteen-year sentence on that Count, to be served consecutively with the thirty-year sentence on Count 1.See, e.g., Mathis v. State, 204 So.3d 104, 105–06 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).We grant the petition in part as to Count 2.