These cases interpreted Burnette Ford to mean that where there are contradictions in the testimony of a respondent to a motion for summary judgment, the contradiction will not be construed against him; rather, all the evidence, even his own self-contradictory testimony, will be construed in the respondent's favor. See, e.g., Whittle v. Johnston, 124 Ga. App. 785 ( 186 S.E.2d 129) (1971); Mathis v. R. H. Smallings Sons, 125 Ga. App. 810 ( 189 S.E.2d 122) (1972); Browder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 126 Ga. App. 140 ( 190 S.E.2d 110) (1972); Columbia Drug Co. v. Cook, 127 Ga. App. 490 ( 194 S.E.2d 286) (1972); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 130 Ga. App. 187 ( 202 S.E.2d 551) (1973); Applegarth Supply Co. v. Schaffer, 130 Ga. App. 353 ( 203 S.E.2d 277) (1973); Ramsey v. Thomas, 133 Ga. App. 869 ( 212 S.E.2d 444) (1975). This interpretation was incorrect.

The Court of Appeals appears to have followed the above rule in several cases reviewing lower court rulings on summary judgment. In Mathis v. R. H. Smallings Sons, 125 Ga. App. 810 ( 189 S.E.2d 122) (1972), the court reversed summary judgment in favor of the movant, holding: "The evidence ... was in conflict. That this conflict may have been occasioned by conflicting testimony of the same witnesses, whether parties or not, does not alter the result.

The evidence must be construed most favorably to the one opposing the motion. Giant Peanut Co. v. Carolina Chemicals, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 718, 719 (1) ( 200 S.E.2d 918); Mathis v. R. H. Smallings Sons, 125 Ga. App. 810 ( 189 S.E.2d 122); Brown v. Sheffield, 121 Ga. App. 383, 388-390 ( 173 S.E.2d 891); Kaplan v. Sanders, 136 Ga. App. 902, 904 (4) ( 222 S.E.2d 630), and cases cited therein; s. c. reversed in part in 237 Ga. 132 ( 227 S.E.2d 38); see 139 Ga. App. 624 ( 229 S.E.2d 106). 3. While the plaintiffs now argue extensively as to the issue of knowledge by the trustees as to the in rem action, we do not reach this question.

Realty Contractors, Inc. v. C S Nat. Bank, 146 Ga. App. 69 ( 245 S.E.2d 342); Union Circulation Co. v. Trust Co. Bank, 146 Ga. App. 612 (3) ( 247 S.E.2d 197). See also, Mathis v. R. H. Smallings Sons, 125 Ga. App. 810 ( 189 S.E.2d 122), holding that inconsistencies in the testimony of the same party may preclude summary judgment. Judgment reversed and remanded.

This statement is equally true in the case sub judice. On summary judgment the evidence must be construed most strongly in favor of the party (plaintiff here) who is opposing the motion, and issues of fact remain for jury determination. Holland v. Sanfax Corporation, 106 Ga. App. 1, 4 ( 126 S.E.2d 442); Mathis v. R. H. Smallings Sons, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 810 ( 189 S.E.2d 122). For all of the foregoing reasons, I must respectfully dissent.

Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 4 ( 126 S.E.2d 442); McCarty v. National Life c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178, 179 ( 129 S.E.2d 408); Armstrong v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 138 Ga. App. 727, 728 (3) ( 227 S.E.2d 409). Although there was evidence which conflicted with plaintiff's affidavit, including plaintiff's testimony on deposition, the result occasioned by the conflicting testimony is not altered. See Mathis v. R. H. smallings Sons, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 810 ( 189 S.E.2d 122). Issues of material fact remain. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment.

In considering motions for summary judgment the evidence is construed more strongly against the movant and more favorably toward the one opposing the motion. Jaffe v. Davis, 134 Ga. App. 651, 654 ( 215 S.E.2d 533); Kaplan v. Sanders, 136 Ga. App. 902, 904 (4) ( 222 S.E.2d 630); Giant Peanut Co. v. Carolina Chemicals, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 718 (1), 719-720 ( 200 S.E.2d 918); Mathis v. R. H. Smallings Sons, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 810 ( 189 S.E.2d 122); Burnette Ford, Inc. v. Hayes, 227 Ga. 551 ( 181 S.E.2d 866). Judgment reversed.

The test for the grant or denial of summary judgment is whether or not any genuine issue as to material fact remains after consideration of the pleadings, depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits or any other authorized and admissible testimony considered by the court. See Davis v. Holt, 105 Ga. App. 125 ( 123 S.E.2d 686); Cates v. Cates, 217 Ga. 626, 630 ( 124 S.E.2d 375); Giant Peanut Co. v. Carolina Chemicals, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 718 (1) ( 200 S.E.2d 918); Mathis v. R. H. Smallings Sons, 125 Ga. App. 810 ( 189 S.E.2d 122). The question here is whether or not the check is offered in full settlement, satisfaction or final settlement of the claim by the insured against the insurer so as to bind plaintiff in keeping the proceeds of such check.

The evidence must be construed most favorably toward the one opposing the motion. Giant Peanut Co. v. Carolina Chemicals, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 718 (1), 719-720 ( 200 S.E.2d 918); Mathis v. R. H.Smallings Sons, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 810 ( 189 S.E.2d 122); Burnette Ford, Inc. v. Hayes, 227 Ga. 551 ( 181 S.E.2d 866); Jaffe v. Davis, 134 Ga. App. 651, 654 ( 215 S.E.2d 533); Kaplan v. Sanders, 136 Ga. App. 902, 904 (4) ( 222 S.E.2d 630). The trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff "had no knowledge" that defendant was not licensed in this state to sell real estate and in granting the partial summary judgment as to liability as an issue of fact remains as to whether or not she had such knowledge. Judgment reversed. Quillian, P. J., and Webb, J., concur.

Primarily, this is because a question of credibility arises from a conflict in the testimony. Where there is such conflict, even though occasioned by testimony from the same witness (in this instance, the plaintiff), grant of summary judgment is not proper. Mathis v. R. H. Smallings Sons, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 810 ( 189 S.E.2d 122); Columbia Drug Co. v. Cook, 127 Ga. App. 490 (1) ( 194 S.E.2d 286). "`An accord and satisfaction is itself a contract and requires a meeting of the minds in order to render it valid and binding.' Pennsylvania Threshermen c. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 113 Ga. App. 283, 293 ( 148 S.E.2d 83)."