Mathis v. Hejna

10 Citing cases

  1. Segers v. Industrial Comm'n

    304 Ill. App. 3d 1060 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 1 times

    The intention of the legislature is to be determined more from the consideration of the general object and purpose for which the statute was enacted than from technical definitions. See Mathis v. Hejna, 109 Ill. App.2d 356, 360 (1969). While the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose, it will not be given a strained construction not fairly within its provisions.

  2. Segal v. Sacco

    136 Ill. 2d 282 (Ill. 1990)   Cited 114 times
    Finding plaintiff acted diligently in effecting service in less than a week after realizing 19-week delay since filing of complaint

    " ( Geneva Construction Co. v. Martin Transfer Storage Co. (1954), 4 Ill.2d 273, 289-90.) ( Mathis v. Hejna (1969), 109 Ill. App.2d 356.) It has long been noted that "[p]revention of intentional delay in the service of summons which would postpone service for an indefinite time after a statutory period of limitations has run, was a primary reason for the passage of Supreme Court Rule 103(b) and its predecessors." Karpiel, 119 Ill. App.2d at 160; Meyer v. Wardrop (1976), 37 Ill. App.3d 243.

  3. Myrick v. James

    444 A.2d 987 (Me. 1982)   Cited 99 times
    In Myrick, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court established that the standard for knowledge on the part of the plaintiff in such cases is "when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should discover" the negligence.

    In accordance with the rule adopted in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, we find a proper balance by holding that a foreign-object surgical malpractice action accrues under section 753 when the plaintiff discovers, or, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should discover the presence of the foreign object in her body. In the following cases, the discovery rule has been applied to foreign-object medical malpractice actions in the face of legislative silence: Mayer v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 14 Ariz. App. 248, 482 P.2d 497 (1971); Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal.2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936); Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944); Puro v. Henry, 32 Conn. Sup. 118, 342 A.2d 65 (1975); Burke v. Washington Hospital Center, 293 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1968); Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964); Mathis v. Hejna, 109 Ill. App.2d 356, 248 N.E.2d 767 (1969); Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 411 N.E.2d 458 (1980); Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hospital, 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469 (1966); Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962); Shillady v. Elliot Community Hospital, 114 N.H. 321, 320 A.2d 637 (1974); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); Flanagan v. Mount Eden General Hospital, 24 N.Y.2d 427, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 248 N.E.2d 871 (1969); Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 32 Ohio St.2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972); Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300 (Okla. 1962); Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996 (1966); Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); Shinabarger v. Jatoi, 385 F. Supp. 707 (D.S.D. 1974) (construing South Dakota law); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967); Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199, 436 P.2d 435 (1968); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn.2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969); Morgan v. Grace Hospital, Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965).

  4. Namur v. Habitat Co.

    294 Ill. App. 3d 1007 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 19 times
    Finding that the plaintiffs' claim for commingling the security deposit accrued when it was deposited and their claim for failing to attach a summary of the RLTO accrued when the lease was offered to the plaintiffs

    Advincula, 176 Ill.2d at 17. Statutes of limitation must be construed in light of their objectives and must be liberally construed to fulfill the object for which they were enacted. Mathis v. Hejna, 109 Ill. App.2d 356, 360, 248 N.E.2d 767 (1969). Section 13-202 has been applied to an action under a statute that does not permit recovery for actual damages but specifies a formula by which damages are to be calculated.

  5. Kararo v. Ruiz

    201 Ill. App. 3d 61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 4 times
    In Kararo, the Appellate Court, Third District, held that the eight-year repose period for minors applied to an injury that occurred when the plaintiff was a minor but accrued after the plaintiff reached majority.

    ( Maloney v. Bower (1986), 113 Ill.2d 473, 498 N.E.2d 1102.) However, statutes of limitation must be construed in the light of their objectives and must be liberally construed to fulfill the object for which they were enacted. ( Mathis v. Hejna (1969), 109 Ill. App.2d 356, 248 N.E.2d 767.) Statutes of limitation consistently have been construed so as to preserve a minor's right to a day in court. Dachs v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hospital (1987), 156 Ill. App.3d 465, 509 N.E.2d 489.

  6. Miller v. Tobin

    186 Ill. App. 3d 175 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 13 times
    In Miller v. Tobin, 18 Fed. Rep. 609, 616, Judge Deady applied this meaning to the removal act, saying, "Trial is a common-law term, and is commonly used to denote that step in an action by which issues or questions of fact are decided.

    • 1 A statute of limitations is to be construed in light of its objectives and to fulfill the object for which it was enacted. ( Mathis v. Hejna (1969), 109 Ill. App.2d 356, 360, 248 N.E.2d 767, 769.) Section 13-212 is meant to apply to suits arising out of patient care.

  7. Farkas v. Howard

    531 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 1 times

    ) As such, section 2-616, like a statute of limitations, must be construed and implemented to fulfill its objects. (See Mathis v. Hejna (1969), 109 Ill. App.2d 356, 248 N.E.2d 767; Wetzel v. Hart (1963), 41 Ill. App.2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 619.) However, because it allows the avoidance of statutes of limitation, the reasons for applying section 2-616 exist when those for applying those statutes do not, i.e., "`when a defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct.'"

  8. People ex Rel. Scott v. Silverstein

    94 Ill. App. 3d 431 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 11 times
    In Silverstein, the court held that a preliminary injunction prohibiting only the sale of museum artifacts was a modification of a prior injunction enjoining the sale of "any assets" of the museum, thus conferring appellate jurisdiction.

    (Webster's Third New International Dictionary 97 (1971).) This same definition is stated in Mathis v. Hejna (1969), 109 Ill. App.2d 356, 361, 248 N.E.2d 767. A subsequent order which would permit the sale of assets other than Museum artifacts can be nothing else but a modification of the original preliminary injunction. A determination of the validity of the order of May 6, 1980, is therefore within the jurisdiction of this court.

  9. Blackhawk Hotel Associates v. Kaufman

    80 Ill. App. 3d 462 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 7 times

    • 7 This guaranty, however, also contains the function word "any." The word "any" is defined as being one indiscriminately of whatever kind ( Mathis v. Hejna (1969), 109 Ill. App.2d 356, 361, 248 N.E.2d 767) in a category containing two or more, and is "equivalent to and has the force of `every' or `all'. [Citations.]" ( Roedler v. Vandalia Bus Lines, Inc. (1935), 281 Ill. App. 520, 523.)

  10. In re Estate of Johnson

    350 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 9 times

    Pocius v. Fleck, 13 Ill.2d 420, 150 N.E.2d 106; Yager v. Lyon, 337 Ill. 271, 169 N.E. 222. Even taking the facts contained in plaintiffs' complaint as true, as we must on a motion to dismiss ( Mathis v. Hejna, 109 Ill. App.2d 356, 248 N.E.2d 767), plaintiffs' complaint contains no allegations indicating why plaintiffs would not be adequately compensated for their performance of services to the decedent pursuant to the alleged oral contract either by money damages for decedent's breach thereof or by restitutional money damages for the reasonable value of the said services. The gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is that they performed certain services for decedent for which they expected to be paid. No reason is perceived, nor is any pointed out, why a complete and adequate remedy does not exist by presentation of a claim therefore to the probate court. Indeed, plaintiffs have filed a claim against the estate, requesting damages in an amount twice the value of the estate.