"(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mathis v. Hammond, 268 Ga. 158, 160 (3), 486 S.E.2d 356 (1997). Our Supreme Court has held that,
(a) The trial court properly denied Prainito's motion for directed verdict on the undue influence claim. Generally, questions of undue influence are for the factfinder, Mathis v. Hammond, 268 Ga. 158, 160(3), 486 S.E.2d 356 (1997), and undue influence may be shown by a broad range of circumstantial evidence. Schaffer v. Fox, 303 Ga.App. 584, 585(1), 693 S.E.2d 852 (2010); Horton v. Hendrix, 291 Ga.App. 416, 420(2)(a), 662 S.E.2d 227 (2008).
In my former report I made no decision as to the instrument hereinabove quoted, deeming that it was unnecessary to the decision, in the view which I took of the case. But the judgment of the Circuit Court was reversed, and the case was sent back in order that this question might be passed upon: Was the instrument sufficient, under the rule announced in Mathis v. Hammond, 9 Rich. Eq. 137, and under the other cases cited by counsel for Wales P. Gowan, to convey the equitable title to Wales P. Gowan? "After carefully examining the authority cited for the defendant, Wales P. Gowan, I conclude that the instrument was entirely insufficient, since those citations do not furnish any authority, as it seems to me, to sustain the position taken by defendant, Wales P. Gowan. * * * The Nancy N. Bishop instrument lacks several of the requirements for a conveyance of land. It is not under seal, it is not witnessed, no consideration is stated, and no sufficient consideration to support such a conveyance of land proved.
"Undue influence may be shown by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct evidence, and slight evidence of fraud and undue influence may authorize the jury to cancel the deed."(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mathis v. Hammond, 268 Ga. 158, 160 (3) (486 S.E.2d 356)(1997).
A case for undue influence is made out not only when a person is suffering from feeble-mindedness, "but also, in the case of an elderly grantor, the domination of the grantor by the grantee, exemplified by the grantee's provision of shelter and care." Mathis v. Hammond, 268 Ga. 158, 161 (4) ( 486 SE2d 356) (1997). "Generally, the question of undue influence is for the factfinder."
We disagree. [T]he question of undue influence is generally for the factfinder ( Mathis v. Hammond, 268 Ga. 158(3), 486 S.E.2d 356 (1997)), and a directed verdict is authorized only when “there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, ... demand[s] a particular verdict.” OCGA § 9–11–50(a).
1. Bean contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that undue influence existed to invalidate Vinson's will. However, the question of undue influence is generally for the factfinder ( Mathis v. Hammond, 268 Ga. 158 (3) ( 486 SE2d 356) (1997)), and a directed verdict is authorized only when "there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, . . . demand[s] a particular verdict." OCGA § 9-11-50 (a).
1 at 322 (6th ed. 2004). See also Mathis v. Hammond, 268 Ga. 158 (2) ( 486 SE2d 356) (1997); Wallace v. Wallace, 260 Ga. 400, 401, n. 4 ( 396 SE2d 208) (1990); Mobley v. Sewell, 226 Ga. App. 866, 869 ( 487 SE2d 398) (1997). "A security deed, although conveying the legal title, does so for the purpose of security only. . . ."
`A presumption of undue influence arises as a matter of law where the grantee of a gift of real property stands in a confidential relationship with the grantor of real property, and the grantor is of a weak mentality.'Mathis v. Hammond, 268 Ga. 158, 160 ( 486 S.E.2d 356) (1997) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In the case of an elderly grantor such as Vera Long, `weak mentality' includes not only feeble-mindedness, "but also the domination of the grantor by the grantee, exemplified by the provision of shelter and care."
However, the question of whether a will is the product of undue influence is generally for the fact-finder. Mathis v. Hammond, 268 Ga. 158, 160 (3) ( 486 S.E.2d 356) (1997). Accordingly, we would reverse the judgment entered on the jury verdict only if this case presents an exception to that general rule.