Opinion
2:21-CV-01573-CRE
01-12-2023
JANIIS MATHIS, LAWRENCE MICHAELS, Plaintiffs, v. JOHN CARNEY, GOVERNOR OF DELAWARE; CLAIRE DEMATTE, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS COMMISSIONER; PERRY PHELPS, FORMER DEPUTY WARDEN; DAVID PIERCE, JAMES T. VAUGHN CORRECTIONAL CENTER; JOHN D. WETZEL, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS SECRETARY; JOHN DOE, DELAWARE STATE POLICE OFFICERS; JOHN DOE, MARYLAND STATE POLICE OFFICERS; JOHN DOE, CERT DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECDTIONS OFFICER; MICHEAL ZAKEN, FACILITY MANAGER; STEPHEN BUZAS, DEPUTY OF FACILITY MANGEMENT; MARK DELLESANDRO, UNIT MANAGER OF THE IMU; AND COULEHAN, Defendants,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CYNTHIA REED EDDY, MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. RECOMMENDATION
This civil action was initiated in this Court on November 3, 2021 by Plaintiffs Janiis Mathis and Lawrence Michaels (collectively “Plaintiffs”) against various public officials and corrections officials alleging violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs were given leave to file an Amended Complaint on June 2, 2022 which is their operative complaint. (ECF No. 65).
Presently before the Court is a partial motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint by Defendants John Wetzel, former Secretary of the Department of Corrections, and four corrections officials at the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI-Greene”), Stephen Buzas, Daniel Coulehan, Mark Delasandros, and Michael Zaken (collectively the “Pennsylvania Defendants”) (ECF No. 69). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. (ECF Nos. 70, 89).
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Pennsylvania Defendants' partial motion to dismiss be granted and Plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims be dismissed with prejudice.
I. REPORT
a. Background
In 2017, Plaintiffs were inmates in the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (“JTVCC”) located in Delaware. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 65) at ¶ 1. On or about February 2, 2017, there was a prison riot at JTVCC and Plaintiffs claim that they were assaulted by Maryland State Police, Delaware State Police and Correctional Staff at the correctional center after they were found on the ground in their cell with their hands up in a non-aggressive manner. Id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiffs claim they were beaten, pepper sprayed, not provided with meals or showers for two days, held in an empty cell without any personal property for two days and their personal property from their cell was destroyed. Id. at ¶¶ 33-38. Plaintiffs claim they were held in solitary confinement following the prison riot after being accused of orchestrating the riot and criminally charged in connection with orchestrating the prison riot. Id. at ¶ 5. These charges were nolle prosequi on July 11, 2019. Id.
They further claim that Defendants Carney and DeMatteis entered into a contract with Defendant John D. Wetzel to transfer 300 JTVCC inmates, including Plaintiffs, to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and to specifically place seven prisoners, including Plaintiffs, into the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) upon transfer into the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections without a misconduct hearing. Id. at ¶¶ 54-56. Thereafter, Plaintiff Mathis was transferred to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections on April 3, 2019, and Plaintiff Michaels was transferred to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections on June 28, 2019. Id. at ¶ 1. Plaintiff Michaels alleges that upon transfer he spent a month in general population before being placed into the RHU. Id. at ¶ 54. Plaintiff Mathis claims that he was immediately placed into the RHU. Id. Plaintiffs claim that since their transfer, they remain housed in the RHU in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, which equates to over two years. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 54, 60, 70. Plaintiffs also claim they have been placed on the Restricted Release List (“RRL”), meaning they cannot return to general population and claim they do not know why but suspect it is because they were charged with crimes in connection with the prison riot that have since been dismissed. Id. at ¶¶ 61, 72.
Plaintiffs assert the following claims against the Pennsylvania Defendants:
1. A Ninth Amendment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Pennsylvania Defendants for entering into or enforcing an allegedly illegal contract with the Governor of Delaware for the transfer of prisoners;
2. A Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Pennsylvania Defendants for placing Plaintiffs in the RHU;
3. A Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Pennsylvania Defendants for Plaintiffs remaining in the RHU without notice or review; and
4. An Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for being placed and remaining in the RHU;
Pennsylvania Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims.
While the Pennsylvania Defendants construe Plaintiffs' complaint as asserting claims under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and move to dismiss those claims, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs' have adequately stated such claims under Rule 8 against the Pennsylvania Defendants and will not construe Plaintiffs' complaint as having asserted those claims against Pennsylvania Defendants.
a. Standard of Review i. Pro Se Litigants
A pro se pleading is held to a less stringent standard than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). As a result, a pro se complaint under § 1983 must be construed liberally, Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002), so “as to do substantial justice.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). While pro se litigants are afforded this leniency, they “do not have a right to general legal advice from judges,” and “courts need not provide substantive legal advice to pro se litigants” because pro se litigants must be treated “the same as any other litigant.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
While 28 U.S.C. § 1915 authorizes litigants like Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, such status is a privilege which may be denied when abused. After granting in forma pauperis status, the Court must dismiss any claims sua sponte if: “(i) the allegation of poverty is untrue; (ii) the action is frivolous or malicious; (iii) the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iv) the complaint seeks money damages from a defendant who is immune from suit.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
i. Rule 12(b)(6) - Failure to State a Claim
The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well settled. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary elements.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Yet the court need not accept as true “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,” Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000), or the plaintiff's “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556).
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.... Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556) (internal citations omitted).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court's role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
As a general rule, if a court “consider[s] matters extraneous to the pleadings” on a motion to dismiss, the motion must be converted into one for summary judgment. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). However, a court may consider (1) exhibits attached to the complaint, (2) matters of public record, and (3) all documents integral to or explicitly relied on in the complaint, even if they are not attached thereto, without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Mele v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New York, 359 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2004) n. 5 (3d Cir. 2004); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
b. Discussion
i. Ninth Amendment Claim
Pennsylvania Defendants argue that that Ninth Amendment is not an independent source of individual rights that provides a basis for Plaintiffs' relief. They are correct. “The Ninth Amendment states: ‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.' U.S. Const. amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment does not independently provide a source of individual constitutional rights.” Clayworth v. Luzerne County, Pa., 513 Fed.Appx. 134, 137 (3d Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (citing Jenkins v. Comm'r, 483 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir.2007)). Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot bring a claim under the Ninth Amendment, as it is does not confer a private right of action. Id. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment claim be dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
ii. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claim
Pennsylvania Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim should be dismissed because it is subsumed by their other claims. Defendants argue that the crux of Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim is that they were not given notice of why they have been placed in the RHU or on the RRL, have never been given a hearing on their RHU status which sounds in procedural due process and their conditions in the RHU are cruel and unusual which is better suited under Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim. Defendants are correct. As for Plaintiff's claims that they have not been afforded adequate due process regarding their confinement in the RHU and on the RRL list, such claims are anchored in the procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Huertas v. Sec. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 533 Fed.Appx. 64, 66 (3d Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (“Procedural due process rights are triggered by deprivation of a legally cognizable liberty interest. For a prisoner, such deprivation occurs when the prison ‘imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life[,]'” and analyzing claims regarding the length of being held in administrative custody under the procedural due process standard of the Fourteenth Amendment).
As for Plaintiff's claims that their conditions of confinement in the RHU are cruel and unusual, these claims are anchored in the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 261 (3d Cir. 2010) (claims challenging conditions of confinement are brought under the Eighth Amendment, and not as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment). Plaintiffs have not otherwise indicated a constitutional interest at issue that Pennsylvania Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of by engaging in “conscience shocking” conduct. Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir.2008); Vargas v. City of Philadelphia, 783 F.3d 962, 973 (3d Cir. 2015) (to state a claim for substantive due process, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the government deprived him of an interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and such deprivation “shocks the conscience.”). Therefore, it is respectfully recommended that Pennsylvania Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim be granted and that claim be dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be futile.
c. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Pennsylvania Defendants' partial motion to dismiss be granted and that Plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims be dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be futile. It is further recommended that the following claims remain:
1. A Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Pennsylvania Defendants for Plaintiffs remaining in the RHU without notice or review; and
2. An Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for being placed and remaining in the RHU.
Any party may file objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiffs, because they are non-electronically registered parties, must file objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation by February 1, 2023 and Pennsylvania Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, must file objections by January 26, 2023.Unless otherwise othered by the District Judge, responses to objections are due fourteen days after the service of objections. The parties are cautioned that failure to file objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).