Opinion
2:21-CV-01573-CRE
01-19-2023
JANIIS MATHIS, LAWRENCE MICHAELS, Plaintiffs, v. JOHN CARNEY, GOVERNOR OF DELAWARE; CLAIRE DEMATTE, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS COMMISSIONER; PERRY PHELPS, FORMER DEPUTY WARDEN; DAVID PIERCE, JAMES T. VAUGHN CORRECTIONAL CENTER; JOHN D. WETZEL, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS SECRETARY; JOHN DOE, DELAWARE STATE POLICE OFFICERS; JOHN DOE, MARYLAND STATE POLICE OFFICERS; JOHN DOE, CERT DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECDTIONS OFFICER; MICHEAL ZAKEN, FACILITY MANAGER; STEPHEN BUZAS, DEPUTY OF FACILITY MANGEMENT; MARK DELLESANDRO, UNIT MANAGER OF THE IMU; AND COULEHAN, Defendants,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CYNTHIA REED EDDY, MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. RECOMMENDATION
This civil action was initiated in this Court on November 3, 2021 by Plaintiffs Janiis Mathis and Lawrence Michaels (collectively “Plaintiffs”) against various public officials and corrections officials alleging violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs were given leave to file an Amended Complaint on June 2, 2022 which is their operative complaint. (ECF No. 65).
Upon review of the Complaint, and pursuant to the screening requirements for litigants proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court recommends sua sponte dismissal of the Complaint with prejudice as to Defendant John Doe Maryland State Police Officer(s) before service, as such claims do not state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
I. REPORT
a. Background
In 2017, Plaintiffs were inmates in the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (“JTVCC”) located in Delaware. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 65) at ¶ 1. On or about February 2, 2017, there was a prison riot at JTVCC and Plaintiffs claim that they were assaulted by Maryland State Police, Delaware State Police and Correctional Staff at the correctional center after they were found on the ground in their cell with their hands up in a non-aggressive manner. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 32, 40, 41. Plaintiffs claim they were beaten, pepper sprayed, not provided with meals or showers for two days, held in an empty cell without any personal property for two days and their personal property from their cell was destroyed. Id. at ¶¶ 33-38. Plaintiffs claim they were held in solitary confinement following the prison riot after being accused of orchestrating the riot and criminally charged in connection with orchestrating the prison riot. Id. at ¶ 5. These charges were nolle prosequi on July 11, 2019. Id.
Plaintiffs assert the following claims against Defendant John Doe Maryland State Police Officer(s): First, Fourth and Eighth Amendment violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in connection with the response to the prison riot on February 1, 2017. Id. at ¶ 31.
b. Standard of Review
i. Pro Se Litigants
A pro se pleading is held to a less stringent standard than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). As a result, a pro se complaint under § 1983 must be construed liberally, Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002), so “as to do substantial justice.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). While pro se litigants are afforded this leniency, they “do not have a right to general legal advice from judges,” and “courts need not provide substantive legal advice to pro se litigants” because pro se litigants must be treated “the same as any other litigant.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
While 28 U.S.C. § 1915 authorizes litigants like Plaintiffs to proceed in forma pauperis, such status is a privilege which may be denied when abused. After granting in forma pauperis status, the Court must dismiss any claims sua sponte if: “(i) the allegation of poverty is untrue; (ii) the action is frivolous or malicious; (iii) the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iv) the complaint seeks money damages from a defendant who is immune from suit.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
ii. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915A (“PLRA”)
This Court has a statutory responsibility to review complaints filed by prisoners and by those who have been granted in forma pauperis to determine if the complaint states a valid claim for relief. The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.
Moreover, not only is a court permitted to sua sponte dismiss a complaint which fails to state a claim, but it is required to do so by the mandatory language of “the court shall dismiss” utilized by § 1915(e)(2) . In performing a court's mandated function of sua sponte reviewing complaints under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A to determine if they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a federal district court applies the same standard as applied to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Powell v. Hoover, 956 F.Supp. 565, 568 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to claim dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
In reviewing complaints as mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A and, consequently, utilizing the standards for a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must be read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all well-pleaded, material allegations of fact in the complaint must be taken as true. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Because Plaintiffs are pro se, the court will accord them an even more liberal reading of the complaint, employing less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
The question to be resolved is: whether, taking the factual allegations of the complaint, which are not contradicted by exhibits and matters of which judicial notice may be had, and taking all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those contradicted factual allegations of the complaint, are the “factual allegations . . . enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true even if doubtful in fact[.]” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Or put another way, a complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. Dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(6), and hence, under the PLRA screening provisions, where the court determines that the contradicted facts alleged, taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, fail to state a claim as a matter of law. See., e.g., Gould Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
c. Discussion
While in general, a statute of limitations defense cannot be raised under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 as it is not an enumerated defense under the rule, motions to dismiss based on the statute of limitations are permitted “if the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the statute of limitations.” Fried v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 850 F.3d 590, 604 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014)). See also PG Publ'g, Inc. v. Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh, 19 F.4th 308, 318 n.13 (3d Cir. 2021).
Constitutional tort claims made pursuant to section 1983 are subject to the statute of limitations for tort claims in the state in which the claims are brought. For section 1983 claims brought in Pennsylvania, there is a two-year statute of limitations. Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2000). Likewise, for section 1983 claims arising in Delaware, there is also a two-year statute of limitations. 10 Del. C. § 8119; St. Louis v. Haller, 215 F.Supp.3d 307, 312 (D. Del. 2016). “The statute of limitations begins to run ‘from the time the cause of action accrued,' which we have previously interpreted to mean when ‘the first significant event necessary to make the claim suable' occurs.” Lake, 232 F.3d at 366 (quoting Ross v. Johns-Manville Corp., 766 F.2d 823, 826 (3d Cir. 1985)). A section 1983 action accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of any injury which is the basis of the action and awareness of an actual injury, not upon awareness that the injury constitutes a legal wrong. Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998); Elliott Reihner Siedzikowski & Egan, P.C. v. Pennsylvania Emps. Benefit Tr. Fund, 161 F.Supp.2d 413, 420-21 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
Plaintiffs' motion to proceed in forma pauperis and pro se complaint was received and filed on November 3, 2021. “Although a complaint is not formally filed until the filing fee is paid, we deem a complaint to be constructively filed as of the date that the clerk received the complaint-as long as the plaintiff ultimately pays the filing fee or the district court grants the plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis.” McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1996). The Court thereafter granted Plaintiffs' motion to proceed in forma pauperis and therefore Plaintiffs commenced this action on November 3, 2021. Therefore, any claims that accrued before November 3, 2019 are time barred.
As for Defendant John Doe Maryland State Police Officer(s), the only allegations in the complaint related to these Defendant(s) are made in connection with their response to the prison riot and treatment of Plaintiffs which occurred between February 2 and 4, 2017. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 2, 33-38. Therefore, any constitutional claim accrued at the latest on February 4, 2017 and Plaintiffs had to bring any cause of action under section 1983 related to those claims by February 4, 2019. Because Plaintiffs did not file the present action until November 3, 2021, and they have not alleged any applicable tolling principals, their claims against Defendant John Doe Maryland State Police Officer(s) are time-barred and must be dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
d. Conclusion
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant John Doe Maryland State Police Officer(s) be dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be futile.
Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiffs, because they are a non-electronically registered party, must file written objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation by February 7, 2023,unless otherwise ordered by the District Judge. Plaintiffs are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See also Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).