Opinion
Civil Action 5:22-cv-00397-TES
01-18-2024
HUSAM ALDIM MATHEWS, Plaintiff, v. WALMART, INC., Defendant.
ORDER
TILMAN E. SELF, III, JUDGE.
Before the Court are four motions filed by Plaintiff Husam Aldim Mathews. First, on January 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed another discovery-related motion. In short, Plaintiff is requesting the Court to compel Defendant Walmart, Inc., to answer his interrogatories without objecting to them. [Doc. 33, p. 1]. Throughout his latest Motion to Compel [Doc. 33], Plaintiff states that he has revised his interrogatories to clarify his meaning to Walmart. See generally [Doc. 33]. However, the extended discovery period in this case ended on December 1, 2023. See [Doc. 8, p. 2], in connection with [Doc. 19, p. 3]. Not only that, but Plaintiff's issues regarding his apparent dissatisfaction with Walmart's responses to his interrogatories have been addressed by both Walmart and the Court multiple times. [Doc. 19, pp. 2-3]; [Doc. 25]; [Doc. 32]. Given that the parties' dispositive motions are due by February 9, 2024, the Court will not further extend discovery in this case. [Doc. 31]. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Compel [Doc. 33].
Next, on January 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Jury Trial [Doc. 34]. In it, he states, “This is a motion for trial by jury to determine the outcome for Walmart's retaliation against the plaintiff.” [Doc. 34, p. 2]. Not only does Plaintiff make a demand for a jury trial in his Complaint [Doc. 1], but the Court has already informed him that, if necessary, it “will conduct a trial . . . after it rules on any dispositive motions.” [Doc. 17]; [Doc. 1, p. 1]. Again though, if Walmart's dispositive motion is due to be granted, such a ruling would “obviate the need for a trial.” [Doc. 17]. As previously mentioned, the parties' dispositive motions are not due until February 9, 2024. [Doc. 31]. Thus, Plaintiff's Motion for Jury Trial [Doc. 34] is premature and not yet ripe, and it is DENIED as such. On that same basis, the Court also DENIES Plaintiff's additional Motion for Jury Trial [Doc. 36] filed on January 16, 2024. In this additional motion, Plaintiff argues that a jury should “determine how to resolve the dispute between” him and Walmart. [Doc. 36, p. 2]. Once more, a court-issued ruling on the parties' forthcoming dispositive motions must come first, and only if there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact that prevents the movant from judgment as a matter of law will a jury trial be held for this case. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Finally, since there is no evidence before the Court because the parties have yet to file their dispositive motions, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Evidence [Doc. 35] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) is also DENIED. The Court notes, however, that Rule 12(f) plainly states that courts “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) (emphasis added); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a) (listing types of pleadings). Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion in his motion, Rule 12(f) is not a vehicle through which a court “can remove a party's . . . evidence from the record.” [Doc. 35, p. 1 (emphasis added)]. Further, in his motion to strike, also filed on January 16, 2024, Plaintiff seems to be under the impression that his Notice of Right-to-Sue Letter [Doc. 1-2] from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission gives him a trial by jury automatically. [Doc. 35, p. 4]. To the extent that is Plaintiff's contention, he is incorrect. The EEOC's website clearly states that a right-to-sue letter “gives [him] permission to file a lawsuit in federal or state court.” Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit, (last visited Jan. 18, 2024). While the receipt of a right-to-sue letter is an all-important statutory prerequisite to commence a Title VII action against an employer, it is only that. Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth, 713 F.2d 1518, 1524 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. 1982)). The right to file a lawsuit against an employer does not automatically dispense with normal litigation practices and thrust the employee and his employer directly to trial.
For the above reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Compel [Doc. 33], his Motion for Jury Trial [Doc. 34], his Motion to Strike [Doc. 35], and his additional Motion for Jury Trial [Doc. 36].
SO ORDERED.