Opinion
No. 1851 C.D. 2011
04-16-2012
John A. Mather v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, Appellant
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department), appeals from the September 9, 2011, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court), which sustained the license suspension appeal of John A. Mather (Mather). We reverse.
Mather was precluded from filing a brief by order of this court dated February 8, 2012.
On July 16, 2010, the Department mailed Mather an official notice of the one-year suspension of his driving privilege, which was authorized by section 1532(c) of the Vehicle Code (Code), 75 Pa. C.S. §1532(c). The Department's notice provided that Mather's suspension resulted from his March 20, 2009, conviction for violating section 13(a)(31) of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (The Drug Act), 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(31), on March 11, 2008. Mather appealed to the trial court from the Department's suspension of his license, and the trial court held a hearing de novo on August 1, 2011.
Section 1532(c) of the Code provides that the Department "shall suspend the operating privilege of any person upon receiving a certified record of the person's conviction of any offense involving the possession, sale, delivery, offering for sale, holding for sale or giving away of any controlled substance. . . ." 75 Pa. C.S. §1532(c). As in Mather's case, the period of suspension shall be one year for a second offense. See 75 Pa. C.S. §1532(c)(1)(ii). Mather's suspension was to take effect in August 2010.
Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended.
Both parties presented evidence at this hearing. Specifically, Mather testified that he needed a valid driver's license in light of his newly obtained technician job at Jiffy Lube and his current studies to become a certified mechanic. (N.T., 8/1/11, at 5-6.) The Department introduced a packet of documents under seal, including a copy of Mather's conviction report, which was certified by the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts (Clerk of Courts) on March 22, 2010. (See C.R., Ex. C-1, "Report of a Court Showing the Conviction of Certain Violations of [The Drug Act]," at 1; R.R. at 42a.) Afterward, the trial court sustained Mather's appeal. In doing so, the trial court stated that there had been unreasonable delay by the Clerk of Courts and the Department and that Mather, who had obtained a job requiring a valid driver's license, had suffered prejudice as a result. The Department's petition for review to this court followed.
On appeal, the Department argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that the Department had unduly delayed notifying Mather of his license suspension and, therefore, Mather's suspension should be reinstated. We agree with the Department.
Our scope of review in an appeal from the Department's suspension of a licensee's driving privilege is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, whether the trial court committed an error of law, or whether the trial court committed a manifest abuse of discretion. Nelson v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 578 A.2d 586, 588 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990).
As our Supreme Court explained in Terraciano v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 562 Pa. 60, 66, 753 A.2d 233, 266 (2000) (citation omitted):
In order to sustain an appeal of a license suspension based on delay, the licensee must prove that: (1) an unreasonable delay chargeable to [the Department] led the licensee to believe that [his] operating privileges would not be impaired; and (2) prejudice would result by having the operating privileges suspended after such delay.With respect to the first element of this two-pronged analysis, it is well settled that, "where [the Department] is not guilty of administrative delay, any delay caused by the judicial system (e.g., the Clerk of Courts) not notifying [the Department] in a timely manner, will not invalidate a license suspension that is authorized by the Code and imposed by [the Department]." Pokoy v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 714 A.2d 1162, 1164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (emphasis in original). The Department can be charged with delay "only from the point when it receives the certificate of conviction." Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Turner, 624 A.2d 759, 761 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993).
Although the conviction report signed by the Clerk of Courts was certified on March 22, 2010, a little more than a year after Mather's conviction, the Department mailed Mather's suspension notice on July 16, 2010, less than four months after the conviction report was certified. Thus, no period of unreasonable delay chargeable to the Department occurred in this case. See Department of Transportation v. Russo, 506 A.2d 1349, 1350 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (a five-month delay between forwarding of the notice of conviction and imposition of the suspension was not unreasonable); Chappell v. Commonwealth, 430 A.2d 377, 379 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981) (a four-month delay between the Department's receipt of the notice of conviction and its suspension action was not unreasonable).
The parties did not dispute the date of the conviction report at the trial de novo. (See, e.g., N.T., 8/1/11, at 9-10.) It is unclear when the Department received the report but, clearly, it was sometime after March 22, 2010. Although the conviction report provided that Mather was convicted of violating section 113(a)(30) of The Drug Act, not section 113(a)(31) as provided in the Department's suspension notice, the law is clear that "immaterial or technical defects in a notice of license suspension will not be grounds for reversing a suspension." Dunn v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 819 A.2d 189, 192 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
Because we hold that the Department is not responsible for any unreasonable delay, we need not reach the question of prejudice. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Gombocz, 589 Pa. 404, 410 n.6, 909 A.2d 798, 802 n.6 (2006). --------
/s/_________
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 16th day of April, 2012, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, dated September 9, 2011, is hereby reversed. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, is directed to reinstate the one-year license suspension of John A. Mather within a reasonable period of time.
/s/_________
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge