Opinion
W.C. No. 3-500-834.
May 25, 2010.
FINAL ORDER
The respondents seek review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Cannici (ALJ) dated December 1, 2009, that denied the insurer's request for admission into the Major Medical Insurance Fund (MMIF). We affirm.
The claimant contracted Chronic Beryllium Disease (CBD), which is a progressive lung disease caused by inhalation of beryllium dust or fumes. The claimant was exposed to beryllium from 1966 to 1968 while working as a grinder for the employer. The treatment for CBD includes the use of steroids, including Prednisone. The claimant filed a worker's compensation claim in 1977 and the claim was determined to be compensable. The insurer applied for admission into the MMIF in 1993. Various letters were exchanged between the MMIF and the insurer but no written administrative order was issued either granting or denying the insurer's application. The insurer filed a renewed application for admission to the MMIF on December 1, 2008. The Director of the Division of Workers' Compensation (Director) denied the insurer's application. The Director's order was based on his determination that the insurer had failed to demonstrate that it had spent $20,000 in authorized medical payments and that the doctrine of laches applied because of the insurer's unconscionable period of delay in pursing admission into the MMIF.
The insurer was dissatisfied with the Director's order denying its application for admission to the MMIF and applied for a hearing with the Office of Administrative Courts. The ALJ determined that the insurer had failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it had directly expended $20,000 for the medical treatment of the claimant's CBD. The ALJ also determined that the MMIF had established the affirmative defense of laches. The insurer brings this appeal of the ALJ's order.
The purpose of the MMIF is to provide additional financial resources after an employer has paid $20,000 of medical benefits to an injured employee. In re Claim of Sterling v. Industrial Commission, 662 P.2d 1096 (Colo. App. 1982). The predicates for MMIF liability for medical benefits are, first, that the employee suffers a compensable injury, second that the injury must have occurred between July 1, 1971 and July 1, 1981 and third, that the total benefits expended by the employer for medical benefits exceed $20,000. See White v. State Compensation Ins. Fund 700 P.2d 923 (Colo. App. 1985). No claim involving an injury after July 1, 1981 shall be admitted to the MMIF. See Claim of Green, 789 P.2d 481 (Colo. App. 1990); Jones v. Goldco Industries, Inc. W. C. No. 3-677-352 (November 9, 1998). Here, on appeal regarding admission into the MMIF, it does not appear to be disputed that the claimant suffered a compensable injury during the period of time that the MMIF was open. Therefore, the first two predicates for admission into the MMIF have been met and the remaining issue is the satisfaction of the requirement that $20,000 be expended for medical treatment.
I.
On appeal the insurer contends that as a matter of law it had established with undisputed medical evidence that it had expended more that $20,000 for the medical treatment of the claimant's CBD, under the provisions of §§ 8-46-202 and § 8-46-212, C.R.S. and W.C. Rule of Procedure 14-7 Code Colo. Reg.1101-3. The insurer contends the order of the ALJ is not supported by substantial evidence in the record concerning the expenditure of $20,000 by it for the treatment of the claimant's CBD, which it claims shows its entitlement for entry of this claim into the MMIF.
Applications for admission to the MMIF are provided for in W.C. Rule of Procedure 14-1, 7 Code Colo. Reg. 1101-3. Rule 14-1 provides as follows:
(A) All applications for admission shall be filed with the Division on the prescribed form along with copies of the payment history, orders, medical records and all available relevant documents that support the application for admission. Upon receipt of an application, the Director shall examine the claim file to determine whether the insurer has exhausted its $20,000 limit of liability for medical benefits as provided in § 8-49-101 C.R.S, 1973. Those applications not meeting this requirement shall be dismissed and the applicant will be so notified by the Director.
(B) Applications meeting the above requirement shall be examined by the Director in accordance with the relevant provisions of the act. The Director may approve or disapprove an application for admission to/from the fund without conducting a hearing
The Director found that the claimant suffered from sequelae stemming from the Prednisone used to treat his CBD, which began to occur after 1981. Citing In re Claim of Green, 789 P.2d 481 (Colo. App. 1990) the Director determined that the sequelae did not occur until after July 1, 1981, the closure date for the MMIF. Therefore, the Director denied the application for admission into the MMIF. The Director noted that the General Assembly had established a cut-off date of July 1, 1981 in broad and comprehensive language admitting of no exceptions. Therefore, the Director determined that even though medical benefits for the sequelae stemming from Prednisone use may be compensable as a natural consequence of the original injury, it constituted a new and distinct injury for the purposes of admission into the MMIF. The Director concluded that because this new and distinct injury occurred after the closure of the MMIF, the application for admission must be denied.
Following this determination by the Director the insurer applied for a hearing before the ALJ. The ALJ, also citing In re Claim of Green, determined that the payments comprising the $20,000 liability limit must be "directly related" to the compensable injury. In In re Claim of Green, the court addressed the closure language related to the phase-out of the MMIF. The court found that a heart attack, even though it was causally related to the industrial injury, constituted a separate and distinct injury. As noted by the ALJ, in Green the court of appeals specifically reasoned as follows:
On review, the petitioners contend that it is inconsistent to treat the heart attack as a natural consequence of the original work injury for purposes of liability, and yet hold that the heart attack is a separate injury for purposes of admission to the MMIF. We disagree.
We agree with the Panel that the intent of the General Assembly in adopting § 8-66-112 was to phase out the MMIF and to make insurance carriers and employers fully liable for medical benefits for injuries incurred after July 1, 1981. In establishing the cut-off date of July 1, 1981, the General Assembly employed broad and comprehensive language admitting of no exceptions. The petitioners argue, however, that an exception must be made for injuries that are the direct sequelae of compensable injuries incurred prior to July 1, 1981. We do not agree. . . . Accordingly, we agree with the Panel that claimant's 1982 heart attack was a separate injury for purposes of admission to the MMIF, and that the Director properly denied the petitioners' application.
In re Green, 789 P.2d at 482-83.
The ALJ made the following findings of fact on the issue of expenditure of $20,000 for medical treatment of the claimant's CBD. Dr. Repsher was the medical expert for the insurer and Dr. Mayer was the medical expert for the MMIF. Dr. Mayer determined that the claimant's only medical treatment for his CBD prior to July 1, 1981 (closure date of MMIF) was Prednisone. Exhibit II at 107. Dr. Mayer persuasively explained that many of the claimant's conditions were more likely than not sequelae of his treatment for CBD. Exhibit II at 107-09. Dr. Mayer defined "progression" as any change in the original condition that would occur in its normal course of development." Exhibit II at 107. Dr. Mayer defined "sequelae as "separate conditions caused by treatment of, or other external influences upon, the original condition." Exhibit II at 107. Dr. Mayer noted that the claimant's long-term use of immune-suppressing medications caused many of the sequelae. Exhibit II at 108. The sequelae included cor pulmonale or right-sided heart failure as a result of lung disease, anemia and a number of infections that resulted from the claimant's compromised immune system. Exhibit II at 108. Dr. Mayer opined that the claimant suffered from a number of conditions that were unrelated to his CBD. Exhibit II at 108-09.
In contrast, Dr. Repsher testified that he estimated the costs directly related to the diagnosis and treatment of the claimant's CBD probably exceeded $200,000. Exhibit II at 101. Dr. Repsher testified that the total payments listed in the insurer's spreadsheet were $183,168.75 and that each payment was directly related to the claimant's compensable disease. Tr. at 46-47. Dr. Repsher agreed with Dr. Mayer's opinions regarding progression and sequelae except that cor pulmonale constituted a progression of CBD. Tr. at 40-41. We also note that the insurer does not contest the legal definitions of "directly related", "progression" and "sequelae" offered by the MMIF and notes that both experts relied on the same definitions.
The insurer's claims adjuster testified at the hearing that the insurer had paid $527,485.68 for medical payments for the claimant's claim. The claims adjuster further testified that the insurer had paid $183,168.75 on the claimant's claim for drugs, tests and procedures required to monitor the claimant's CBD.
The ALJ made the following conclusions. The insurer had not produced evidence as to whether it expended $20,000 exclusive of sequelae. The insurer only offered a total dollar figure with no breakdown. Dr. Repsher only provided an opinion regarding the total combined cost of direct treatment, its sequelae and its progression. With the profusion of sequelae acknowledged by both doctors, the insurer was required to present evidence as to how much of the total was spent exclusive of treatment of sequelae that occurred after the MMIF closed. Although medical benefits for the sequelae stemming from the claimant's use of Prednisone may be compensable as a natural consequence of the claimant's CBD, the sequelae constitute a new and distinct injury for purpose of admission into the MMIF. Any sequelae that occurred after July 1, 1981 constitute separate injuries for which the cost of treatment cannot be applied toward the $20,000 threshold. Consequently, in the absence of persuasive evidence regarding the $20,000 limit, the ALJ determined that the insurer had failed to carry its burden of proof and denied its request to the MMIF.
The insurer, however, argues that the ALJ misapplied the terms because he failed to address the progression of the disease and ignored open and obvious evidence of payment made for direct treatment alone. The insurer, citing Hall v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office 757 P.2d 1132 (Colo. App. 1988), argues that such failure requires reversal. The insurer essentially argues that it has paid over $500,000 on this claim and therefore clearly paid at least $20,000 in directly related expenses. We are not persuaded to interfere with the ALJ's order.
Because the issue of whether the insurer had directly expended $20,000 for the medical treatment of the claimant's CBD is factual in nature, we must uphold the ALJ's determination if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. This standard of review requires us to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, and defer to the ALJ's credibility determinations, resolution of conflicts in the evidence, and plausible inferences drawn from the record. Wilson v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1117 (Colo. App. 2003). The court of appeals has noted that in this context the scope of our review is "exceedingly narrow." Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411, 415 (Colo. App. 1995).
The court in In re Claim of Green drew a distinction between a medical condition that was the natural consequence of the original work injury and which would ordinarily establish liability under the Workers' Compensation Act, and yet be held as a separate injury and therefore for would not serve as a basis for admission to the MMIF. The Green court determined that the intent of the General Assembly was to phase out the MMIF and to make insurance carriers and employers fully liable for medical benefits for injuries incurred after July 1, 1981. In establishing the cut-off date of July 1, 1981, the General Assembly employed broad and comprehensive language admitting of no exceptions. The Green court rejected the argument that injuries that were the direct sequelae of compensable injuries incurred prior to July 1, 1981 could serve for the purposes of admission to the MMIF. The ALJ was aware of the court's determination In re Claim of Green and examined the testimony of medical experts for the insurer and the MMIF on this issue.
The ALJ here was not persuaded by the testimony of Dr. Repsher noting that he had only provided an opinion regarding the total combined cost of direct treatment, its sequelae and it progression. The ALJ determined that the insurer had not produced evidence as to whether it expended $20,000 exclusive of sequelae. The ALJ, noting the profusion of sequelae acknowledged by both medical experts, determined that the insurer was required to present evidence as to how much of the total was spent excusive of treatment of sequelae that occurred after the MMIF closed. The insurer was found only to have offered a total dollar figure with no breakdown. The ALJ specifically found that although medical benefits for the sequelae stemming from the claimant's use of Prednisone may be compensable as a natural consequence of the claimant's CBD, the sequelae constituted a new and distinct injury for the purpose of admission into the MMIF. Any sequelae that occurred after July 1, 1981, constitute separate injuries for which the cost of treatment could not be applied toward the $20,000 threshold. The ALJ concluded that the insurer failed to carry its burden of proof.
In addition, we note the testimony of the claims adjuster for the MMIF in support of the ALJ's determination that the insurer had failed in its burden of proof regarding the $20,000 threshold. A claims adjuster for the MMIF explained that there were a number of problems associated with attempting to review the insurer's medical bills to determine whether direct payments for the treatment of the claimant's CBD had exceeded $20,000. The claims adjuster specifically noted that it was unknown whether the medical bills had been paid according to the fee schedule. The claims adjuster also commented that the insurer had not performed an analysis of whether the medical bills were directly related to the claimant's CBD or constituted sequelae of the claimant's condition.
We also note the admissions made by the claims adjuster for the insurer. The claims adjuster for the insurer testified that the claimant's original claim was berylliosis and the insurer's records show that no billing was berylliosis was made until May 1990. Tr. at 71. The claims adjuster for the insurer further testified that the bills were not analyzed by the insurer as to whether they were treatment for berylliosis as opposed to sequelae; rather the bills were paid if they were related to the claim. Tr. at 71-72. In our view the testimony of Dr. Mayer, the admissions made by the claims adjuster for the insurer and the testimony of the claims adjuster for the MMIF constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's determination that the insurer failed to carry its burden of proof that it had met the $20,000 threshold.
II.
As a separate ground for denying entry into the MMIF the ALJ determined that the MMIF had established the affirmative defense of laches. The insurer contends on a number of grounds that this determination constituted error. The insurer first contends that the ALJ's order concerning the MMIF's defense of laches is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
In a worker's compensation proceeding, "[t]he equitable defense of laches may be used to deny relief to a party whose unconscionable delay in enforcing his rights has prejudiced the party against whom enforcement is sought." See Safeway, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office 186 P.3d 103 (Colo. App. 2008); Burke v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 905 P.2d 1, 2 (Colo. App. 1994); Bacon v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office 746 P.2d 74 (Colo. App. 1987). The MMIF had the burden of proof to establish laches, and the question of whether it did so is essentially one of fact for determination by the ALJ. See Johnson v. Industrial Commission, 761 P.2d 1146 (estoppel). Because the issue is factual, we must uphold the ALJ's findings if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. This standard of review requires us to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, and defer to the ALJ's resolution of conflicts in the evidence, credibility determinations, and plausible inferences drawn from the record. Cordova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 55 P.3d 186 (Colo. App. 2003).
On the issue of laches, it must be remembered that admission to the MMIF is only for injuries that occurred between July 1, 1971 and July 1, 1981. Therefore, it is critical to establish what the date of injury is before admission to the MMIF can occur. Here there were some complications regarding the date of injury. The claimant's exposure to beryllium was from 1966 to approximately 1968. In 1977, the claimant underwent a comprehensive lung evaluation and was diagnosed as having CBD. The First Report of Injury form was filed on October 24, 1977 and listed the "injury or initial diagnosis of illness" as 1966-1968 and that the employer first knew of the injury on March 21, 1977. Exhibit I at 99. The claimant filed a worker's claim for compensation on December 15, 1977 and listed the date of injury as April 1, 1977. Exhibit I at 98.
The insurer's October 1993 application for admission into the MMIF listed the injury date as February 28, 1970. Exhibit 1 at 340. The date of the injury listed by the insurer on its application thus fell outside of the period covered by the MMIF. On October 15, 1993 a MMIF adjuster asked the insurer to clarify the claimant's injury date and provide additional documentation regarding the medical benefits it had paid. Exhibit IV at 174. Because the MMIF adjuster recognized a conflict between the insurer's date of injury and the date on the employer's first report of injury he remarked that the claim might be a candidate for the Medical Disaster Insurance Fund, because this fund applies to injuries incurred prior to July 1, 1971. On December 10, 1994 the MMIF adjuster wrote a second letter to the insurer again stating that because of the date of the injury the Medical Disaster Insurance Fund was the appropriate fund and offered a method of resolving the matter. Exhibit IV at 173. There was no written administrative order denying the insurer's 1993 application to the MMIF.
On April 8, 1999, an employee of the insurer contacted the MMIF to inquire about the status of its 1993 application for admission into the MMIF. A claims adjuster for MMIF recounted the phone conversation in a May 5, 1999 letter to the Director. Exhibit IV at 171. The program administrator from the special funds unit wrote a letter dated April 26, 1999 to the insurer explaining that the claim was governed by the Medical Disaster Fund because of the 1970 injury date. Exhibit IV at 172. The case manager for the insurer in a letter dated May 5, 1999 requested information on why money could not be paid out of the Medical Disaster Insurance Fund. Exhibit at 171. A May 11, 1999 letter from the previous Director explained the $55,000 cap that was available to pay the difference between what the carrier had paid and the amount allowed under the cap. Exhibit IV at 170.
The insurer did not again contact MMIF regarding the claim until it filed a renewed application for admission to the MMIF on December 1, 2008. Exhibit I at 84-86. The application noted that the insurer had paid medical benefits in the amount of $527,485 for the treatment of the claimant's CBO. This second application for admission to the MMIF specified an injury date of April 1, 1997. This date, unlike the date on the insurer's original application for admission into the MMIF, is within the period covered by the MMIF. The April 1, 1997 date is the date of injury listed in the worker's claim for compensation filed in 1977.
In our view, it is useful at this point to review the Director's original findings concerning the equitable doctrine of laches, and his determination that the doctrine applied because of the insurer's unconscionable period of delay in pursing admission into the MMIF. The Director made the following findings. The insurer had repeatedly failed to respond to requests for clarification of the date of injury and to provide additional clarifying information. The MMIF's ability to manage and control the direction of the claim was obstructed by the insurer's inaction. The Director's ability in 2008, to evaluate the medical benefits provided to the claimant, was severely compromised and prejudiced. Specifically once a claim has been admitted to MMIF, § 8-46-208(2) C.R.S. the Director is authorized to review the case when medical expenditures reach $15,000 to determine whether continuation or cessation of further payments from MMIF is proper and at each $10,000 increment after that. The opportunity for the Director to review the case at critical junctures had been foreclosed by the insurer's failure to timely pursue admission to MMIF. The Director had been stripped of the opportunity to determine whether any benefit provided was "necessary to promote recovery, alleviate pain, or reduce disability" as required by § 8-46-202(1)(a) C.R.S.
We now turn to the findings made by the ALJ on the issue of laches. The ALJ noted the following testimony from a manager for the MMIF. The insurer's 1993 request for admission into the MMIF was not denied, but the MMIF simply sought clarification of the claimant's date of injury. The MMIF subsequently requested information from insurer about the claimant's date of injury but the insurer failed to respond. The 1999 letters from the MMIF were based on a 1970 date of injury and the MMIF was not apprised of a 1997 injury date until the insurer's 2008 application for entry into the MMIF. The MMIF had established by a preponderance of the evidence that it justifiably relied on the insurer's representations regarding the claimant's date of injury in the 1993 application as being 1970. This date of injury would place the injury outside the period of time the injury must have occurred for admission into the MMIF. Based on insurer's 1993 application the MMIF proceeded under the impression that the claimant had been injured in 1970. The insurer did not correct the injury date until after it had amassed significant medical expenses in 2008.
The ALJ made the additional findings of fact on the issue of laches. The insurer's delay in correctly identifying the injury date until after it had amassed significant medical expenses in 2008 denied the MMIF of the opportunities of determining whether the insurer's payment for treatment of the claimant's CBD was necessary to promote recovery, alleviate pain or reduce disability. In this connection, we note that in every case in which an MMIF award is made, the Director is required to review the case when the total medical expenditures reach specific levels and, depending on whether further expenditure of funds will promote recovery, alleviate pain, or reduce disability, enter an order either continuing or ceasing further payments. Section 8-46-208(2); Major Medical Ins. Fund v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office 77 P.3d 867 (Colo. App. 2003).
On the issue of prejudice, the ALJ made the following additional findings of fact. The insurer's delay denied the Director his statutory opportunity to review the claimant's case when total medical expenditures reached $15,000 and at subsequent $10,000 increments to determine continuation or cessation of further payment from the MMIF. The MMIF was unable to examine the claimant as various treatments were suggested to determine whether the treatments were necessary to promote recovery, alleviate pain or reduce disability. The Director was deprived of these opportunities by the insurer's failure to file promptly an application for admission to the MMIF containing correct information as to the date of the injury and proof of $20,000 in direct medical payments for the claimant's CBD. The supervisor for the MMIF credibly testified that MMIF sought information from insurer about the claimant's date of injury, but the insurer failed to respond. As was noted previously in this order the claims supervisor for the MMIF explained that there are a number of problems associated with attempting to review the insurer's medical bills to determine whether direct payments for treatment of the claimant's CBD had exceeded $20,000. The claims supervisor noted that it was unknown whether medical bills had been paid according to the fee schedule and that the insurer had not performed an analysis of whether the medical bills were directly related to the claimant's CBD or constituted sequelae of the claimant's condition.
The findings above are consistent with the ALJ's conclusion that the delay in this case was prejudicial, because the insurer had amassed significant medical expenses in 2008 when it renewed its application for admission to the MMIF. In our view, the ALJ's conclusion that the MMI had established the affirmative defense of laches because the insurer caused an unconscionable delay that prejudiced the MMIF's defenses is supported by substantial evidence.
The insurer argues that the ALJ failed to address or resolve any of its arguments made in response to the laches claim of the MMIF. In its position statement the insurer had argued that any delay was because of information it received from the MMIF and not on its part in seeking admission. The insurer argued that its actions did not prejudice the Director but the delay was instead due to actions of the MMIF. As we understand the insurer's argument it maintains that changes in the law regarding occupational diseases that occurred in the 1970s should have put the MMIF on notice that the injury date it set forth in its 1993 application for Admission to the MMIF could not have legally been February 28, 1970. Therefore, any delay or prejudice to the Director at that time was at least partially attributable to the MMIF's handling of the claim. We are not persuaded that a remand on this issue is necessary.
The insurer argues that it was not until some time after Union Carbide Corp. v. ICAO 128 P.3d 319 (Colo. App. 2005) was decided in 2005 that it asserted that the appropriate date of injury was April 1, 1977. The insurer does not explain how it arrived at the date of injury as April 1, 1977. However, we note that the claimant filed a worker's claim for compensation on December 15, 1977 and listed the date of injury as April 1, 1977. Exhibit I at 98. We note that the insurer was aware of this date of injury in 1977, years before it filed its 1993 application for admission into the MMIF.
Here, the ALJ found that MMIF was under the impression that the claimant had been injured in 1970 even though the insurer was aware that the claimant's injury occurred on July 8, 1977. Finding of Fact 18 at 5. This finding is supported by the October 1993 application for admission into the MMIF, which listed the injury date as February 28, 1970 and a June 12, 1981 order from the Industrial Commission which provided that the evidence supported a finding that the claimant suffered a permanent disability as a result of an occupational disease effective July 8, 1977. Exhibit 1 at 340; Exhibit I at 89. In our view, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's conclusion that the insurer, as of the time it filed it first application for admission into the MMIF in 1993, was aware that the claimant's injury occurred sometime in 1977.
Further, Rule 14-1 does place the burden on the party applying for admission into the MMIF to fill out the prescribed form, which requires the date of injury, along with copies of the payment history, orders, medical records and all available relevant documents that support the application for admission. It is also provided in § 8-47-201 C.R.S. that the party filing a division form shall have the burden to properly fill out the blanks and furnish the information requested fully and correctly. In our view, it was not error for the ALJ to determine that the MMIF relied on the date of injury listed by the insurer in its first application for admission to the MMIF in coming to his conclusions on the application of the doctrine of laches. Contrary to the insurer's arguments we are not persuaded that it was the duty of the MMIF to conduct an investigation of whether the insurer might have been mistaken in listing, in its application for admission, a date of injury as having occurred outside the relevant time period for admission into the MMIF. Rather, in our opinion, it was the duty of the insurer to prepare an application for admission into the MMIF with correct information supported by relevant documents as provided for in Rule 14-1.
We further note that the ALJ is not held to a standard of absolute clarity in expressing findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is sufficient for the ALJ to enter findings concerning the evidence he considers dispositive of the issues, and evidence and inferences inconsistent with the order are presumed to have been rejected. Magnetic Engineering Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 5 P.3d 385 (Colo. App. 2000). Further, the ALJ is presumed to have considered and applied the relevant legal principles. Shafer Commercial Seating, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 85 P.3d 619 (Colo. App. 2003). As we read the ALJ's order he was not persuaded that the MMIF had some independent duty to research the issue of when the injury occurred rather then relying on the date listed by the insurer in its application for admission to the MMIF.
We have considered the insurer's remaining arguments and are not persuaded by them. We perceive no reversible error in the ALJ's determination that the MMIF had established the affirmative defense of laches.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated December 1, 2009 is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
______________________________ John D Baird
______________________________ Thomas Schrant
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Attn: DEBRA SEARCY, IRVING, TX, (Insurer).
INMAN, FLYNN, BIESTERFELD BRETLINGER, PC, Attn: MICHAEL W SUTHERLAND, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (For Claimant).
LEE KINDER, LLC, Attn: THOMAS L KANAN, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (For Respondents).
JOSEPH P HAUGHAIN, ESQ., Attn: ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, DENVER, CO, (Other Party).