Under Illinois law, a minor involved in litigation is a ward of the court and the court has "a duty and broad discretion to protect the minor's interests." Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 316 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1026, 738 N.E.2d 964, 968 (2000); Mastroianni v. Curtis, 78 Ill. App. 3d 97, 100, 397 N.E.2d 56, 58 (1979). Further, it is the public policy of this state that the rights of minors be guarded carefully.

It is the public policy of this State that the rights of minors are to be guarded carefully. ( Mastroianni v. Curtis (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 97, 397 N.E.2d 56.) Every minor plaintiff is a ward of the court when involved in litigation, and the court has a duty and broad discretion to protect the minor's interests.

This provision requires court approval of any settlement and is mandatory, because it is intended to substitute a judicial determination for the guardian's personal discretion in order to provide additional protection to the ward. Mastroianni v. Curtis (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 97, 99-100, 397 N.E.2d 56, 58. The Probate Act has been held to require that the terms and conditions of any proposed compromise "be submitted to, inquired into, and passed upon by, that court having special jurisdiction of the estate of minors."

In so doing, the Legislature emphasized the significant role of the parent, declaring “[t]hese are proper parental choices on behalf of children that should not be ignored. So long as the decision is voluntary and informed, the decision should be given the same dignity as decisions regarding schooling, medical treatment, and religious education....” Col.Rev.Stat. Ann. (2010), § 13–22–107(1)(a)(v). The Illinois court in Meyer v. Naperville Manner, Inc., 262 Ill.App.3d 141, 199 Ill.Dec. 572, 634 N.E.2d 411, 414 (1994), cited its prior decision in Mastroianni v. Curtis, 78 Ill.App.3d 97, 33 Ill.Dec. 723, 397 N.E.2d 56 (1979), for the proposition that a parent may not settle a claim without court approval. The Mastroianni court interpreted Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, ch. 3, par. 215, now codified at 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/19–8 (1992), which provided: “By leave of court * * * [a] guardian * * * may compound or compromise any claim or any interest of the ward * * * in any personal estate * * * upon such terms as the court directs.”

" Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. (2010), § 13-22-107(1)(a)(v). The Illinois court in Meyer v. Naperville Manner, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 411, 414 (Ill. App. 1994), cited its prior decision in Mastroianni v. Curtis, 397 N.E.2d 56 (Ill. App. 1979), for the proposition that a parent may not settle a claim without court approval. The Mastrioianni court interpreted Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 3, par. 215, now codified at 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/19-8 (1992), which provided: "By leave of court * * * [a] guardian * * * may compound or compromise any claim or any interest of the ward * * * in any personal estate * * * upon such terms as the court directs."

A conservator or guardian cannot waive any rights of the ward. Jeanblanc v. Mellott, 152 Ill. App.3d 801, 811, 504 N.E.2d 990, 997 (1987); Mastroianni v. Curtis, 78 Ill. App.3d 97, 101, 397 N.E.2d 56, 59 (1979). Any argument that by granting summary judgment here the court implicitly held that summary judgment was in the ward's best interest is without merit.

On appeal, plaintiff first argues that parents have no legal authority to release, waive, or compromise their child's legal right of action by signing such a waiver without court approval. Plaintiff relies on Mastroianni v. Curtis (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 97. We agree that in the case at bar the parent's waiver of liability was ineffective to bar her minor child's cause of action against defendant.

Similar to Zimmerman , the Burton court addressed a scenario where courts have a duty and discretion to protect a minor plaintiff's legal rights. Burton , 149 Ill.App.3d at 976, 103 Ill.Dec. 233, 501 N.E.2d 254 (citing Mastroianni v. Curtis , 78 Ill.App.3d 97, 99-100, 33 Ill.Dec. 723, 397 N.E.2d 56 (1979) ). In Burton , the reviewing court interpreted a provision of the Probate Act of 1975 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110 ½, ¶ 19-8) and determined that the provision was designed to substitute a judicial determination for the guardian's personal discretion in order to provide additional protection to minor plaintiffs who enter into settlement agreements.

Similar to Zimmerman, the Burton court addressed a scenario where courts have a duty and discretion to protect a minor plaintiff's legal rights. Burton, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 976 (citing Mastroianni v. Curtis, 78 Ill. App. 3d 97, 99-100 (1979)). In Burton, the reviewing court interpreted a provision of the Probate Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.

The Probate Act requires that the terms and conditions of any proposed compromise must be submitted to, inquired into, and passed upon by the court having special jurisdiction of the estate of minors. Mastroianni v. Curtis, 78 Ill. App. 3d 97, 99-100 (1979). ¶ 112 I do not agree with Chessick's assertion that the narrower language of the Joint Memorandum limits or takes precedence over the broad language of Rule 6.4. The stated objective of the procedures described in the Joint Memorandum "is to permit the total disposition by the Law Division or Municipal Department of any case in which appropriate Probate Division action is not necessary while, at the same time, ensuring that appropriate Probate Division involvement is not eliminated by reason of an overly broad Law Division or Municipal Department order."