Opinion
D069854
03-22-2017
Daniel J. Masterson, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Assistant Attorney General, Jessica N. Blonien and Amy M. Roebuck, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondents and Defendants.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2015-00002482-CU-WM-CTL) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Lisa C. Schall, Judge. Affirmed. Daniel J. Masterson, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Assistant Attorney General, Jessica N. Blonien and Amy M. Roebuck, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondents and Defendants.
I
INTRODUCTION
Daniel J. Masterson, an inmate, appeals from a judgment denying his administrative petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel prison officials to process his inmate appeal challenging the actions of a correctional officer. Masterson contends we must reverse the judgment because the court erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed issues of facts and by failing to recognize the prison had a ministerial duty to process his inmate appeal. We do not reach these issues because Masterson's claim is moot and he did not exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. We, therefore, affirm the judgment.
II
BACKGROUND
In October 2014, Masterson was an inmate at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (RJD). He alleged that after he made complaints about staff a correctional officer retaliated by confiscating some of his personal belongings and thereby violated his rights under the First Amendment. Masterson prepared an inmate appeal form requesting the return of his personal property. According to Masterson, he placed the completed appeal form in an envelope and submitted it to a correctional officer for mailing to Daniel Paramo, Warden of RJD.
Masterson alleged he did not receive a response to his appeal from the prison's appeals office. He inquired about the status of his appeal two times and claims he never received a response.
Masterson then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. In the petition, Masterson alleged he "received no response to the Appeal and all applicable time limits to respond to the Appeal has[sic] expired." He named as respondents the prison warden, Paramo, two correctional counselors, B. Baenziger and R. Olson, and then secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Dr. Jeffery A. Beard. In his prayer for relief, he asked the superior court to issue a writ of mandate "directing respondents to process [Masterson's appeal form] according to applicable regulations."
Respondents answered Masterson's petition indicating the prison's appeals office denies receiving Masterson's appeal. A prison appeals coordinator declared she reviewed the prison's records and could not find evidence the appeals office received Masterson's appeal.
Masterson replied claiming the prison's appeals coordinator made "false and incorrect statements" in her declaration. To prove the appeals office did receive his appeal, he submitted a copy of "CDC Form 695" which he received from the prison's appeals coordinator cancelling his appeal as untimely.
Respondents submitted an amended answer, now indicating the prison's appeals office did receive Masterson's appeal. Respondents acknowledged that although the prison's appeals office overlooked Masterson's appeal during its first review, they located Masterson's appeal and the appeal cancellation form. In light of this discovery, respondents argued Masterson's writ petition was moot because the prison fulfilled its ministerial duty to process the appeal. They also argued that to the extent Masterson was challenging cancellation of his appeal as untimely, his claims were barred because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing the petition for writ of mandate in the superior court.
Following an unreported hearing with all parties present, the superior court denied the petition for writ of mandate. In its order the court found "[Masterson] failed to timely file his inmate appeal with the prison inmate appeals office, and thus respondent does not have a ministerial duty to process [Masterson's] untimely administrative appeal." Masterson then moved for reconsideration of the order, which the court denied.
In his notice of appeal, Masterson states the appeal is from a minute order entered on November 6, 2015. That minute order, however, directed counsel to prepare an order for signature. Respondent submitted a proposed order, which the court adopted and signed on December 18, 2015. This court augmented the record on its own motion to include the December 18, 2015, order. Because the formal appealable order was entered before Masterson filed his notice of appeal, the appeal is timely and we exercise our discretion to treat the notice of appeal as being taken from the appealable order. (See, e.g., Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 11, 14, fn. 1.)
III
DISCUSSION
A
Masterson raises several contentions challenging the trial court's denial of his writ petition. He believes the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed issues of fact and the court erred in finding his inmate appeal to be untimely. Although the trial court reached the merits of his arguments, we need not do so because Masterson had already been afforded the relief he sought in his writ petition, rendering his central claim moot.
"A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) State law provides prison inmates with the right to appeal any action adversely affecting the inmate's welfare and, if a prison neglects to reasonably process the appeal, the inmate may seek relief by way of a petition for writ of mandate. (See, e.g., Wright v. State of California (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 659, 666-668.) To state a proper claim for mandamus relief, a petitioner must establish a " 'clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent.' " (Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 657.)
"[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief." (Lincoln Place Tenants Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 425, 454.) It is the duty of every judicial tribunal " ' "to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it." ' " (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541.)
Masterson's writ petition asked the superior court to issue a writ of mandate "directing respondents to process [Masterson's appeal form] according to applicable regulations." After Masterson's writ petition was filed, however, he presented evidence the prison officials did process his appeal, which was ultimately cancelled. Because Masterson seeks an order compelling the respondents to perform an act they have already completed, there is no remaining controversy to be considered and Masterson is not entitled to any additional relief. Thus, his claim that the prison has a ministerial duty to process his appeal is now moot.
B
Masterson also challenges the prison's cancellation of his administrative appeal as untimely. His petition for writ of mandate, however, contains no allegations concerning this issue and does not expressly seek relief on this basis.
"The ordinary rules of pleading are applied in determining whether or not a petition which seeks the remedy of administrative mandamus states a cause of action." (Turner v. Hatch (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 759, 765; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1109.) Thus, in the same way a complaint defines the issues to be tried, the petition for writ of mandate defines the issue in controversy in the writ proceeding. (See, e.g., Simmons v. Ware (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1049; Bell v. City of Mountain View (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 332, 342 [petitioner seeking mandamus relief must allege "the specific facts from which the conclusions entitling him to relief would follow"].) By failing to allege any facts concerning the cancellation of his administrative appeal, Masterson is barred from raising this argument. (See, e.g., Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1174, fn. 23.)
Regardless, even if Masterson's petition is construed as properly raising this claim, it is barred because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Under this well-established doctrine, a party must exhaust all available administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. (Wright v. State, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 664-666.) This doctrine applies to prison inmates, who are subject to an inmate appeal process created by state regulation. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3084-3085; see also Parthemore v. Col (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1379-1380.)
The cancellation of an inmate's administrative appeal is itself appealable through the prison's administrative appeal process. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3084.6, subd. (e).) Masterson presents no evidence that he pursued his administrative appeal through the third level of review after his inmate appeal was cancelled as untimely. Thus, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies, which precludes consideration of his claim in this judicial proceeding.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
MCCONNELL, P. J. WE CONCUR: HALLER, J. AARON, J.