When a landlord agrees to make repairs in a portion of the rented premises and has the right to inspect the premises for defects, he may have retained control of that portion of the premises for the purpose of making repairs. See Masterson v. Atherton, 179 A.2d 592, 596 (Conn. 1962); Smith, 127 A.2d at 48; Restatement (Second) of Torts Section(s) 357 (1965); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts Section(s) 63, at 443-45 (5th ed. 1984). In Smith, the court considered "evidence before the jury of an agreement between the parties that the landlord had the right to inspect the premises and the exclusive right to make repairs therein, and that the tenant would refrain from making any repairs at all."
Pignatario v. Meyers, 100 Conn. 234, 237, 123 A. 263; 32 Am.Jur. 526, Landlord and Tenant, 662; 52 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, 417(3). The general rule and its certain or apparent exceptions are carefully analyzed in Masterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 179 A.2d 592, including, at page 309, the theory upon which the present plaintiff sought recovery, namely, that the landlord had control of the stairway. The word "control" has no legal or technical meaning distinct from that given in its popular acceptation; Robinson v. Kistler, 62 W. Va. 489, 495, 59 S.E. 505; and refers to the power or authority to manage, superintend, direct or oversee. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Crafton, 350 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Ark.); see Bates v. Connecticut Power Co., 130 Conn. 256, 261, 33 A.2d 342; 9A Words Phrases 5, 7, 31 (Perm.
As late as 1962, our court said: "Ordinarily, a tenant takes the demised premises as he finds them, and the landlord is not liable for defective conditions . . . within the demised area." Masterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 306 (1962. Also see Smith v. Housing Authority, 144 Conn. 13, 16 (1956).
The plaintiff responds that courts which have held that an owner of property lacks standing to assert a private nuisance claim against a predecessor in possession, have relied on the doctrine of caveat emptor. Since in the present case the complaint can be read to plead wrongful failure to disclose the existence of an environmental problem on the property, caveat emptor does not apply, Masterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 179 A.2d 592 (1962). In Wiel, the court held that an owner of property lacked standing to assert a private nuisance claim against his predecessors in possession.
Under the Lease (¶ 12), Robbins as tenant had a right to quiet enjoyment of the premises. In Masterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 309-10 (1962), the Supreme Court held that proof of the landlord’s control of a building component would carry a duty to repair known or discoverable defects and to keep the area controlled in a reasonably safe condition. See also Sammarco v. Kotowski, 2010 WL 2682418 *6 (Conn.Super. 2010) (Gilardi, J.) (" when a landlord retains control of a portion of the demised premises ... the landlord must use reasonable care to keep that portion of the premises in a reasonably safe condition."
Under the Lease (¶ 12), Robbins as tenant had a right to quiet enjoyment of the premises. In Masterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 309-10 (1962), the Supreme Court held that proof of the landlord’s control of a building component would carry a duty to repair known or discoverable defects and to keep the area controlled in a reasonably safe condition. See also Sammarco v. Kotowski, 2010 WL 2682418 *6 (Conn.Super. 2010) (Gilardi, J.) (" when a landlord retains control of a portion of the demised premises ... the landlord must use reasonable care to keep that portion of the premises in a reasonably safe condition."
The Supreme Court of Errors expressly considered whether to order a new trial and found no justification for doing so. It therefore remanded the case "with direction to render judgment for the defendant in accordance with her motion for a directed verdict." Masterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 317, 179 A.2d 592, 599 (1962). On March 16, 1962, pursuant to the remand, the Superior Court entered judgment for defendant Nellie Atherton.
The court noted, however, that the doctrine of caveat emptor would not apply to defects in the property which are not discoverable on reasonable inspection and of which the predecessor in possession is chargeable with knowledge. Id. at 443 n. 12 (citing Masterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 307, 179 A.2d 592, 595 (1962)). The court therefore considered whether the plaintiffs allegations supported the position that the doctrine of caveat emptor would not apply.
As previously noted, the demised premises did not include the "imminently dangerous or imminently defective condition" which the jury was entitled to find directly and proximately caused the entire loss of merchandise of Tiger Furniture and Tiger Appliances. Masterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 179 A.2d 592 is not controlling. For that case applied the following principle, not here pertinent:
(8) The words "any such action" (following the semicolon in the first sentence of § 52-592) refer back to the preceding instances of actions which have not been tried on the merits; the words "any such action" do not refer forward in this statute so as to apply, for example, to the instance of "a judgment for the plaintiff reversed". (9) Since § 52-592 does not apply to Civil Action No. 9313 and since the parties to and the cause of action alleged therein are the same as in the state court action which has been determined on its merits (Masterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 179 A.2d 592 (1962), judgment entered on verdict for plaintiffs reversed with direction to render judgment for defendant), the judgment entered pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court of Errors in the Superior Court for Fairfield County on March 16, 1962 is res adjudicata as to Civil Action No. 9313; (10) For the same reasons, the cause of action in Civil Action No. 9313 is barred by the one year statute of limitations (Conn.Gen. Stat. § 52-584 (1958)); and