Mastercraft Lamp Co. v. Mortek

7 Citing cases

  1. Swanson v. United-Greenfield Corporation

    239 F. Supp. 299 (D. Conn. 1965)   Cited 8 times

    Adler v. Consumers Co., 152 F.2d 696 (7 Cir. 1945). Mastercraft Lamp Co. v. Mortek, 28 Ill.App.2d 273, 171 N.E.2d 427 (1960); Steidtmann v. Joseph Lay Co., 234 Ill. 84, 84 N.E. 640 (1908). Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co., 258 N.Y. 168, 171, 179 N.E. 373, 374, 80 A.L.R. 1052 (1932).

  2. Delaney Electric Co. v. Schiessle

    235 Ill. App. 3d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 22 times

    He claims that his failure to answer is not due to any fault of his own, but occurred because the court stayed the proceedings and compelled the parties to arbitrate their dispute. In support of this position, Schiessle relies on the authority of Mastercraft Lamp Co. v. Mortek (1960), 28 Ill. App.2d 273, 274-75, in which the court stated: "The pleadings are to be considered in order that the court may know what the issues are. A motion for summary judgment presupposes that the pleadings join issue.

  3. National Underground Construction Co. v. E.A. Cox Co.

    216 Ill. App. 3d 130 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 13 times

    • 4 In regard to these additional alternative arguments, we note that a court's first step in deciding a motion for summary judgment is to analyze the pleadings in order to define the contested issues. ( Fryison v. McGee (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 537, 436 N.E.2d 12; Mastercraft Lamp Co. v. Mortek (1960), 28 Ill. App.2d 273, 171 N.E.2d 427. See generally 4 R. Michael, Illinois Practice, Civil Procedure Before Trial § 39.6, at 256 (1989).

  4. St. Paul Fire Marine v. West Am. Ins. Co.

    437 A.2d 165 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981)   Cited 4 times

    It appears that the risks which are peculiar to the "automobile business" provisions constitute a separate risk category to which a separate premium rate applies in the insurance industry. Mastercraft Lamp Co. v. Mortek, Ill.App., 28 Ill. App.2d 273, 171 N.E.2d 427 (1961); Commercial Standard Insurance Company v. Sanders, supra. Because of the singularity of that area of insurance coverage there is substantial uniformity in the language which has been the subject of a substantial body of decisional law. Cf. Annotations in 71 A.L.R.2d 964, et seq., 47 A.L.R.2d 556, 165 A.L.R. 1471; Continental Nat. American Group v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., supra. The language must be applied in such way that the result would be just if applied as a measure of insurance coverage as well as a measure of insurance exclusion.

  5. Kelley v. Riverside Blvd. Ind. Church

    358 N.E.2d 696 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 9 times

    This deposition must, of course, be construed most strictly against the plaintiffs in this case and most liberally in favor of the defendants. In ruling upon the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, it was proper for the trial court to examine the pleadings for the limited purpose of determining what the issues in the case were. ( Metropolitan Sanitary District v. Anthony Pontarelli Sons, Inc. (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 829, 839, 288 N.E.2d 905, 911; Mastercraft Lamp Co. v. Mortek (1960), 28 Ill. App.2d 273, 275, 171 N.E.2d 427, 428.) In their amended complaint plaintiffs alleged that the Virginia Avenue Church of God was a member of the Church of God.

  6. Metropolitan San. Dist. v. Pontarelli Sons, Inc.

    7 Ill. App. 3d 829 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)   Cited 33 times
    Stating the "rule relating to `imputed knowledge'"

    In deciding the motion for summary judgment the court considers the pleadings to determine what the issues are and in so doing it presupposes that the pleadings join the issue. ( Mastercraft Lamp Co. v. Mortek (1960), 28 Ill. App.2d 273, 275, 171 N.E.2d 427, 428.) The court is not however prohibited from considering affirmative defenses raised in the motion for summary judgment in spite of the fact that those matters were not raised in an answer or by a motion under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 110, par. 43(4) or 48. Slone v. Morton (1963), 39 Ill. App.2d 495, 497, 188 N.E.2d 493, 494.

  7. Voral v. Voral

    38 Ill. App. 2d 328 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962)   Cited 1 times

    Defendant, appealing, insists that the court erred in entering a summary decree because there was a material issue of fact to be resolved. We have held that the purpose of the summary judgment procedure is not to try an issue of fact, but to determine whether there is an issue of fact. Scharf v. Waters, 328 Ill. App. 525, 537, 66 N.E.2d 499; Gliwa v. Washington Polish Loan and Building Ass'n, 310 Ill. App. 465, 470, 34 N.E.2d 736; Tezak v. Cooper, 24 Ill. App.2d 356, 362, 164 N.E.2d 493; Mastercraft Lamp Co. v. Mortek, 28 Ill. App.2d 273, 171 N.E.2d 427. Plaintiff maintains that there was no issue of fact either as to the paternity of the child or the defendant's guilt of adultery because these issues had been determined by a consent order entered after a hearing on November 30, 1961. [1] Plaintiff's argument that because of the approval of the order of November 30, 1961, by the attorney for the wife that she is not in a position to challenge the findings in that order on paternity and adultery, is without merit.