w provisions, plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act, although there may be provisions in the old act not embraced in the new." Among other cases to the same effect are the following: Coats v. Hill, 41 Ark. 149; DeQueen v. Fenton, 100 Ark. 504, 140 S.W. 716; Eubanks v. Futrell, 112 Ark. 437, 166 S.W. 172; Hickey v. State, 114 Ark. 526, 170 S.W. 562; Common School District No. 52 v. Rural Special School District No. 11, 146 Ark. 32,225 S.W. 21; Security Mortgage Co. v. Herron, 174 Ark. 698, 296 S.W. 363; Dicken v. Missouri Pacific Rd. Co., 188 Ark. 1035, 69 S.W.2d 277; State, ex rel., Trimble v. Kantas, 191 Ark. 22, 82 S.W.2d 847; McDonald v. Wasson, 188 Ark. 782, 67 S.W.2d 722; Curlin v. Watson, 187 Ark. 685, 61 S.W.2d 701; Faulkner v. Faulkner, 186 Ark. 1082, 57 S.W.2d 818; Lawyer v. Carpenter, 80 Ark. 411, 97 S.W. 662; Johnson County v. Hartman, 177 Ark. 1009, 8 S.W.2d 469; Massey v. State, Use Prarie County, 168 Ark. 174, 269 S.W. 567; Boas v. Coates, 114 Ark. 23, 169 S.W. 312; Milwee v. Board of Directors Horatio School District, 105 Ark. 77, 150 S.W. 391; Hampton v. Hickey, 88 Ark. 324, 114 S.W. 707. Act 78 is a general act, applicable to every county in the state, and if it is anything at all more than a mere scrap of paper, it is a Salary Act. It can be nothing else, if it is anything at all.
Repeals by implication are not favored, and exist only where there is all invincible repugnancy. Baker v. Hill, 180 Ark. 387, 21 S.W.2d 867; Massey v. State, 168 Ark. 174, 269 S.W. 567; Babb v. El Dorado, 170 Ark. 10, 278 S.W. 649; State v. White, 170 Ark. 880, 281 S.W. 678. From a careful comparison of the language of the two sections, it is apparent there is no invincible repugnancy or conflict between them.
An illuminating discussion will also be found in the case of Louisiana Oil Ref. Co. v. Rainwater, 183 Ark. 482, 488, 37 S.W.2d 96. There is no gainsaying the determinative force of the following cases: Massey v. State, use Prairie County, 168 Ark. 174, 269 S.W. 567 (see cases there cited); King v. McDowell, 107 Ark. 381, 155 S.W. 501; State v. White, 170 Ark. 880, 281 S.W. 678; Johnson County v. Hartman, 177 Ark. 1009, 8 S.W.2d 469. Again quoting from Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, page 463: "Subsequent legislation repeals previous inconsistent legislation, whether it expressly declares such repeal or not.
We have always held that repeals by implication are not favored. Baker v. Hill, 180 Ark. 387, 21 S.W.2d 867; Massey v. State, 168 Ark. 174, 269 S.W. 567, and cases there cited. Without setting out in detail the provisions of said acts, it may be said that act 158 lays a tax upon the privilege of operating standard pool tables.
In such case the later law prevails as the last expression of the legislative will. When the repugnancy is ascertained, the later act, in date, has full force, and displaces by repeal whatever in the earlier act is inconsistent with it, and this is true whether it expressly declares such repeal or not. Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, vol. 1, 461 et seq; Massey v. State use Prairie County, 168 Ark. 174, 269 S.W. 567; Mays v. Phillips County, 168 Ark. 829, 274 S.W. 5, 279 S.W. 366; Standley v. County Board of Education, 170 Ark. 1, 277 S.W. 559; Babb v. El Dorado, 170 Ark. 10, 278 S.W. 649; State v. White, 170 Ark. 880, 281 S.W. 678; Ouachita County v. Stone, 173 Ark. 1004, 293 S.W. 1021. As repeal by implication is not favored, in order that a later statute repeal a former statute by implication, there must be such a positive repugnancy between the two laws that they cannot stand together, and there must be irreconcilable conflict.
It is only where there is an invincible repugnancy between the two acts, as where it is evident that the last act is a substitute for the first act, or where the last act takes up the whole subject anew and covers the entire ground of the subject-matter of a former statute, that a repeal by implication is accomplished. Massey v. State, 168 Ark. 174, 269 S.W. 567; Babb v. El Dorado, 170 Ark. 10, 278 S.W. 649; and State v. White, 170 Ark. 880, 281 S.W. 678. Here there is not only no repugnancy between the first act and the two later, but it is manifest that the two later acts were passed in aid of the first act, and not as a substitute therefor, or with the implied intention of repealing it. Finally it is insisted that the source of revenue provided for the payment and retiring of the bonds under act 180 is exclusively the fund from act 118, the Income Tax Law of 1929, and that this renders the act uncertain and void.
This act was approved February 28, 1929. It is true that repeals by implication are not favored, and the repeal will not be allowed unless the implication is clear and irresistible. Massey v. State, 168 Ark. 174, 269 S.W. 567; Babb v. El Dorado, 170 Ark. 10, 278 S.W. 649; and State v. White, 170 Ark. 880, 281 S.W. 678. Another cardinal rule of construction is that, where two acts were under consideration by the Legislature at the same time, and were passed at the same session, this strengthens the presumption that there was no intention to repeal one by the other.
"There is, however, another rule of construction sometimes employed, which we should perhaps notice, which is that, where the Legislature takes up a whole subject anew, covering the whole ground, revising the whole subject-matter of a former statute, and evidently intending to enact a substitute, the old statute is repealed, although the new statute contains no express words to that effect." To the same general effect see Massey v. State, 168 Ark. 175, 269 S.W. 567; State v. White, 170 Ark. 880, 281 S.W. 678; Ouachita County v. Stone, 173 Ark. 1004, 293 S.W. 1021; and Babb v. El Dorado, 170 Ark. 10, 278 S.W. 649. We think it is well settled by many decisions of this court, as said in St. Louis, I. M. S. Ry. Co. v. Paul, 64 Ark. 83, 40 S.W. 705, "that a statute repeals or operates as an amendment of a prior law on the same subject to the extent that they are in conflict, although the latter is not mentioned in the former."
" Babb v. El Dorado, ante p. 10. In the application of those principles, the following cases may be considered with profit: Lawyer v. Carpenter, 80 Ark. 411; Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 82 Ark. 302; Hampton v. Hickey, 88 Ark. 324; C. R. I P. Ry. Co. v. McElroy, 92 Ark. 600; Carpenter v. Little Rock, 101 Ark. 238; Eubanks v. Futrell, 112 Ark. 433; Massey v. State for Use of Prairie County., 168 Ark. 174; Mays v. Phillips County, 168 Ark. 829; Farelly Lake Levee District v. Hudson, 169 Ark. 33. Applying those tests to the statute now under consideration, we are of the opinion that, in enacting the last statute, the Legislature took up the whole subject anew as a substitute for the former legislation on the subject, and that it operated as a repeal of the former statute. The language of the caption of a statute is not controlling, but it has some force in interpreting the meaning of the lawmakers when otherwise in doubt, and the language of this caption leads to the conclusion that the lawmakers intended it as a substitute for former legislation, which recites that it is the purpose to provide a "complete system for working the county convicts of the State on the public roads and various counties of the State."
It is well settled in this State that, where a subsequent general act is repugnant to a prior special act or acts, the general act, without any repealing clause, operates as a repeal of the special act or acts to the extent of the repugnancy and where two such acts are passed at different times and it is clearly evident that the later act was intended as a revision of the prior one, it will repeal the first act to the extent in which its provisions are revised or substituted. Massey v. State use Prairie County, 168 Ark. 174. Tested by (this rule, it is manifest that 1 of act 356 of the Acts of 1925 above set forth, repeals the provision in 6 of the amendatory acts above referred to wherein, it is declared by the Legislature that no land in the Farelly Lake Levee District will be benefited more than $20 per acre by reason of the proposed improvement.