Opinion
Case No. S24A0131
06-27-2024
Christopher MASSEY v. The STATE.
A. James Rockefeller, Rockefeller Law Center, 102 Tommy Stalnaker Drive, Warner Robins, Georgia 31088, for Appellant. John R. Monroe, John Monroe Law, PC, 156 Robert. Jones Road, Dawsonville, Georgia 30534, Ross Warren Bergethon, Deputy Solicitor-General, Stephen John Petrany, Solicitor-General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, SW, Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Mazie Lynn Guertin, Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 215 Church Street, Suite 111, Decatur, Georgia 30030, Matthew P. Cavedon, Northeastern Circuit Public Defender’s Office, 111 Spring Street SE, Gainesville, Georgia 30501, Virginia Natasha Perdew Silas, Federal Defender Program Inc., 215 Church Street, Suite 111, Decatur, Georgia 30030, Hunter Joseph Rodgers, 3939 Atlanta Rd., Smyrna, Georgia 30080, Peter J. Skandalakis, Robert Wright Smith, Jr., Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia, 1590 Adamson Parkway, 4th Floor, Morrow, Georgia 30260, for Neutral Amicus. Bradford Lee Rigby, District Attorney, Lauren Warbington Fletcher, Cordele Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office, P.O. Box 5510, Cordele, Georgia 31010, Meghan Hobbs Hill, Assistant Attorney General, Clint Christopher Malcolm, Assistant Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300, for Appellee.
Superior Court, Crisp County, Robert W. Chasteen, Judge
A. James Rockefeller, Rockefeller Law Center, 102 Tommy Stalnaker Drive, Warner Robins, Georgia 31088, for Appellant.
John R. Monroe, John Monroe Law, PC, 156 Robert. Jones Road, Dawsonville, Georgia 30534, Ross Warren Bergethon, Deputy Solicitor-General, Stephen John Petrany, Solicitor-General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, SW, Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Mazie Lynn Guertin, Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 215 Church Street, Suite 111, Decatur, Georgia 30030, Matthew P. Cavedon, Northeastern Circuit Public Defender’s Office, 111 Spring Street SE, Gainesville, Georgia 30501, Virginia Natasha Perdew Silas, Federal Defender Program Inc., 215 Church Street, Suite 111, Decatur, Georgia 30030, Hunter Joseph Rodgers, 3939 Atlanta Rd., Smyrna, Georgia 30080, Peter J. Skandalakis, Robert Wright Smith, Jr., Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia, 1590 Adamson Parkway, 4th Floor, Morrow, Georgia 30260, for Neutral Amicus.
Bradford Lee Rigby, District Attorney, Lauren Warbington Fletcher, Cordele Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office, P.O. Box 5510, Cordele, Georgia 31010, Meghan Hobbs Hill, Assistant Attorney General, Clint Christopher Malcolm, Assistant Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300, for Appellee.
The trial court’s order is vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in the light of United. States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. —, 144 S.Ct. 1889 (2024).
All the Justices concur, except Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, and Colvin, JJ., who dissent.
LaGrua, Justice, dissenting.
While I respect my colleagues’ decision, I must respectfully dissent. This appeal asks a critical question: whether the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution permits a State to prohibit someone who has committed a violent felony from possessing firearms during the pendency of a first-offender sentence. See OCGA § 16-11-131 (b). We are remanding this case back to the trial court to consider the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S —, 144 S.Ct. 1889, — LE2d —, No. 22-915 (June 21, 2024). But I do not believe that Rahimi gives any better guidance in this case than the Supreme Court’s previous Second Amendment decisions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022) and D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). The trial court relied on both cases in its order denying Appellant’s demurrer as well as on this Court’s opinion in Spencer v. State, 286 Ga. 483, 484 (5), 689 S.E.2d 823 (2010) (holding that prohibiting a defendant from possessing a firearm as a condition of probation does not violate the Second Amendment and citing Heller's declaration that " ‘longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons’ are not in doubt." (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (III), 128 S.Ct. 2783). Looking to the facts of this case, I find that Rahimi would not undercut the trial court’s order. Rather, Rahimi likely supports the idea that the legislature may disarm those who have committed violent crimes like Appellant. See Rahimi 603 U.S. at — (II) (B) (3), 144 S.Ct. 1889 ("the surety and going armed laws confirm what common sense suggests: When an individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed."); id. at —, 144 S.Ct. 1889 (repeating Heller’s declaration that felon-in-possession is "presumptively lawful"); id. at —, 144 S.Ct. 1889 ("we do not suggest that the Second Amendment prohibits the enactment of laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons thought by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse"); id. at —, 144 S.Ct. 1889 (Barrett, J., concurring) (citing her dissent in Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451 (7th Cir. 2019), where she explained that "[h]istory is consistent with common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns.").
The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that vacating and remanding a case without issuing an opinion is inappropriate when the "delay and further cost entailed in a remand are not justified by the potential benefits of further consideration by the lower court." Laurence on Behalf of Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 168, 116 S.Ct. 604, 133 L.Ed.2d 545 (1996) (per curiam). And I am concerned that the benefits of remanding this case are far outweighed by the delay and costs. More guidance from the Supreme Court may be forthcoming, but the governing law as it stands now is sufficient to address Appellant’s claim and (in my opinion) affirm the trial court’s order. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Ellington, Justice McMillian, and Justice Colvin join in this dissent.