Massey v. People

8 Citing cases

  1. Moses v. the Diocese of Colorado

    863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993)   Cited 204 times
    Holding that the First Amendment did not relieve a church from liability for breach of fiduciary duty where a priest engaged in sexual relations with a mentally ill parishioner he was counseling

    The fact that the non-preserved issue involves questions of constitutional analysis, interpretation, or application is not dispositive of whether we will address the issue on appeal. See, e.g., Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658, 662 (Colo. 1982) (declining to address a constitutional argument on appeal that was not presented for determination by the trial court). A

  2. Tucker v. U.S.

    569 A.2d 162 (D.C. 1990)   Cited 9 times
    In Tucker v. United States, 569 A.2d 162, 166 n. 8 (D.C. 1990), we left open the issue whether, and in what circumstances, a defendant may have to show prejudice as a prerequisite to dismissal of charges under the IAD.

    Id. In Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658, 658 (Colo. 1982), an arrest warrant was sent to Colorado prison authorities with a "request" from Omaha authorities "to file a warrant for [the prisoner's] release as a detainer against his release from custody." Finally, in State v. Black, 594 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1979), an arrest warrant served as a detainer where it was accompanied by an instruction to "place it against [the prisoner] as a detainer.

  3. Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Division

    720 P.2d 564 (Colo. 1986)   Cited 43 times
    Holding under the express consent statute that driving means being "in actual physical control" of a motor vehicle and is not limited to "placing and controlling a vehicle in motion"

    The plaintiff challenges section 42-2-122.1 on the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague both with respect to the burden of proving the offense and with respect to procedural guidelines. The plaintiff did not raise this issue at the hearing or at the district court level; therefore, we will not consider it here. Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1982). The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

  4. People v. Unruh

    713 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1986)   Cited 37 times
    Holding under the Colorado constitution that while a dog sniff is a search, it is permissible if reasonable suspicion exists

    The defendant raised this issue too belatedly for us to consider it. Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1982). II.

  5. Brewster v. Nandrea

    705 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1985)

    The appellate court could consider only those questions raised in the motion for new trial. C.R.C.P. 59(f); Furer v. Allied Steel Co., 174 Colo. 171, 483 P.2d 212 (1971); Shows v. Silver Shield Mining Milling Co., 150 Colo. 592, 375 P.2d 522 (1972); see Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1982). The motion for new trial included specific assignments of error in order to give the trial court another opportunity to look at the issues; it was insufficient to allege general error in fact and law. Martin v. Opdyke Agency, Inc., 156 Colo. 316, 398 P.2d 971 (1965); see Shows v. Silver Shield, 150 Colo. at 598, 375 P.2d at 525 (general assignments of error regarding jury instructions and admission of evidence not sufficient to support specific assignments on appeal).

  6. In re Application for Water Rights

    688 P.2d 1102 (Colo. 1984)   Cited 13 times
    Involving an option contract that "would be exercised" provided that a water court entered a decree with certain terms

    C.R.C.P. 59(f). See Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1982); Rowe v. Watered Down Farms, 195 Colo. 152, 576 P.2d 172 (1978); Furer v. Allied Steel Co., 174 Colo. 171, 483 P.2d 212 (1971). The objectors' motion to alter or amend did assert as error the trial court's inclusion of land owned by George Gruber in its calculation of the amount of water to be credited as a result of the dry-up requirement.

  7. Moore v. Wilson

    662 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1983)   Cited 1 times

    See Buffalo v. Tanksley, 189 Colo. 45, 536 P.2d 827 (1975). The petitioner's argument that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution cannot properly be considered in this appeal. As we said in Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658, 661 (Colo. 1982): "We decline to address [the petitioner's] constitutional challenge to the Agreement on Detainers because the only issue litigated at the habeas corpus hearing was compliance with the procedures of Article IV. [The petitioner's] counsel did not mention the constitutional challenge at the hearing, the district court did not address the constitutional issue in its ruling discharging the writ, and [the petitioner's] new trial motion did not raise the issue."

  8. State v. Sephus

    32 S.W.3d 369 (Tex. App. 2000)   Cited 13 times

    A Colorado court held that where a detainer was not officially withdrawn, the prisoner was properly processed through the Detainers Act and affirmed the denial of his writ of habeas corpus. Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658, 660 (Colo. 1982). In New York, the state's supreme court declared a detainer void because the issuing state did not try the prisoner within the proscribed time periods of the Detainers Act; however, the issuing state charges were not affected by the declaration, and the prisoner could not halt extradition proceedings when arrested on those outstanding charges.