The fact that the non-preserved issue involves questions of constitutional analysis, interpretation, or application is not dispositive of whether we will address the issue on appeal. See, e.g., Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658, 662 (Colo. 1982) (declining to address a constitutional argument on appeal that was not presented for determination by the trial court). A
Id. In Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658, 658 (Colo. 1982), an arrest warrant was sent to Colorado prison authorities with a "request" from Omaha authorities "to file a warrant for [the prisoner's] release as a detainer against his release from custody." Finally, in State v. Black, 594 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1979), an arrest warrant served as a detainer where it was accompanied by an instruction to "place it against [the prisoner] as a detainer.
The plaintiff challenges section 42-2-122.1 on the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague both with respect to the burden of proving the offense and with respect to procedural guidelines. The plaintiff did not raise this issue at the hearing or at the district court level; therefore, we will not consider it here. Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1982). The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
The defendant raised this issue too belatedly for us to consider it. Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1982). II.
The appellate court could consider only those questions raised in the motion for new trial. C.R.C.P. 59(f); Furer v. Allied Steel Co., 174 Colo. 171, 483 P.2d 212 (1971); Shows v. Silver Shield Mining Milling Co., 150 Colo. 592, 375 P.2d 522 (1972); see Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1982). The motion for new trial included specific assignments of error in order to give the trial court another opportunity to look at the issues; it was insufficient to allege general error in fact and law. Martin v. Opdyke Agency, Inc., 156 Colo. 316, 398 P.2d 971 (1965); see Shows v. Silver Shield, 150 Colo. at 598, 375 P.2d at 525 (general assignments of error regarding jury instructions and admission of evidence not sufficient to support specific assignments on appeal).
C.R.C.P. 59(f). See Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1982); Rowe v. Watered Down Farms, 195 Colo. 152, 576 P.2d 172 (1978); Furer v. Allied Steel Co., 174 Colo. 171, 483 P.2d 212 (1971). The objectors' motion to alter or amend did assert as error the trial court's inclusion of land owned by George Gruber in its calculation of the amount of water to be credited as a result of the dry-up requirement.
See Buffalo v. Tanksley, 189 Colo. 45, 536 P.2d 827 (1975). The petitioner's argument that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution cannot properly be considered in this appeal. As we said in Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658, 661 (Colo. 1982): "We decline to address [the petitioner's] constitutional challenge to the Agreement on Detainers because the only issue litigated at the habeas corpus hearing was compliance with the procedures of Article IV. [The petitioner's] counsel did not mention the constitutional challenge at the hearing, the district court did not address the constitutional issue in its ruling discharging the writ, and [the petitioner's] new trial motion did not raise the issue."
A Colorado court held that where a detainer was not officially withdrawn, the prisoner was properly processed through the Detainers Act and affirmed the denial of his writ of habeas corpus. Massey v. People, 656 P.2d 658, 660 (Colo. 1982). In New York, the state's supreme court declared a detainer void because the issuing state did not try the prisoner within the proscribed time periods of the Detainers Act; however, the issuing state charges were not affected by the declaration, and the prisoner could not halt extradition proceedings when arrested on those outstanding charges.