Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Victor Chavez and Lee Smalley Edmon, Judges. Super. Ct. No. BC310003.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Daniel M. Flores, Lindsay Pennington and Mark E. Weber for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ballard Rosenberg Golper & Savitt, Linda Miller Savitt and Christine T. Hoeffner for Defendants and Respondents.
KITCHING, J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant Evelyn Massey (Massey) sued defendant and respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), and one of its principals, Arturo Del Rio (Del Rio) (collectively defendants), for defamation and breach of contract, among other causes of action. Massey alleged that defendants breached a prior settlement agreement by failing to remove a below standard employee evaluation from her personnel file and by disclosing the below standard employee evaluation to potential employers.
The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the breach of contract cause of action. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of defendants on the defamation cause of action and entered judgment accordingly.
Here, Massey appeals only the order summarily adjudicating the breach of contract cause of action. We affirm. Massey failed to raise a triable issue of material fact that defendants’ alleged breaches of the settlement agreement caused her any damages.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendants assert in this appeal that, in attempting to establish a triable issue of material fact, plaintiff improperly relies upon evidence admitted during the later bench trial on the defamation cause of action, which evidence was not before the trial court when it ruled on the motion for summary adjudication. Defendants also assert that Massey improperly relies upon facts presented in a later motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Massey asserts that it is proper to rely upon this evidence.
We have no occasion to resolve this dispute. Considering all of Massey’s evidence, we nevertheless conclude that the trial court did not err by granting summary adjudication of the breach of contract cause of action.
1. Massey’s Work History as a Teacher
In 1986, LAUSD hired Massey as a teacher. Now, a certificated employee of LAUSD, Massey obtained tenure in 1989. Throughout her teaching career, LAUSD provided Massey with performance evaluations which rated her as “Meets Standard or Better,” the highest rating a teacher can receive.
2. Massey Obtains Administrative Position
Normally, an applicant for a position as a principal or assistant principal must pass a promotional examination required by LAUSD. Upon passing the examination, an individual is placed on a list of eligible candidates for that job classification. LAUSD regulations, however, provide for an exception to the rule regarding promotional examinations. When there are no applicants or fewer than five applicants on the eligibility list for an Assistant Principal, Secondary Counseling Services (APSCS) position, a principal may hire an applicant who meets the minimum qualifications, but who has not passed the promotional examination.
In 1997, Massey applied for the APSCS position at LAUSD’s San Fernando Middle School. She had no prior experience as an administrator. Defendant Del Rio was the principal of the school and he was Massey’s supervisor.
When Massey applied for the APSCS position, she had not passed the promotional examination. However, there were no candidates on the eligibility list. Del Rio hired Massey in August 1997 as the APSCS based upon her credentials.
Massey worked as the APSCS at San Fernando Middle School during the 1997-1998 school year. As an APSCS, she was responsible for preparing a master schedule of classes and programming students into the appropriate classes. The position was interactive and required Massey to have strong people skills and to collaborate with staff, counselors, teachers, parents, and the school psychologist.
In December 1997, Massey suffered injuries in an automobile accident. She took a temporary medical leave. While on leave, Massey requested a transfer to a school closer to her home for medical treatment. LAUSD denied the transfer because Massey had not passed the promotional examination. Massey returned to work as the APSCS at San Fernando Middle School in April 1998.
3. Massey’s 1997-1998 Annual Stull Evaluation
Senator John Stull sponsored legislation to establish a uniform system for evaluating the performance of certificated employees, including teachers and administrators. The evaluations are thus called “Stull Act evaluations” (Stull evaluation). (Hahn v. Board of Education (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 744, 748, fn. 4.)
In May 1998, principal Del Rio prepared Massey’s Stull evaluation (the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation). The evaluation rated Massey as “below standard.” Del Rio noted that Massey had good communication skills and that she was ambitious and motivated to do well. However, Del Rio noted that when observations about Massey’s behavior were shared with her, she became unprofessional, tactless, defensive, and undiplomatic. Del Rio also stated that Massey failed to build cohesiveness, did not facilitate conflict resolution, and needed to improve her interpersonal skills.
In his declaration in support of defendants’ motion for summary adjudication, principal Del Rio explained that during the 1997-1998 school year he spent too much time dealing with problems created by Massey’s inexperience as an assistant principal and her conflicts with other staff employees. Del Rio noted that in 1997-1998, four employees requested transfer from San Fernando Middle School because they were unable to work with Massey.
4. Massey’s Grievance
Massey believed that the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation was baseless. She filed a grievance with her union, Associated Administrators Los Angeles (AALA), to challenge the evaluation.
On October 20, 1998, Massey, who was represented by counsel, entered into a settlement agreement with LAUSD. The settlement agreement required LAUSD to withdraw the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation from Massey’s personnel file and her file at San Fernando Middle School. The settlement agreement also required Massey and her attorney to withdraw the grievance and not pursue further action related to the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation.
Paragraph 5 of the settlement agreement provided: “The District generally and [Del Rio] specifically, will not initiate any evaluation discussion with a principal/school for which Ms. Massey applies for a prospective position, however, if the District is contacted by a principal/school regarding a prospective position the District will respond to that inquiry in the same manner as in regards to any other employee, except that no reference shall be made to the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation including the below standard evaluation.”
Paragraph 6 of the settlement agreement provided: “In the event the District is contacted by a prospective employer regarding Ms. Massey, District staff will respond to that inquiry in the same manner as in regards to any other employee or previous employee, except that no reference shall be made to the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation including the below standard evaluation.”
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Massey agreed to self-demote from the APSCS position to a teaching position for which she was properly credentialed and at a location where an opening existed. In addition, Massey relinquished her right to challenge the grievance in an arbitration proceeding. She also waived any and all claims against LAUSD or its employees arising from her service during the 1997-1998 school year. Finally, Massey waived any claim to attorney fees.
5. Massey Accepts New Teaching Position
Massey accepted a teaching position at Daniel Webster Middle School, where she completed the 1998-99 school year. Massey then worked as a counselor at Palisades High School for the 1999-2000. She then took a family medical leave for the 2000-2001 school year. In 2001, Massey accepted a teaching position in the Education Options Program at a community day high school, where she continued to teach at all relevant times.
In February 1999, Massey contacted John Lade (Lade), who was then the Administrative Coordinator, Office of Staff Relations for LAUSD, to discuss promotional opportunities. Lade informed Massey that when a person goes against a principal, it is disappointing and the person will not be successful. According to Massey’s declaration, the words used by Lade during this conversation made her suspicious that Del Rio had revealed the existence and contents of the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation to prospective employers in the LAUSD school system.
6. Massey Applies for Promotional Examination
In February 1999, Massey applied to take the promotional examination to improve her chances of becoming an assistant principal. In March 1999, Kathleen B. Price (Price), an Administrative Coordinator for the LAUSD Personnel Division, sent Massey a letter informing her that she was “disqualified from the examination process” because of the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation. The letter stated: “In accordance with Board Rule 4140, you are ineligible for participation in any promotional examination process for 1 calendar year following issuance of a less than satisfactory performance. Notice of Below Standard Performance Issued 5/98.”
After Massey explained that the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation was to have been pulled from her personnel file, Price investigated the status of Massey’s application. She telephoned Lade. Lade was one of the signatories to the October 1998 settlement agreement in which LAUSD agreed to withdraw the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation from Massey’s personnel file. Lade informed Price that Massey was cleared to the take the promotional examination and that the below standard evaluation had been withdrawn.
7. Principal Del Rio Responds to Request for an Evaluation
The promotional application involved three parts: (1) an evaluation by the applicant’s former supervisors, (2) a multiple choice test, and (3) an oral interview. As part of the application process, each applicant was required to submit references from principals for whom the applicant worked during the three-year time period preceding the filing of the application.
In March 1999, Del Rio received a request to evaluate Massey on LAUSD’s standard Training and Experience rating sheets (referred to as “tracer documents”), for assistant principal positions. About tracer documents, Dr. Dina Wiley, Ph.D., LAUSD’s Director of Personnel Research and Assessment in the Human Resources Division, submitted a declaration stating: “These documents are highly confidential. The only individuals who see the documents are those in the Administrative Selection Office as well as the Personnel Research and Assessment office. The applicant never sees the documents completed by the principals and/or supervisors. The individuals who conduct the oral interview do not see these documents. Principals and supervisors at schools or sites where applicants apply for prospective positions are not permitted to review the exam files or these documents.”
The first page of the tracer document stated: “This is a confidential evaluation. DO NOT discuss your evaluation, whether positive or negative, with the candidate or anyone (other than a fellow evaluator) during or after the completion of the examination process. All materials contained in this packet are also confidential. DO NOT photocopy or share these materials with anyone.” (Italics omitted.)
In addition, defendants presented the declaration of Dr. Stephen Magel, who was at one time the Director of Personnel Research and Assessment, Office of Personnel Services and Research Branch. Magel declared that tracer documents are highly confidential. They are not accessible to applicants, principals or supervisors or those individuals who conduct the oral examination process. To ensure the scores are appropriate, the tracer documents are accessible only to Magel’s Office.
In the tracer document, Del Rio submitted a rating that Massey was “Marginal (less than fully acceptable)” or “Needs Development” in each of the six professional categories under evaluation, including: (1) “Planning and Organizing,” (2) “Initiative and Innovativeness,” (3) “Judgment,” (4) “Extra-Organizational Sensitivity,” (5) “Instructional Leadership,” and (6) “Leadership and Influence.”
In the commentary section of the tracer document, Del Rio wrote that Massey had problems collaborating with others, she did not coordinate multiple tasks well, she failed to follow correct procedures for disciplining staff, she was not prepared for the opening day of school, she was unwilling to admit when she lacked experience and needed help, she was insensitive to the culture of the school and alienated counselors, she lacked people skills, she lost credibility with staff, she was insubordinate, she argued with counselors in front of students and parents, and that when Del Rio disagreed with Massey, she “constantly” went over his head and wrote to the Superintendent and Board Members.
Del Rio concluded the tracer evaluation by stating: “And last but not least, she is definitely not a team player. I gave her a below standard evaluation. She appealed and lost at all 3 levels. AALA denied her request to take the case to arbitration. In order to avoid another chaotic year at my school an agreement was negotiated: the below standard was to be pulled from her personnel file if she demoted herself, which she did.”
At trial on the defamation cause of action, Del Rio testified that he referenced Massey’s 1997-1998 Stull evaluation in the tracer document sent back to LAUSD in relation to Massey’s promotional examination. At the time he referenced the evaluation, he knew that it was supposed to have been withdrawn from Massey’s file. Del Rio testified that he intended that his comments would be considered in the evaluation of Massey’s application. He understood that his comments would be reviewed by someone on the examination committee and could have an effect on Massey’s future. He testified: “I knew it was going to be read. It was going to be scored in some way. I assume.”
Del Rio also testified that he knew his tracer document was confidential. He then testified that he knew that his comments would not be viewed by the interview committee, which apparently conducted the third part of Massey examination process for promotion to an assistant principal position. In his declaration, Del Rio stated that he did not discuss the tracer document with anyone and did not discuss what he wrote in the tracer document with anyone.
8. Massed failed the Administrative Examination
As part of the promotional examination process, three other evaluators gave Massey low ratings in areas of performance including judgment. The three evaluators were David Legacki, Margaret Jones and Ron Twombly. Each gave Massey low ratings from competent to marginal.
According to Dr. Wiley, LAUSD’s Director of Personnel Research and Assessment, the promotional examinations are scored on a “purely objective basis.” She declared: “Comments written by the evaluating supervisors and interviewers are not taken into account. The numerical scores from all three parts of the exam are combined into one score for the candidate. The scores of all candidates are then listed in rank order. A ‘cut off’ is selected. This point is chosen without regard to the names of the applicants[.] All candidates whose scores exceed the ‘cut off’ pass the exam.”
With respect to Massey, Dr. Wiley declared: “Ms. Massey did not score highly on the structured interview portion of the exam. . . . [¶] . . . Ms. Massey did not pass the exam. Ms. Massey’s combined score was 2.24. When measured against other candidates, Ms. Massey’s score did not exceed the ‘cut off’ point. The cut off for this exam was 3.18. There were eight other candidates who scored higher than Ms. Massey but who also failed to pas the exam. Ms. Massey’s failure to pass the exam was based solely on her numerical score. No subjective comments were taken into account.”
9. Massey Fails to Obtain Administrative Position
While at Daniel Webster Middle School, Massey continued to be interested in applying for assistant principal positions. LAUSD Administrative Selection and Placement Coordinator Kathy Price gave Massey a list of Assistant Principal positions for which she could apply.
At her deposition, Massey testified that from 2000 to 2003 she applied for assistant principal positions at 28 different schools. Counsel questioned Massey about the application process at the various schools. Massey testified that she did not know whether the principals of those schools contacted principal Del Rio or whether they were aware of the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation. Massey assumed that the principals contacted her references because that was part of the application process.
Massey also testified that she interviewed for an assistant principal position at Cooper High School. Massey concluded that the principal at Cooper High, Jan Avallone, had seen the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation. During the interview, Massey asked what they were looking for in an assistant principal. The principal responded: “Well, I don’t want somebody who makes decisions without contacting me.” Massey explained that this statement was included in the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation, and thus, principal Avallone must have reviewed it. Massey testified that she otherwise had no other knowledge that Avallone knew about or reviewed the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation.
Massey testified: “So to me that was like an indication she received information that I made decisions without contacting [Del Rio], unilateral decisions. And that was stated in my Stull.”
In her declaration in support of defendants’ motion for summary adjudication, LAUSD Administrative Selection and Placement Coordinator Kathy Price stated that while her office performed the ministerial function of clearing promotional exam applications to ensure the applicants have the minimum qualifications, she did not score the applications. Price also declared: “For each APSCS position to which Plaintiff applied, with one exception, Human Resources cleared Plaintiff to be interviewed. Plaintiff had applied for a position at a school where there had been more than 5 applicants on the eligibility list who had passed the promotional exam. As Plaintiff had not passed the exam, and was therefore not on the eligibility list, she could not be interviewed for the position.”
10. Massey Files Suit
The LAUSD Board rejected Massey’s claim for damages pursuant to Government Code section 910. On February 2, 2004, Massey filed suit against LAUSD and Del Rio. After the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers, Massey proceeded with respect to the causes of action for breach of contract and defamation alleged in the first amended complaint. Massey alleged that defendants breached the settlement agreement by disclosing its contents to potential employers. Massey further alleged that because defendants were to remove the Stull evaluation from her file, the statements contained in the document were false and that defendants’ references to the document were defamatory.
11. Defendants Move for Summary Judgment
On June 10, 2005, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication of the breach of contract and defamation causes of action. With respect to the breach of contract cause of action, defendants asserted that neither Del Rio nor any other LAUSD personnel breached the settlement agreement by referencing or disclosing the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation to prospective employers of Massey. Defendants also asserted that plaintiff could not show any damages. With respect to the defamation claim, defendants asserted that the allegedly defamatory statements were privileged and that there was no evidence that defendants acted with malice.
12. Counsel Views Plaintiff’s Electronic File
On September 19, 2005, counsel for Massey traveled to the LAUSD offices. There, he viewed Massey’s personnel file maintained in the LAUSD computer system. In the file, there was a summary entry of a “B” for the 1997-1998 year indicating that the below standard Stull evaluation was electronically recorded in Massey’s computer file.
13. Trial Court Grants Motion for Summary Adjudication
On November 4, 2005, the trial court (per Lee Smalley Edmon, judge) issued a tentative ruling granting defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the cause of action for breach of contract. The trial court denied the motion as to the cause of action for defamation.
14. Motion for Reconsideration
On November 23, 2005, Massey filed a motion for reconsideration. Massey asserted that the electronic file Massey’s counsel reviewed on September 19, 2005, constituted new evidence showing that defendants breached the settlement agreement by failing to purge Massey’s file of reference to the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation.
In response, defendants filed over 30 declarations showing that the declarants and other hiring personnel did not have access to Massey’s evaluation and did not know of Massey’s 1997-1998 Stull evaluation.
In addition, in its opposition to the motion for reconsideration, defendant LAUSD conceded that at the time Massey’s 1997-1998 Stull evaluation was pulled from her file, someone in human resources should have accessed Massey’s electronic file in the Accuterm system and deleted and purged the reference to the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation.
15. Trial Court Denies Motion for Reconsideration
On February 17, 2006,~(CT 2451)~ the trial court (per Lee Smalley Edmon, Judge) denied Massey’s motion for reconsideration. The trial court ruled that the motion was untimely pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a), because it was not filed within ten days of the order granting the motion for summary adjudication. The trial court also found that the fact that the Stull evaluation was contained in the computer database did not establish causation. The court explained that evaluators and potential hiring administrators did not have access to the employee’s evaluation summary in the LAUSD Accuterm electronic database. Finally, the trial court ruled that the presence of the electronic reference did not create an inference that Massey was damaged by it.
16. Order Granting Summary Adjudication
On February 23, 2006, the trial court (per Lee Smalley Edmon) entered an order granting defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the breach of contract cause of action. The trial court ruled that plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of material fact as to breach, causation or damages.
The order provided: “Plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract has no merit because there is no evidence of a breach. Plaintiff’s opposition only offers speculation as to why she was not offered jobs and has no specific evidence that the specific language in the contract was breached. Plaintiff’s speculation that her application was initially red-flagged lacks merit in that there is no explanation by plaintiff as to why or what effect. In any event, plaintiff’s claim has no merit as the plaintiff cannot establish damages as a result.”
17. Trial on the Defamation Cause of Action
On May 15, 2006, the trial court (per Victor E. Chavez), conducted a bench trial on the defamation cause of action. At trial, the Director of Employee Relations at LAUSD, Robert Fisher, testified. He testified that beginning in 2003, LAUSD created an electronic filing system because it had to process more than 21,000 annual performance evaluations. Fisher testified that only individuals in the employee relations office had access to the computer file. He also testified that principals interviewing candidates for positions at their schools would not have access to an employee’s personnel file. Fisher explained, however, that his office would confirm employment status to prospective employers. Fisher also testified: “If the question of whether or not an individual had had a satisfactory record as an employee, that could also be part of the inquiry.”
Fisher testified that he was knowledgeable with the procedure for removing a Stull evaluation from an employee’s personnel file. Fisher testified that the electronic database maintained by his office had not been updated, and it did maintain a record of Massey’s 1997-1998 Stull evaluation. Fisher noted, however, that the electronic database was accessible only to his office.
The trial court (per Victor E. Chavez) found in favor of defendants on the cause of action for defamation. The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants. Massey timely filed a notice of appeal.
CONTENTIONS
Massey contends that the trial court erred by granting the motion for summary adjudication. Massey contends that she raised a triable issue of material fact that defendants breached the settlement agreement and that she suffered damages.
Massey also contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion for reconsideration. Massey contends that undisputed evidence shows that defendants did not remove the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation from her electronic computer file in breach of the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation.
On appeal, as explained above, we consider the evidence that Massey’s electronic personnel file included a reference to the 1997-98 Stull evaluation. For this reason, we have no occasion to address whether the trial court erred by denying the motion for reconsideration.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant of summary judgment. (Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 698-699.) In Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849, the California Supreme Court explained: “[I]n moving for summary judgment, a ‘defendant . . . has met’ his ‘burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if’ he ‘has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.’ ” (Id. at p. 849, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).)
DISCUSSION
Massey claims that the trial court erred by granting defendants’ motion for summary adjudication. Specifically, Massey claims that she established triable issues of material fact that defendants breached the settlement agreement and that she suffered damages. We conclude that the trial court did not err by summarily adjudicating the breach of contract cause of action.
The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) performance by plaintiff or excuse of nonperformance; (3) defendants’ breach; and (4) damages caused by the breach. (McDonald v. John P. Scripps Newspaper (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 100, 104 [“A fundamental rule of law is that ‘whether the action be in tort or contract compensatory damages cannot be recovered unless there is a causal connection between the act or omission complained of and the injury sustained.’ ”].) In this case, Massey failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to causation or damages.
1. Causation
Massey relies upon the following alleged facts in support of her breach of contract cause of action: (1) after the parties executed the October 1998 settlement agreement, LAUSD apparently allowed the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation to remain in her file which caused LAUSD representative Kathy Price to flag Massey’s application for the promotional examination; (2) in his 1999 tracer document evaluating Massey’s candidacy for an administrative position, principal Del Rio referred to the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation; and (3) in September 2005, there was a reference to the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation in Massey’s electronic file.
On this record, we do not reach the issue of whether these three foregoing incidents constituted a breach of contract. Assuming breach only for purposes of this opinion, we conclude that Massey has not raised a triable issue of material fact to establish a causal connection between the foregoing three items and her claimed injury of not being able to obtain an administrative assistant principal position. There is no evidence in the record that any decision maker at any school to which Massey applied was aware of the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation. There is no evidence that any school decision maker knew that Massey had been momentarily barred from taking the promotion examination; there is no evidence that any school decision maker knew that Del Rio had referenced the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation in his 1999 tracer evaluation; and there is no evidence that any school decision maker (or anyone else) knew about the reference to the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation in Massey’s electronic data base.
In fact, as soon as Massey informed the LAUSD, and specifically John Lade, about the fact that she was barred from taking the promotional examination, LAUSD immediately resolved the problem. Massey was cleared to take the exam. There is no evidence that anyone grading the promotional examination knew that she had received the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation. Notably, eight other individuals failed the test and Massey scored below those individuals. The evidence is undisputed that the promotional examination was scored objectively and not based upon prior supervisors’ comments.
In sum, there is no evidence supporting the allegation that Massey failed the promotional examination because she was initially flagged not to take the test because of the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation. There is also no evidence that Massey was denied an assistant principal position because her application to take the promotional examination was initially flagged.
With respect to Del Rio’s reference to the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation in his confidential tracer document, there is no evidence that any decision maker read his comments or was aware that he referred to the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation. In fact, Dr. Dina Wiley, LAUSD’s Director of Personnel Research and Assessment in the Human Resources Division, declared that the individuals who conducted the oral examinations, as well as principals and supervisors at schools where applicants applied, are not permitted to review the tracer documents.
Massey responds that Del Rio stated that he intended that his comments would be reviewed. Del Rio’s intention does not establish causation. Massey has not identified a single individual who was aware of Del Rio’s comments or his reference to the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation. About this, Dr. Wiley declared that the comments by past supervisors are not taken into account when scoring promotional examinations. In addition, Del Rio testified that he did not discuss his tracer document with anyone and did not discuss what he wrote in the tracer document with anyone.
Likewise, with respect to the reference to the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation in her electronic file, Massey presented no evidence that any school decision maker was aware of it. In fact, plaintiff presented no evidence that any LAUSD employee, a decision maker or not, knew the reference was there. In other words, Massey presented no evidence to support the allegation that LAUSD denied her a promotion to assistant principal because of the reference in her electronic file. Moreover, the evidence showed that LAUSD employees, including principals, evaluators and hiring administrators did not have access to an employee’s evaluation on the computer system.
Massey asserts, however, that one principal, Jan Avallone, made comments suggesting that she had spoken with Del Rio, or had reviewed his comments on the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation. Massey declared that Avallone used phrases which sounded similar to phrases used by Del Rio in the tracer document.
We reject this argument for two reasons. First, the clerk’s transcript at page 2207 shows that the trial court sustained defendants’ evidentiary objections to Massey’s declaration as to what Avallone stated to Massey. Massey has not asserted that the trial court abused its discretion with respect to this evidentiary ruling.
Second, considering this evidence, it is nothing but speculation. It is not a reasonable inference on this record. Massey presented no direct evidence that Avallone or any other principal knew about principal Del Rio’s reference to the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation in the tracer document. Thus, Massey has not presented substantial evidence in support of her allegation that defendants disclosed the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation to school principals and other decision-makers. (Fashion 21 v. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1149, internal quotation omitted [“An inference of fact must be based upon substantial evidence, not conjecture. . . . It must be such that a rational, well-constructed mind can reasonably draw from it the conclusion that the fact exists[.]”].)
In conclusion, to the extent that Massey has shown a breach of the settlement agreement (an issue we do not reach), Massey has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact that defendants’ handling of the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation caused her to suffer any injury.
2. Damages
Plaintiff asserts that she raised a triable issue of material fact that she suffered actual damages. First, Massey asserts that she failed to obtain a new position based upon defendants’ breach of the settlement agreement and is thus entitled to actual compensatory damages. Second, Massey asserts that to the extent that this court concludes that Massey did not raise a triable issue of actual damages, she is entitled to an award of nominal damages for defendants’ alleged breach of the settlement agreement. Third, Massey asserts that she is entitled to detrimental reliance damages. She asserts that she changed her position from assistant principal back to teacher at a reduced salary in detrimental reliance on the settlement agreement. We reject these assertions.
With respect to compensatory damages, “ ‘[i]t is fundamental that damages which are speculative, remote, imaginary, contingent, or merely possible cannot serve as a legal basis for recovery.’ ” (McDonald v. John P. Scripps Newspaper, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 105.) As explained above, Massey presented no evidence, just impermissible inference, that she was denied a promotion because of defendants’ handling of the 1997-1998 Stull evaluation. An award of compensatory damages based upon such speculation and inference is contrary to law.
With respect to nominal damages, “the failure to award nominal damages is not alone ground for reversal of a judgment.” (Sweet v. Johnson (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 630, 633 (Sweet).) The Sweet case states, however, that a plaintiff may be entitled to an award of nominal damages in cases in which a plaintiff can establish the elements of a breach of contract cause of action (other than damages) and without an award of nominal damages, the party showing a breach of contract would be liable for costs. (Id at p. 633.)
In this case, the order granting defendants’ motion for summary adjudication was not erroneous because of a failure to award nominal damages. The order must be affirmed because Massey failed to establish a triable issue of material fact as to causation. Thus, Massey was not entitled to an award of nominal damages because Massey cannot show that she should have prevailed on the breach of contract cause of action.
Finally, we reject Massey’s claim for detrimental reliance damages. To be entitled to such damages, Massey must make a showing of causation. (US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 904 [“Thus, because promissory estoppel claims are aimed solely at allowing recovery in equity where a contractual claim fails for a lack of consideration, and in all other respects the claim is akin to one for breach of contract, it is logical and proper to require that any claimed damages be caused by a defendant’s breach of the agreement.”)
Here, Massey has not made a showing that she was denied a promotion based upon defendants’ alleged breach of the settlement agreement. Thus, Massey has not shown that she was injured by voluntarily entering into the settlement agreement. She agreed to return to a teaching position. Thus, she is not entitled to an award of detrimental reliance damages.
DISPOSITION
The order granting defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the breach of contract cause of action is affirmed. Each party is to bear its own costs on appeal.
We concur: KLEIN, P. J., ALDRICH, J.