"It is impossible to determine, with any assurance, how or why the jury went wrong." Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Orr, 420 N.W.2d 1, 3 (N.D. 1988). Thus, reversal and remand, rather than a reduction in the award, is appropriate.
Id. at 169; see also Belinskey v. Hansen, 261 N.W.2d 390, 392 (N.D. 1977) (affirming denial of new trial where minor rear-end collision with claimed serious injuries and disability resulted in jury finding that other driver negligently caused collision but jury awarded nothing for damages). [¶ 11] Conversely in Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Orr, 420 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1988), this Court reversed and remanded a special jury verdict form that included the following findings: a security agreement existed between a debtor and a secured creditor; no agreement existed that would waive a deficiency judgment upon repossession of collateral; and a finding of no damages. Id. at 2.
The test is similar to the one applied to a jury's special verdict, where we will reverse and remand for a new trial if no reconciliation of the jury's answers is possible and the inconsistency is such that the special verdict will not support the judgment entered below or any other judgment. See, e.g., Barta v. Hinds, 1998 ND 104, ¶ 6, 578 N.W.2d 553; Fontes v. Dixon, 544 N.W.2d 869, 871 (N.D. 1996); Binstock v. Fort Yates Public School District, 463 N.W.2d 837, 839-40 (N.D. 1990); Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Orr, 420 N.W.2d 1, 3 (N.D. 1988). [¶ 13] The pivotal issue in this case is whether there was an oral agreement for the purchase of the entire 59.17 acres of the McEnroe property.
Id. at 27. See also Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Orr, 420 N.W.2d 1, 3 (N.D. 1988) (reversed and remanded special verdict where jury found that there was no agreement between secured creditor and debtor waiving deficiency judgment upon repossession of collateral, but jury awarded creditor no damages); Continental Assur. Co. v. Davis, 538 So.2d 542, 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (setting aside jury's award of compensatory and punitive damages against insurance company and its salesman where jury found that salesman did not deliberately and knowingly misrepresent policies). In Lewis, two of the jury's factual findings directly conflicted.
This court will generally interfere with a jury's award of damages only if it is so excessive or inadequate as to be without support in the evidence. Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747, 753 (N.D. 1989); Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Orr, 420 N.W.2d 1, 2 (N.D. 1988). Our review of the record here leads to the conclusion that various aspects of this jury verdict are clearly contrary to the evidence. Perhaps the most striking inadequacy in the verdict is the award of $34,000 for Karen's past medical expenses.
As the use of special verdict forms becomes more popular, and their use has increased greatly in recent years, we can on appeal expect even more allegations of inconsistent answers to the special interrogatories. E.g., Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Orr, 420 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1988). Presumably we will not abandon the theory of the law because of those challenges nor will we recommend the abandonment of the special interrogatories, although there are times when they may appear to be overly complicated.
Generally, special verdicts are upheld on appeal whenever possible and will be set aside only if perverse and clearly contrary to the evidence. Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Orr, 420 N.W.2d 1, 3 (N.D. 1988); Tsudek v. Target Stores, Inc., 414 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Minn.Ct.App. 1987). The test for reconciling apparent conflicts in the jury's answers is: