Massengill v. Sand

12 Citing cases

  1. Higgins v. Advanced Tower Servs.

    No. A-1-CA-40732 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2024)

    We review the WCJ's interpretation of Section 56-8-4 de novo. See Massengill v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co., 2013-NMCA-103, ¶ 6, 311 P.3d 1231. Because the WCJ did not find that there was bad faith-as discussed above- interest was properly calculated at the rate of 8.75 percent.

  2. Martin v. N.M. Mut. Cas. Co.

    547 P.3d 741 (N.M. Ct. App. 2024)

    Thus, we must give effect to this plain meaning unless there is some compelling reason to depart therefrom. See Taylor, 2021-NMCA-026, ¶ 8, 489 P.3d 994 (providing that if the plain language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it generally must be given effect); see also Massengill v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co., 2013-NMCA-103, ¶¶ 7-12, 311 P.3d 1231 (examining the employer’s contentions against applying the plain meaning of the statute). B. Reasons for Departing From the Plain Meaning

  3. Martin v. N.M. Mut. Cas. Co.

    No. A-1-CA-39609 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2023)

    Thus, we must give effect to this plain meaning unless there is some compelling reason to depart therefrom. See Taylor, 2021-NMCA-026, ¶ 8 (providing that if the plain language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it generally must be given effect); see also Massengill v. Fisher Sand &Gravel Co., 2013-NMCA-103, ¶¶ 7-12, 311 P.3d 1231 (examining the employer's contentions against applying the plain meaning of the statute).

  4. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Brian F.

    538 P.3d 478 (N.M. Ct. App. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    However, "[t]he term ‘finality’ is to be given a practical, rather than a technical, construction." Massengill v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co. , 2013-NMCA-103, ¶ 16, 311 P.3d 1231 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Where a judgment declares the rights and liabilities of the parties to the underlying controversy, a question remaining to be decided thereafter will not prevent the judgment from being final if resolution of that question will not alter the judgment or moot or revise decisions embodied therein."

  5. Barrozo v. Albertson's, Inc.

    No. A-1-CA-39001 (N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2022)

    {¶7} In response, Employer/Insurer observes that Section 52-1-49(A), on its face, does not indicate whether an employer must cover the full cost of health care services, medical cannabis included. See Massengill v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co., 2013-NMCA-103, ¶ 6, 311 P.3d 1231 (providing that, in determining the meaning of the Act, "[w]e look first to the plain meaning of the statute's words, and we construe the provisions of the [Act] together to produce a harmonious whole"). Along those lines, Employer/Insurer observes that Worker's argument runs counter to the Legislature's stated intent that the Act be interpreted "to assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured and disabled workers at a reasonable cost to the employers."

  6. Nieto v. Lowe's Co.

    No. A-1-CA-38644 (N.M. Ct. App. May. 3, 2022)

    "The term 'finality' is to be given a practical, rather than a technical, construction." Massengill v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co., 2013-NMCA-103, ¶ 16, 311 P.3d 1231 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Moreover, an "appeal from [a] final judgment draws [into] question all earlier nonfinal orders and rulings that produced [the] judgment."

  7. Stocker v. Lovelace Rehab Hosp.

    No. A-1-CA-37869 (N.M. Ct. App. Jun. 21, 2021)

    This body of law has been applied by this Court to determine the finality for appeal of an order or judgment of a WCJ. See Gomez v. Nielson's Corp., 1995-NMCA-043, ¶ 5, 119 N.M. 670, 894 P.2d 1026; Kellewood v. BHP Min. Int'l, 1993-NMCA-148, ¶ 1, 116 N.M. 678, 866 P.2d 406; see also Massengill v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co., 2013-NMCA-103, ¶ 13, 311 P.3d 1231. In the 2018 compensation order the WCJ determined that "[t]he 2016 [c]ompensation [o]rder resolved the issues presented for trial and was [a] final order for purposes of appeal."

  8. Stocker v. Lovelace Rehab Hospital

    No. A-1-CA-37869 (N.M. Ct. App. Jun. 12, 2021)

    This body of law has been applied by this Court to determine the finality for appeal of an order or judgment of a WCJ. See Gomez v. Nielson's Corp., 1995-NMCA-043, ¶ 5, 119 N.M. 670, 894 P.2d 1026; Kellewood v. BHP Min. Int'l, 1993-NMCA-148, ¶ 1, 116 N.M. 678, 866 P.2d 406; see also Massengill v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co., 2013-NMCA-103, ¶ 13, 311 P.3d 1231. In the 2018 compensation order the WCJ determined that "[t]he 2016 [c]ompensation [o]rder resolved the issues presented for trial and was [a] final order for purposes of appeal."

  9. Taylor v. Waste Mgmt. of N.M.

    2021 NMCA 26 (N.M. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 5 times
    Providing that if the plain language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it generally must be given effect

    In other words, while the existence of a plain meaning might normally end our inquiry, it may nevertheless be necessary to examine, inter alia, the history, background, and overall structure of the statutory provision being construed, as well as the purpose of the statute. See id. ¶¶ 7, 13; see also Dewitt v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 2009-NMSC-032, ¶ 29, 146 N.M. 453, 212 P.3d 341 (observing that where the plain language of the Act is clear, our statutory construction inquiry should normally end, but considering other principles of statutory construction to the extent the language could be considered ambiguous); Massengill v. Fisher Sand &Gravel Co., 2013-NMCA-103, ¶¶ 7-12, 311 P.3d 1231 (examining the employer's contentions against applying the plain meaning of the statute). Thus, we "exercise caution in relying only on the plain language of a statute because its beguiling simplicity may mask a host of reasons why a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the statute's meaning."

  10. Aragon v. Wilson & Co.

    No. A-1-CA-35034 (N.M. Ct. App. Jul. 15, 2019)

    Section 52- 5-12(C) is clear that Worker must be at MMI in order to receive a partial lump sum award, and therefore, Worker's challenge to the WCJ's MMI determination prevented the WCJ from entertaining a petition for lump sum payment. {27} Additionally, none of the authority Worker cites supports the proposition that the WCJ should have granted his petition for a partial lump sum award even though he appealed the WCJ's determination of his MMI. Worker relies on Massengill v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co., 2013-NMCA-103, 311 P.3d 1231, to support his argument, as we perceive it, that the WCJ should have awarded the partial lump sum award from the benefits Worker received under the compensation order. But Massengill is not helpful to Worker because it concerned the finality of a lump sum award order for purposes of an award of post-judgment interest.