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Massaro v. Yale New Haven Hospital

Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven
May 14, 2003
2003 Ct. Sup. 6854 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003)

Opinion

No. CV 02-0459379

May 14, 2003


MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE


Before the court is defendant's motion to strike count two of plaintiff's complaint.

The plaintiffs, Dawn Massaro and Robert Massaro, filed a three-count amended complaint on March 14, 2002 against the defendant, Yale New Haven Hospital. Counts one and two allege "hospital malpractice," and count three alleges a loss of consortium on behalf of Robert. On March 26, 2002, the hospital filed a motion to strike accompanied by a memorandum of law. It moves to strike the second count on the ground that it "is truly a spoliation of evidence claim at heart, and is not viable as a matter of law because Connecticut does not recognize the tort of spoliation." (Hospital's Motion to Strike.) The Massaros filed an opposition to the motion to strike on December 13, 2002. The hospital also filed a supplemental memorandum of law in support of its motion on February 13, 2003.

In count one, Dawn alleges the following facts. Dawn entered the hospital on September 24, 1999 where she gave birth to a baby girl by caesarean section. Following the birth, Dawn began to suffer from stomach and abdominal pain. On September 26, after Dawn became extremely ill, the hospital performed an abdominal x-ray. On September 29, emergency surgery was performed on the plaintiff "which revealed three separate perforated sites in her cecum . . . a markedly dilated colon, and copious pus and free air throughout her abdomen." (Amended Complaint, Count One, ¶ 9.) Dawn's cecum and a segment of her adjoining small and large intestine were removed and the surgeon performed an ileostomy. Dawn was released on October 12, 1999, but she developed an intestinal obstruction and was readmitted to the hospital on October 31, 1999. She was subsequently discharged on November 10, 2001 after undergoing "a second surgical exploration of her abdomen, surgical removal of the adhesions causing said intestinal obstruction, and surgical reversal of the ileostomy." (Amended Complaint, Count One, ¶ 13.)

Count two further alleges that the hospital lost or destroyed all x-rays taken of Dawn's abdomen during her hospital stay from September 24, 1999 to October 12, 1999, and that the unavailability of the films and records may prevent her from proving the cause of action alleged in count one. The second count also alleges that the hospital breached a duty of care to Dawn by failing to keep and maintain the x-ray films, and that, as a result of the hospital's spoliation, she cannot "causally connect her injuries and damages to the [hospital's] malpractice." (Amended Complaint, Count Two, ¶ 7.)

Count two of the amended complaint also incorporates paragraphs one through thirteen, eighteen and nineteen of count one.

"A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual finding by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 321, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as submitted and taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 260, 765 A.2d 505 (2001). The court must "construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, supra, 321.

In support of its motion, the hospital contends that count two alleges a claim for spoliation of evidence, which is merely a rule of evidence, and is not a recognized cause of action in Connecticut.

The Massaros argue that count two does not allege a cause of action for spoliation, but, rather, it alleges a negligence cause of action based upon the breach of the hospital's duty to maintain Dawn's medical records for her benefit.

In its supplemental memorandum in support of its motion, the hospital argues that a majority of decisions refuse to recognize a cause of action for spoliation when the defendant named in the spoliation count is the same defendant named in the negligence count. The hospital further argues that Connecticut courts have tools with which to sanction a party that has lost evidence without establishing an independent action for spoliation of evidence. Finally, the hospital contends that Connecticut simply does not recognize a cause of action for spoliation of evidence, nor does it recognize a statutory cause of action for lost medical records.

Count two of the plaintiff's complaint alleges hospital malpractice but is truly a spoliation of evidence claim. In Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 236 Conn. 769, 675 A.2d 829 (1996), the issue was "the effect of intentional spoliation of evidence in a products liability case." Id., 770. The court observed that the issue of spoliation of evidence had not ever been addressed by the court in a civil context. The court proceeded to adopt the rule of a majority of other jurisdictions in holding "that the trier of fact may draw an inference from the intentional spoliation of evidence that the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the party that destroyed it" provided that certain criteria are met. Id., 775. "In this state, spoliation refers to a rule of evidence, and is not a cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Butler v. Buchanan Marine Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, CV 95 0149347 (May 29, 1998, Mintz, J.) ( 22 Conn.L.Rptr. 213). See also Regency Coachworks v. General Motors Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, CV 95 554389 (June 26, 1996, Wagner, J.) ( 17 Conn.L.Rptr. 245). A majority of other jurisdictions have held that there is no cause of action for a spoliation of evidence claim. Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 921 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1990); see Christian v. Kenneth Chandler Construction Co., 658 So.2d 408 (Ala. 1995); La Raia v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 118, 722 P.2d 286 (1986); Murray v. Farmers Insurance Co., 118 Idaho 224, 796 P.2d 101 (1990); Gardner v. Blackston, 185 Ga. App. 754, 365 S.E.2d 545 (1988).

Having found no supporting authority in Connecticut allowing a cause of action for spoliation of evidence, the defendant's motion to strike count two of the amended complaint is granted by the court.

The court orders the parties to appear before the court for argument as to the appropriate sanction to be imposed against the defendant in connection with the lost radiological films.

Skolnick, J.


Summaries of

Massaro v. Yale New Haven Hospital

Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven
May 14, 2003
2003 Ct. Sup. 6854 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003)
Case details for

Massaro v. Yale New Haven Hospital

Case Details

Full title:DAWN MASSARO ET AL. v. YALE NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL

Court:Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven

Date published: May 14, 2003

Citations

2003 Ct. Sup. 6854 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003)
34 CLR 609