Opinion
Civil Action 2:21-cv-1170
11-04-2021
MANNA MASSAQUOI, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL ZAKEN, et al ., Defendants.
LISA PUPO LENIHAN, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMONDATION
ECF Nos. 7, 26
W. SCOTT HARDY, DISTRICT JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's “Motion for Immediate Permanent Injunction, Immediate Permanent Transfer, Appointment of Counsel, & Etc.” (ECF No. 7) be denied and recommended that Plaintiff's letter dated October 22, 2021, which has been construed and docketed as a Motion for Hearing (ECF No. 26) also be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff, Manna Massaquoi, a prisoner currently in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and confined at SCI-Greene, initiated this case in August 2021 and his Complaint was docketed on September 3, 2021. (ECF Nos. 1 & 5.) Plaintiff's Complaint names 143 Defendants, and, although it contains virtually no factual allegations against any of the Defendants, Plaintiff states that this action is brought for violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, and for additional violations. On September 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Immediate Permanent Injunction, Immediate Permanent Transfer, Appoint of Counsel, & Etc.” (ECF No. 7.) In the Motion, Plaintiff complains that he is “being falsely imprison[ed] & held on unrequested solitary segregation on unrequested self-confinement/protective custody status since 9/26/19” and further complains that the staff and guards at SCI-Greene are “deliberately refusing to return [his] already 10/5/19 initial inventoried in-cell property/legal documents plus [his] 10/10/19 addition approved legal exemption record box of legal documents/property, and again on 9/1/21 took away [his] remaining in-cell legal documents . . . /property.” Id., ¶ 1. Plaintiff additionally complains that prison officials at SCI-Greene are not wearing or not properly wearing their PPE/face masks. Id., ¶ 4. As relief, Plaintiff seeks the Court to (1) order officials at SCI-Greene to audio and video record every interaction they have with Plaintiff until this case is final, (2) order the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections to transfer him to SCI-Phoenix or SCI-Chester, (3) order officials at SCI-Greene to return his personal and legal property, and (4) appoint him an attorney. At the request of the Court, defense counsel entered his appearance for the limited purpose of participating in a telephone conference on the Motion held on September 29, 2021. (ECF Nos. 8, 9.) At the conference, discussion took place on the Motion and Plaintiff made an oral motion to amend to include a request that the guards be required to properly wear their face masks. (ECF No. 16.) That request was granted and defense counsel was directed to respond to Plaintiff's Motion by October 13, 2021. Id. Said response was filed on October 13, 2021. (ECF No. 25.)
B. Standard of Review
Motions for preliminary injunctive relief are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are judged against exacting legal standards. To obtain a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order, a movant “must satisfy the traditional four-factor test: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) granting relief will not result in even greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) the public interest favors such relief.” Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010). It is the movant's burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits. Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1992).
Pursuant to Rule 65(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(1). In contrast, a “court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney” if certain conditions are met. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1).
Preliminary injunctive relief “is not granted as a matter of right.” Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982), see also Thomas v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 3:13-CV-2661, 2014 WL 3955105, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) (“An injunction is an ‘extraordinary remedy' that is never awarded as of right.”). Rather, the decision to grant or deny such relief is committed to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 1982).
Generally, preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that places precise burdens on the moving party, and “[t]he preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). “It has been well stated that upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937). Further, where the requested preliminary injunctive relief “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnet v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980). Mandatory injunctions should be used sparingly. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982).
For a party to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 65, he must demonstrate both a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted. Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998); Kershner, 670 F.2d at 443. “As these elements suggest, there must be ‘a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.'” Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)). “To establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, the moving party must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause of action.” Sutton v. Cerullo, 3:CV-10-1899, 2014 WL 3900235, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2014). To establish irreparable injury, “the moving party must establish that the harm is imminent and probable.” Stilp v. Contino, 629 F.Supp.2d 449, 466 (M.D. Pa. 2009). “The mere risk of injury is not sufficient to meet this standard.” Id. And the burden of showing irreparable injury “is not an easy burden” to meet. Moore v. Mann, 3:CV-13-2771, 2014 WL 3893903, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug 7, 2014). In assessing a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the court must also consider the harm to the defendants and whether granting the preliminary injunction will be in the public interest. New Jersey Retail Merchants Ass'n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 388 (3d Cir. 2012).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
C. Discussion
With the above considerations in mind, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a temporary restraining order is warranted in this case. First and foremost, Plaintiff has not established a nexus between the injuries claimed in his Motion and the conduct asserted in the Complaint. Specifically, the issuance of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm until the court has an opportunity to rule on the merits of the pending lawsuit. However, Plaintiff's Complaint is void of any factual allegations against the Defendants, and, at this time, the injuries claimed in his Motion bear no relation to the pending action. See Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Medical Center, 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that “there must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint”); Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, 111 F.3d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of interim equitable relief is to protect the movant, during the pendency of the action, from being harmed or further harmed in the manner in which the movant contends [he] was or will be harmed through the illegality alleged in the complaint.”); Ball, 396 Fed.Appx. at 838 (affirming the denial of injunctive relief because the individuals whose conduct the plaintiff sought to enjoin were not named as defendants in the action and because most of the relief she was requesting was completely unrelated to the allegations in her amended complaint); Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that because plaintiff's motion was based on new assertions of mistreatment that are entirely different from the claim raised and the relief requested in the original lawsuit, they cannot provide the basis for a preliminary injunction); Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 647 (3d Cir. 1994) (“A primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is maintenance of the status quo until a decision on the merits of a case is rendered.”); see also Spencer v. Stapler, No. 04-1532, 2006 WL 2052704, *9 (D. Ariz. July 21, 2006) (denying plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief because it concerns events that are unrelated to the subject of his complaint and concerns conduct of persons other than the named defendants); Westbank Yellow Pages v. BRI, Inc., No. 96-1128, 1996 WL 255912, *1 (E.D. La. May 13, 1996) (determining that a preliminary injunction is not an appropriate vehicle for trying to obtain relief that is not sought in the underlying action); Williams v. Platt, 2006 WL 149124, *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 18, 2006) (concluding that “[a] preliminary injunction would be inappropriate to address wrongs wholly unrelated to the complaint”).
The undersigned would note that by Order dated September 29, 2021, Plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint by October 29, 2021, with such amended complaint to comply with the instructions contained in the Order. (ECF No. 17.) As of today, no amended complaint has been received.
Nevertheless, based solely on the allegations in the Motion itself, Plaintiff has not shown an immediate irreparable injury justifying the grant of the relief he is requesting. Irreparable injury is established by showing that the plaintiff will suffer harm that “cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989) (‘The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm').” In this context, the word irreparable has a specific meaning and connotes “that which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again, [or] atoned for . . . .” Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (citations omitted). Thus, an injunction will not issue “simply to eliminate the possibility of a remote future injury . . . .” Id. at 655 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff, who has the burden of showing an imminent threat of irreparable injury, has failed to meet this precise burden with respect to his various requests for preliminary injunctive relief. With respect to the allegations made in his Motion, defense counsel has submitted a declaration from Sam V. Napoleon, a Lieutenant currently assigned to the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) at SCI-Greene. (ECF No. 25-1.) Lt. Napoleon states that at the time Plaintiff's Motion was filed, he was serving a disciplinary sanction and was held in Disciplinary Custody (“DC”) status. However, Plaintiff's DC time expired on September 27, 2021, and he was changed to Administrative Custody (“AC”) status. Plaintiff has since been recommended for transfer to the Step Down Unit (“SDU”) at SCI-Greene, which allows for long-term RHU inmates to adjust to increased privileges in a less secure environment with the ultimate goal of placing the inmate in a general population housing unit, but, to date, Plaintiff has refused the transfer to the SDU program and has therefore remained in the RHU. With respect to Plaintiff's property, Lt. Napoleon states that Plaintiff was found to have “extreme excess” in-cell property following a routine cell search on August 21, 2021. At the time of the cell search, Plaintiff did not have a valid legal exemption for additional legal property. While he was subsequently afforded an opportunity to review his property with staff, he refused. Plaintiff has since obtained legal exemptions, but he now refuses to sign documentation that would acknowledge that he has received and taken custody of such legal property. Finally, with respect to Plaintiff's allegation that staff at SCI-Greene are not wearing or properly wearing their face masks, Lt. Napoleon states that the Department of Corrections has a policy, which is implemented at SCI-Greene, that requires all staff to be vaccinated or provide proof of a negative test on a weekly basis before working at the facility. The policy also requires all staff to properly wear a mask while at work and SCI-Greene enforces this masking policy if an employee is seen not complying with it.
According to Lt. Napoleon, and per Department of Corrections policy, an inmate may only have a total amount of property (all property, not simply in-cell property) that fits into four standard size record boxes plus any authorized legal exemptions. An inmate on AC status is only permitted in-cell property that will fit into one standard size record box, but SCI Greene permits one additional in-cell box for legal materials with an approved exemption.
Apart from calling it all “lies, ” Plaintiff has not filed anything refuting the statements made by Lt. Napoleon in his declaration, and the undersigned finds that, based on the representations made by Lt. Napoleon, Plaintiff is not at risk of immediate or irreparable injury with respect to his claims regarding his property or access to his property, or his claims regarding staff not properly wearing their face masks. Consequently, his Motion should be denied with respect to his specific requests for preliminary injunctive relief regarding ordering the return of his property or ordering staff at SCI-Greene to wear or properly wear their face masks.
Next, with respect to Plaintiff's request that the Court order officials at SCI-Greene to audio and video record every interaction they have with Plaintiff, and to order his transfer to SCI-Phoenix or SCI-Chester, the undersigned would note that granting such relief would “effectively have the federal courts making ad hoc, and individual, decisions concerning the treatment of a single prisoner, [which] could harm both the defendants' and the public's interest.” Kelly v. Merrill, 2014 WL 7740025, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2014); see generally Jenkins v. Crayton, 2013 WL 3467191, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 10, 2013) (“The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the ‘operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.'” (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974)). The balance of the hardships does not weigh in favor of granting Plaintiff these specific requests for preliminary injunctive relief and, for this reason, his Motion should also be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's “Motion for Immediate Permanent Injunction, Immediate Permanent Transfer, Appointment of Counsel, & Etc.” (ECF No. 7) be denied and recommended that Plaintiff's letter dated October 22, 2021, which has been construed and docketed as a Motion for Hearing on the aforementioned Motion (ECF No. 26) also be denied.
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)&(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written objections thereto. Plaintiff's failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.