Opinion
33651.
DECIDED JULY 16, 1951.
Appeal; from Fulton Superior Court — Judge Pharr. April 25, 1951.
T. J. Long, Nick Long Jr., for plaintiffs in error.
Austin, Fisher Hilliard, James M. Austin, Maurice H. Hilliard, contra.
There being some evidence to support the findings of the full compensation board, which also specifically ruled that the injury to the claimant was an accidental one and arose out of and during the course of his employment, and on appeal to the superior court such award being affirmed, and there being no fraud apparent, such award will not be disturbed and set aside by this court.
DECIDED JULY 16, 1951.
This case arose under the Workmen's Compensation Act upon an appeal by the employer, the Orkin Exterminating Company, and the Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company, the insurer, from an award of a single director of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation, which award was approved by a majority of the full board, to the Superior Court of Fulton County, which court denied said appeal, approving and affirming the award.
The director, before whom the claim was first heard, found as a matter of fact that the claimant sustained an injury on March 22, 1950, which grew out of and in the course of his employment, and awarded compensation to him for total disability. The director also found, from the testimony of the claimant on the hearing, that before the claimant, who did some actual physical work on this job, went out on a call to the Georgia Baptist Tabernacle where he suffered the heart attack and thereby became totally disabled, he was moving some heavy barrels weighing as much as 100 pounds each; that on the day of the attack he went out on a call to locate a dead rat at the Baptist Tabernacle and when he arrived there he had a heart attack, being rendered unconscious therefrom. The director also found as a matter of fact that the claimant had a pre-existing heart ailment and "myocardial" condition. The director further found that the physician examining the claimant testified that "overexertion" is "certainly a factor, at least in a good many cases, if not all, whether just preceding the attack or several days before."
On this hearing the claimant testified that he was 58 years of age and had been employed by his employer for 21 years; that he was transferred from a route to the stockroom in January, 1950; that his work in the stockroom necessitated the moving of heavy objects and even lifting them, and his duties were much more arduous and exacting upon his strength than the work he had been doing on the route; that the same consisted of moving barrels, kegs and boxes, and keeping stock; and that he has not been able to work since the attack on March 22, 1950. The claimant testified as to how the attack took place and as to his examination by the physicians, one of whom, Dr. Parks, testified as to the fact that his work, which could cause overexertion, could easily have at least contributed to the subsequent heart attack and aggravated any pre-existing heart condition.
While Dr. Jeff L. Richardson testified for the employer, by deposition read on the hearing "that the patient's coronary thrombosis was due to arteriosclerosis and not physical exertion," Dr. Harry Parks, who testified by deposition for the claimant, said that the claimant was brought into his office by another doctor on March 22, 1950, the day of the attack, and he appeared to have all the symptoms of a very sick man; that the witness visited the claimant many times at the hospital where he was confined; that the claimant was discharged on April 16, 1950, in an improved condition; that subsequently the doctor visited the claimant at his home and at the office of the physician; and that "overexertion is certainly a factor [in such seizure as it is shown that the claimant had] at least in a great many cases, if not all, whether just preceding the attack or some days before."
The award of the director was appealed to the full State Board of Workmen's Compensation and on February 26, 1951, that board made this finding: "The evidence demands a finding that the heart attack was the result of an accident and injury which arose out of and in the course of his [claimant's] employment while he was undergoing physical exertion in the performance of his duties" and that "the hearing director did not specifically find that the disability was the result of an accident and injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, but the majority of the board does so find, and with this additional finding, the award of the deputy director, dated January 23, 1951, as herein amended, is affirmed." Chairman Arlie D. Tucker dissented from this ruling and award. From the order and judgment of the Superior Court of Fulton County denying the appeal of the employer and the insurance carrier, exception is taken to this court.
The record presents but a sole question for determination by this court, and that is, whether or not the heart attack suffered by the claimant on March 22, 1950, causing his total disability, resulted from an accidental injury, which arose out of and during the course of the claimant's employment. The director found that the claimant was entitled to compensation because of his total disability and the full board approved this finding and also amended the award by finding that the accidental injury of the claimant was an injury growing out of his employment and during the course thereof. An award of the compensation board, where supported by the facts in the record and not contrary to law in some manner, is binding upon the courts and will be, in the absence of fraud, upheld. Code, § 114-102. The single director or the full board, as the case may be, constitutes the fact-finding body, and if there is any evidence to sustain a finding made, no matter how much evidence there is to the contrary, this court will not disturb that finding, unless it is contrary to law in some manner. The finding of fact that the claimant performed work before going out on a call, which work could cause overexertion to a man of the claimant's age, and particularly when that person had a cardiac ailment at the time, although unknown to him, was a proper finding of fact, where the medical expert, who examined the claimant immediately after the attack and who treated him therefor, testified to the effect that "overexertion is certainly a factor at least in a great many cases, if not all, whether just preceding the attack or some days before." Such finding was not, according to the authorities examined by this court construing the Workmen's Compensation Law and which are set out hereinafter, contrary to the law for any reason. The courts of this State have held that a heart attack, where brought about by the employee's work, such as lifting heavy objects, becoming fatigued, overexertion, straining, et cetera, even though there is no external mishap or unexpected occurrence, is properly found to be an accidental injury, and where disability or death results therefrom, the same is properly found by the board as compensable under said law. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277 ( 9 S.E.2d 84), and cit. See also Maddox v. Buice Transfer c. Co., 81 Ga. App. 503 ( 59 S.E.2d 329); Fidelity Casualty Company v. Adams, 70 Ga. App. 297 ( 28 S.E.2d, 79). This holding is in harmony with the decisions of both the English courts and other American State courts in those jurisdictions having compensation laws similar to ours. See Griggs v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 61 Ga. App. 448 ( 6 S.E.2d 180), and the outside authorities therein dealt with.
Even where the employee had a pre-existing ailment which the overexertion or strain caused to flare up and become aggravated, it was properly ruled to have been an accidental injury arising out of and during the course of the employment, and compensable. See Maddox v. Buice, supra; U.S. Casualty Company v. Kelly, 78 Ga. App. 112 (50 2d, 238); Williams v. Maryland Casualty Co., 67 Ga. App. 649 ( 21 S.E.2d 478), and cit. Where the accident hastened or accelerated the ultimate result, i.e., the disability or the death of the employee, the courts uniformly hold that compensation may be awarded. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Buchanan, 79 Ga. App. 439 ( 54 S.E.2d 156). This is true even though the employee had no knowledge of any pre-existing ailment. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Young, 77 Ga. App. 512 ( 48 S.E.2d 748). Also, it is the rule that although the disability or death does not result immediately from the overexertion or strain, incurred during the employee's work, the board may properly find in favor of awarding compensation. Maddox v. Buice, supra. In a case recently decided by this court, the employee had a malignant internal carcinoma, and there was evidence that about a week or so before the employee died, and while he was at work, he sustained a blow in the region of this cancer, which could cause a more rapid spread of the malignant cancer cells and hasten death, compensation was not improperly awarded. This court ruled that this was true although there was medical testimony to the effect that the treatment received by the employee rather than the blow hastened his death, where there was some testimony that the accidental blow was a contributing proximate cause of the employee's death. After the accident in that case, the claimant worked for a week without any apparent unsatisfactory results of the accident. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company v. Reed, ante. This is analogous to the principle of law decided in the instant case.
It follows that there being some evidence to support the award of the deputy director and approved by the full board, which also specifically ruled that the injury was an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and the same having been affirmed on appeal to the Superior Court of Fulton County, and there being no fraud apparent, such award will not be disturbed and set aside by this court.
Judgment affirmed. MacIntyre, P.J., and Townsend, J., concur.