Given the circumstances, in which two of plaintiff's treating physicians have speculated that there is a psychological or "factitious" element to plaintiff's complaints and have referred plaintiff for psychiatric evaluation, we conclude that plaintiff's psychological status is "in controversy," thus requiring plaintiff to submit to examination by a psychiatrist designated by the defense (CPLR 3121[a]; see generally, Koump v Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287, 294). Further, nothing in the CPLR precludes psychological testing, provided that it is performed by or under the supervision of a physician ( see, Rook v. 60 Key Centre, 237 A.D.2d 901 [decided herewith], citing Paris v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 218 A.D.2d 561, 563-564; cf., Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v. Stamm, 237 A.D.2d 145). (Appeals from Order of Supreme Court, Erie County, Whelan, J. — Discovery.)

Here, defendants failed to show that a further physical examination of plaintiff was required. All of plaintiff's injuries were known at the time defendants assigned the first orthopedist, and there was no change of circumstances, such as additionally pleaded injuries to a different body part or the unavailability of the orthopedist (see Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v Stamm, 237 A.D.2d 145 [1st Dept 1997]; Strauss v New York Ethical Culture Socy., 210 A.D.2d 134, 134 [1st Dept 1994]).

Moreover, the defendant failed to show why the information obtained from the prior examination was inadequate, or that the first doctor was unqualified to render an evaluation ( see, Stella v. Ahmed, supra; see also, Strauss v. New York Ethical Culture Socy., 210 A.D.2d 134; Korolyk v. Blagman, 89 A.D.2d 578, 579). Finally, the defendant's dissatisfaction with his chosen expert's diagnosis of the plaintiff's condition does not warrant a second examination by a new expert ( see, Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v. Stamm, 237 A.D.2d 145). Therefore, the Supreme Court's order denying the plaintiffs' motion to vacate the prior determination must be reversed, and the prior order vacated.

Plaintiff, relying on cases such as Greene v Xerox Corp. (244 AD2d 877), Antonelli v Yale Materials Handling Corp. (239 AD2d 951), and Rook v 60 Key Centre (237 AD2d 901), argues that any examination of plaintiff by Dr. Fisher must be supervised by a physician. In Antonelli, for example, our Appellate Division held that "nothing in the CPLR precludes psychological testing, provided that it is performed by or under the supervision of a physician (see, Rook v 60 Key Centre, 237 AD2d 901 [decided herewith], citing Paris v Waterman S. S. Corp., 218 AD2d 561, 563-564; cf., Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v Stamm, 237 AD2d 145)" (Antonelli v Yale Materials Handling Corp., supra [emphasis added]). In Paris v Waterman S. S. Corp. (218 AD2d 561, 564, supra) —the Appellate Division, First Department case cited by our Appellate Division in Antonelli (supra) — the Court held that CPLR 3121—which expressly authorizes a physical or mental examination of a party who has put his or her physical or mental condition at issue in a lawsuit—does not preclude "examination by any non-medical health professional when such an examiner, providing only a diagnostic tool for the physician, is only acting as an agent for, and under the direction of, the designated physician." The dispute in Paris centered, as it does in the instant case, on an examination by a psychologist.