Mass Transfer Inc. v. Vincent Constr. Co.

8 Citing cases

  1. Jamax Corppration v. City of Bridgeport

    Case No. 05-CV-4207-JPG (S.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2006)

    Under Illinois law, a foreign corporation is not required to obtain a certificate of authority if it is "simply conducting interstate commerce[,]" Subway Rests., Inc. v. Riggs, 696 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ill.App.Ct. 1 Dist. 1998), and a defendant bears the burden of establishing that the plaintiff is conducting business in violation of the Business Corporation Act. Id.; Mass Transfer Inc. v. Vincent Const. Co., 585 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Ill.App.Ct. 5th Dist. 1992). In its complaint, Jamax alleges that it is an Indiana corporation that does business in Illinois and it plainly asserts that it conducts an interstate business (Doc. 2 at ¶¶ 1, 97, 98, 99, 100, and 101).

  2. Central Mfg. Co. v. Brett

    No. 04 C 3049 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2006)

    In addition, where a foreign corporation can demonstrate that it is engaged in interstate commerce in Illinois, it is not required to obtain a certificate of authority and may bring an action in an Illinois court. See, e.g., Subway Rests., Inc. v. Riggs, 696 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ill.App.Ct. 1998); Mass Transfer Inc. v. Vincent Constr. Co., 585 N.E.2d 1286, 1289-90 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992); Buckingham Corp. v. Modern Liquors, Inc., 306 N.E.2d 650, 652 (Ill.App.Ct. 1973). Incapacity to sue would affect only plaintiffs' ability to bring a claim under Illinois law.

  3. Europaper B.V. v. Integrated Material Managment Serv., Inc.

    No. 01 C 211 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 16, 2003)

    Matsukis bears the burden of proving that Europaper was transacting business in Illinois, and absent proof to the contrary it cannot be assumed that Europaper operated in violation of the statute. Masss Transfer Inc. v. Vincent Constr. Co., 585 N.E.2d 1286 (1992). Furthermore, Illinois courts have also held that the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits Illinois from requiring that foreign corporations that "simply conduct interstate commerce," (though they have not addressed foreign commerce) obtain a certificate of authority.

  4. Am. Consumer Prods. Corp. v. Inland Real Estate Auctions, Inc.

    2013 Ill. App. 2d 121174 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    s not raised at the earliest opportunity). ¶ 35 Even if defendants could properly raise an alleged violation of section 13.70 in a response to the motion to vacate, defendants essentially argued that the fact that ACPC had a principal office in the state meant that ACPC was transacting business here. By not providing any evidence as to what ACPC was actually doing through its principal office, defendants could not be said to have satisfied their burden of proving that ACPC violated the Business Act. Cf. Career Concepts, Inc. v. Synergy, Inc., 372 Ill. App. 3d 395, 403 (2007) (the defendant did not satisfy its burden that the plaintiff violated the Act through evidence that: (1) it was not listed as a foreign corporation authorized to conduct business in Illinois, and (2) its owner and president testified that the company regularly assisted Illinois residents in finding jobs in Illinois, and he had attended industry meetings in Illinois to solicit business a couple of times); see also Mass Transfer Inc. v. Vincent Construction Co., 223 Ill. App. 3d 746, 752 (1992) ("Absent proof to the contrary, the trial court erred in assuming that the plaintiff was transacting business in Illinois in violation of the statute."). Therefore, the trial court erred in accepting defendants' assertion that ACPC violated section 13.70. ¶ 36 As stated, the trial court denied ACPC's motion to vacate solely on the basis that ACPC could not maintain the suit because: (1) it had dissolved after its bankruptcy, and (2) it was a foreign corporation transacting business in Illinois without registering in this state, in violation of section 13.70 of the Business Act.

  5. Bank of America, N.A. v. Ebro Foods, Inc.

    409 Ill. App. 3d 704 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 28 times
    Addressing whether federal law preempted state requirement that corporations obtain certificate of authority to pursue civil action

    On a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, Duffy cannot satisfy this burden merely by showing that Bank of America is a foreign corporation without a valid certificate of authority. Mass Transfer Inc. v. Vincent Construction Co., 223 Ill. App. 3d 746, 751-52 (1992). Duffy must also allege facts showing that Bank of America was not engaged in conducting interstate commerce.

  6. Career Concepts v. Synergy

    372 Ill. App. 3d 395 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 32 times
    Noting that the trier of fact determines the credibility of the witnesses, weighs their testimony, and resolves conflicts in the evidence

    Defendant's burden of proof, however, is not satisfied with this information alone. See Mass Transfer, Inc. v. Vincent Construction Co., 223 Ill. App. 3d 746, 751-52 (1992). Defendant additionally argues that the trial evidence "indisputably" demonstrated that plaintiff was regularly transacting business in Illinois as an unauthorized foreign corporation.

  7. Subway Restaurants Inc. v. Riggs

    297 Ill. App. 3d 284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 19 times
    In Subway Restaurants, Inc. v. Riggs, 696 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ill.App. 1998), the court held that Subway Restaurants' business in Illinois-namely, “10 leasing transactions”-did “not constitute a substantial amount of business in Illinois” for purposes of the IBCA.

    Textile Fabrics Corp. v. Roundtree, 39 Ill.2d 122, 233 N.E.2d 376 (1968). Defendant bears the burden of proof on the issue of whether SRI was transacting business in Illinois in violation of the Business Corporation Act. Mass. Transfer Inc. v. Vincent Construction Co., 223 Ill. App.3d 746, 585 N.E.2d 1286 (1992). The information provided in the record concerning the leasing transactions leads us to find that defendant failed to sustain this burden.

  8. Walker Proc. Equip. v. Advance Mech. Sys

    282 Ill. App. 3d 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 7 times
    Noting that courts have been willing to consider substantial compliance arguments despite strict construction of the procedural provisions of the Mechanics Lien Act where a technical construction would undermine its purposes

    Aluma Systems, Inc. v. Frederick Quinn Corp., 206 Ill. App.3d 828, 840, 564 N.E.2d 1280 (1990). An instructive case is Mass. Transfer Inc. v. Vincent Construction Co., 223 Ill. App.3d 746, 585 N.E.2d 1286 (1992). There, the plaintiff-subcontractor filed a claim for a public lien against the general contractor and the municipality of Anna, Illinois, pursuant to section 23. Plaintiff's initial notice of claim for lien was not in compliance with section 23 because the notice was sent by regular mail and the statute requires that the notice be delivered by means other than regular mail. Subsequently, plaintiff sent another notice by certified mail. Plaintiff's case was dismissed, and on appeal, the general contractor argued that because the initial notice of lien was improper, the subsequent notice was void.