Opinion
14-P-757
02-06-2015
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. UNITED STEELWORKERS, LOCAL 5696 & another.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Massachusetts Department of Transportation (MassDOT), appeals from an order of the Superior Court denying its motion to vacate an arbitration award, and entering judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant United Steelworkers, Local 5696 and Coalition of MassDOT Unions - Bargaining Unit E (union). MassDOT claims the arbitrator exceeded his powers by modifying or adding to the express terms of the contract agreed to by both parties. We affirm.
"The strong public policy favoring arbitration requires us to uphold an arbitrator's decision even where it is wrong on the facts or the law, and whether it is wise or foolish, clear or ambiguous." Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Assn., 443 Mass. 813, 818 (2005). This is particularly so in the context of labor disputes. See School Comm. of Pittsfield v. United Educators of Pittsfield, 438 Mass. 753, 758 (2003) ("Arbitration has long been viewed as a particularly appropriate and effective means to resolve labor disputes"). Judicial review of an arbitrator's decision is, as pertinent here, limited to determining whether the arbitrator exceeded the powers granted him by the parties in the collective bargaining agreement. See G. L. c. 251, § 12(a)(3). "If there is room for doubt or interpretation on the question, then the issue properly lies within the broad authority conferred upon arbitrators of civil disputes." Plymouth-Carver Regional Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., 407 Mass. 1006, 1008 (1990) (citation omitted).
MassDOT claims that the relevant section of the agreement, section 7.1, is "plain and unambiguous," and therefore the arbitrator's remedy -- and the Superior Court's judgment -- should be vacated. We disagree. Section 7.1 states that the workweeks for employees transitioned from their former agency to MassDOT shall be "as has been established for that job title at the particular job location . . . ." Left open is the question of determining how workweeks are "established" at a particular location.
The parties were bound by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the Commonwealth and the Massachusetts Organization of State Engineers and Scientists (MOSES).
It may be, as the union urged and the arbitrator concluded, that workweeks are "established" by reference to the workweeks of employees already working at that location (or similar locations) at the time of the transition. On the other hand, it may be, as MassDOT urges, that workweeks are "established" by looking to the hours that transitioned employees worked at the time of their transition to MassDOT. That question of contract interpretation is ultimately not one for our resolution. See Boston v. Professional Staff Assn., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 105, 112 (2004) (courts have "no business overruling an arbitrator because [they] give a contract a different interpretation). Given that section 7.1 of the agreement was ambiguous, we cannot say the arbitrator exceeded his powers in interpreting that provision, even if he committed an error of law or fact in so doing. Indeed, "[i]t was the arbitrator's interpretation of the bargained-for language that the [parties] had agreed to accept, not the interpretation by a court acting upon a subsequent application under G. L. c. 150C, § 11." Sheriff of Suffolk County v. AFSCME Council 93, Local 419, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 222, 226 (2007).
MassDOT relies on School Comm. of Hanover v. Hanover Teachers Assn., 435 Mass. 736 (2002) (Hanover), in support of its argument that the arbitrator here exceeded his powers by going beyond the terms of the contract in fashioning a remedy. However, as the Superior Court judge held, the contested provision in Hanover unambiguously excluded nurses from coverage, yet the arbitrator nevertheless ruled they should be included. In that circumstance, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the arbitrator exceeded his powers where his chosen remedy went directly contrary to an agreement that left "no room for doubt as to interpretation." Id. at 741. Such is not the case where, as here, the contested language is ambiguous, and parol evidence was required to ascertain its meaning.
We do not accept the union's claim that MassDOT's argument is "entirely frivolous." Consequently, we reject its request for costs and appellate attorney's fees. "Unpersuasive arguments do not necessarily render an appeal frivolous." Avery v. Steele, 414 Mass. 450, 455 (1993).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Kafker, Meade & Maldonado, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: February 6, 2015.