Opinion
No. 10–P–1064.
2013-08-8
MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another v. FUNG WAH BUS TRANSPORTATION, INC., & another.
Adoption of Daisy, 460 Mass. 72, 76–77 (2011).
By the Court (RAPOZA, C.J., CYPHER & CARHART, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
In January, 2004, Albert and Mary Sten–Clanton, both of whom are visually impaired, were denied transportation on a bus owned and operated by Fung Wah Bus Transportation, Inc., due to the directive of Pei Lin Liang, its president (collectively, the defendants). The Attorney General filed a charge with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) in March, 2005, alleging that the defendants had violated State anti-discrimination laws by their actions. After a hearing, the MCAD hearing officer in July, 2007, found that the defendants violated the Massachusetts public accommodation law, G.L. c. 272, §§ 98 and 98A.
The hearing officer ordered the defendants to pay a total of just over $60,000 in damages to the Sten–Clantons, pay a civil penalty of $10,000, and comply with various conditions.
The parties stipulated before the hearing officer that the buses owned and operated by the defendants are places of public accommodation within the meaning of G.L. c. 272, § 98.
The defendants appealed the hearing officer's decision to the full MCAD. On October 28, 2008, the MCAD dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the hearing officer in its entirety. The defendants did not file an action for judicial review of the October 28, 2008, MCAD decision, the final agency decision for purposes of judicial review pursuant to G.L. c. 151B, § 6.
.General Laws c. 151B, § 6, permits respondents to appeal decisions of the MCAD within thirty days after the service of such a decision.
On September 1, 2009, more than ten months after the final decision of the MCAD, the Commonwealth and the MCAD sought enforcement of the final decision in Superior Court pursuant to G.L. c. 151B, § 6. The defendants filed an opposition to the motion of the MCAD and the Commonwealth for final judgment, by which the defendants sought judicial review of the damages portion of the MCAD decision. The MCAD and the Commonwealth moved to strike the defendants' opposition. After a hearing, the Superior Court judge allowed both the motion to enforce the MCAD final decision and the motion to strike the defendants' opposition, stating that “[as] the [thirty-]day period to appeal the [MCAD's] Final Order has expired, this Court does not now have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See Friedman v. B[oard] of Registration in Medicine, 414 Mass. 663 (1993); Stowe v. Bologna, 415 Mass. 20, 22 (1993).” The defendants now appeal.
Discussion.General Laws c. 151B, § 6, as amended through St.1987, c. 465, § 38, states, in relevant part:
“Any complainant, respondent or other person aggrieved by such order of the commission may obtain judicial review thereof, and the commission may obtain an order of court for its enforcement, in a proceeding as provided in this section.... The court shall have power ... to make and enter ... an order or decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the commission.... A proceeding under this section when instituted by any complainant, respondent or other person aggrieved must be instituted within thirty days after the service of the order of the commission.”
The defendants concede that they did not timely appeal the final decision of the MCAD. They argue, however, that they are nonetheless entitled to a review of the damages award because it was the MCAD which brought this action in the Superior Court, not them. As set out in the statute, a respondent or other person aggrieved by a decision of the MCAD has thirty days to appeal that decision to the Superior Court. The MCAD is not subject to any time limitation for bringing an enforcement action in the Superior Court.
The defendants argue that the language of § 6 permits the Superior Court to review any aspect of a decision of the MCAD whenever the MCAD commences a proceeding to enforce that decision. The MCAD, on the other hand, argues that the defendants' failure to file a timely appeal is fatal to their argument that they are entitled to any form of judicial review.
We are guided by the familiar principles of statutory construction:
“In interpreting a statute, we look first to its language as the ‘principal source of insight into legislative intent.’ Water Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 740, 744 (2010), quoting Providence & Worcester R.R. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 453 Mass. 135, 142 (2009). Where the meaning of the language is plain and unambiguous, we will not look to extrinsic evidence of legislative intent ‘unless a literal construction would yield an absurd or unworkable result.’ Boston Hous. Auth. v. National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 3, 458 Mass. 155, 162 (2010).... Where the meaning of a statute is not plain from its language, we consider the ‘cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.’ DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 486, 490 (2009), quoting Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364 (1975).”
Adoption of Daisy, 460 Mass. 72, 76–77 (2011).
We interpret G.L. c. 151B, § 6, to mean that when a respondent fails to timely appeal the decision of the MCAD, a court at the time of an enforcement proceeding can consider the respondent's arguments regarding the decision only as to matters that could not have been raised on direct appeal. Our interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Massachusetts Commn. Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli, 357 Mass. 112 (1970), a case the defendants rely on heavily. Much of the discussion in Franzaroli pertains to the dual-track mechanism for appeals in cases of housing discrimination pursuant to G.L. c. 151B, § 5, which is not at issue here. Relevant to this case, however, is the court's statement that “the statutory scheme assures that ... where the respondents are unable or unwilling to seek review under ... § 6, the propriety of a damage award will still be reviewed by the Superior Court.” 357 Mass. at 114–115. The interpretation of § 6 that we set out above permits the court to review damages awards to the extent a respondent's arguments related to the award could not have been made in a timely appeal. To permit the court to review any more than what could not have been raised on appeal would render meaningless the final sentence of § 6 (“A proceeding under this section when instituted by any complainant, respondent or other person aggrieved must be instituted within thirty days ...”).
Here, the defendants argued at the enforcement proceeding that there was insufficient evidence to support the MCAD decision and that the amount of damages awarded was excessive. Both of these arguments could have been raised in a direct appeal. Accordingly, the judge was right to conclude that he did not have authority to consider them.
Judgment affirmed.