Minn. Stat. ___.03, subd. 6. Minnesota courts have consistently held that, because the issuance of building permits and certificates of occupancy and the interpretation of building codes are discretionary acts, municipalities are immune from tort liability for those acts. Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 287 Minn. 287, 289, 178 N.W.2d 215, 217 (1970) (issuance of building permits protected by statutory immunity); Masonick v. J.P. Homes, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn.App. 1993) (issuance of occupancy certificates is protected discretionary function). In Snyder, the supreme court reaffirmed the general rule that the issuance of a building permit is a protected discretionary function.
This court has previously granted immunity where the decision-making process being evaluated is similar to that involved in the issuance of a building permit. See Masonick v. J.P. Homes, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn.App. 1993) (holding that "the decision making process involved in the issuance of a certificate of occupancy is similar to that involved in the issuance of a building permit and therefore * * * a protected discretionary function"). And the record indicates that the procedure followed in deciding whether to grant a permit to construct a sewage treatment system is similar to that involved in deciding whether to grant a building permit — both attempt to ensure that minimum safety requirements are met. See Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 287 Minn. 287, 288, 178 N.W.2d 215, 217 (1970) ("The act [of issuing a building permit] involved an exercise of discretion in the sense that the city's employee had to make a judgment as to whether plans submitted * * * constituted a permissible use of the property.").
Lakewood also argues it had no duty to warn Rasivong. Generally, a litigant has no right to interlocutory review of issues that do not involve immunity from suit. See Boop v. City of Lino Lakes, 502 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Minn.App. 1993) (interlocutory appeal of denial of summary judgment inappropriate for issue not involving immunity from suit); Masonick v. J.P. Homes, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn.App. 1993) (interlocutory appeal of issue involving defense to suit rather than immunity from suit is inappropriate); Stubbs v. North Memorial Medical Ctr., 448 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Minn.App. 1989) (denial of motion for summary judgment ordinarily not appealable), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 12, 1990).
Minnesota courts have held that the act of a municipal employee issuing various types of permits was an exercise of discretion protected from liability under Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6. See Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 287 Minn. 287, 288, 178 N.W.2d 215, 217 (1970) (employee issuing building permit exercised discretion in determining whether building plans constituted a permissible use of property); Masonick v. J.P. Homes, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn.App. 1993) (act of building inspector issuing a certificate of occupancy was a protected discretionary function). However, if no discretion is involved, such as when a proposed land use authorized in a building permit is clearly illegal, immunity does not protect the municipality.
Jan. 15, 2002), an assumption-of-risk argument is not immediately appealable. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03 (delineating when an appeal may be taken to the appellate court); Masonick v. J.P. Homes, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. App. 1993) (holding interlocutory review of non-immunity defense to liability is not appropriate). The United States Supreme Court recognized that federal precedent allows for review of additional issues if they are "inextricably intertwined" with the issues properly raised in the collateral-order appeal. Aon Corp. v. Haskins, 817 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. App. 2012) (citing Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 51, 115 S. Ct. 1203, 1212 (1995)).
We further decline to address the remaining issues raised by the county because they are unrelated to immunity; on appeal from the denial of a summary judgment motion, interlocutory review of issues not involving immunity generally is inappropriate. See Masonick v. J.P. Homes, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn.App. 1993). Affirmed.
1984), the supreme court held that the issuance of permits to put fill on land was a discretionary act because it resembled in process the issuance of building permits held to be discretionary in Anderson. Similarly, in Masonick v. J.P. Homes, 494 N.W.2d 910 (Minn.App. 1993), this court applied discretionary immunity to the issuance of certificates of occupancy, stating that "the decisionmaking process involved * * * is similar to that involved in the issuance of a building permit." Id. at 913.
See, e.g., Boop v. City of Lino Lakes, 502 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Minn.App. 1993), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 10, 1993); Masonick v. J.P. Homes, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn.App. 1993). Interlocutory review may be available, however, if the issues have been thoroughly briefed, review would eliminate the need for a trial, and the issues can be resolved as a matter of law. Rasivong v. Lakewood Community College, 504 N.W.2d 778, 783 (Minn.App. 1993), pet. for rev. denied (Minn.
An order denying summary judgment is otherwise generally not appealable, and interlocutory review is not appropriate on issues which do not involve immunity from suit. Masonick v. J.P. Homes, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn.App. 1993). Therefore, while we address the immunity claims raised herein, we decline to address the other arguments appellants raise challenging the denial of summary judgment.
As the issue of whether the city owes Boop a special duty involves a defense to a liability, review of the denial of summary judgment would be interlocutory, and therefore, inappropriate. See Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 103.03; Masonick v. J.P. Homes, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn.App. 1993) (interlocutory appeal of summary judgment is inappropriate for issue not involving immunity from suit). DECISION