Opinion
88087-COA
10-04-2024
JAMES MASON, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
James Mason appeals from a district court order denying a petition for a writ of mandamus filed on October 9, 2023, and his motion for transport filed on November 17, 2023. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Erika D. Ballou, Judge.
Mason alternatively sought a writ of prohibition but does not provide cogent argument regarding that relief. Therefore, we need not consider it. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987).
In his petition, Mason contended that the method for determining the credit that should be applied toward an offender's sentence had been revised by Senate Bill (S.B.) 413 and that these revisions should apply to him. The district court denied the petition because (1) S.B. 413, which was passed by the Nevada Legislature in 2023, does not become effective until July 1, 2025; and (2) Mason had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through a postconviction habeas petition. On appeal, Mason appears to contend that a petition for a writ of mandamus was the proper vehicle to pursue his claim because he sought an order compelling the government to apply his newly "elected" computation method. Mason also argues the district court erred by denying his petition without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.
A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, NRS 34.160, or to control a manifest abuse or arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion, Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981). A writ of mandamus will not issue, however, if the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. NRS 34.170.
A postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus "[i]s the only remedy available to an incarcerated person to challenge the computation of time that the person has served pursuant to a judgment of conviction, after all available administrative remedies have been exhausted." NRS 34.724(2)(c) (emphasis added). Therefore, Mason had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Because Mason had an adequate remedy available, he failed to demonstrate mandamus relief was warranted, and so the district court did not err in denying his petition and motion to be transported without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Although Mason argues that mandamus was proper because he challenged the computation method rather than the computation number, we conclude that this claim lacks merit. See Williams v. State Dep't of Corr., 133 Nev. 594, 596, 402 P.3d 1260, 1262 (2017) (recognizing the petitioners claim that credits were not being applied to her eligibility for parole under NRS 209.4465(7)(b) challenged the computation of time served and was properly raised in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus); Johnson v. Dir., Nev. Dep't of Prisons, 105 Nev. 314, 316, 774 P.2d 1047, 1049 (1989) (affirming the district court's denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in part because "when appellant expired his sentences, any question as to the method of computing those sentences was rendered moot"). Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Gibbons, C.J., Bulla J., Westbrook J.
Hon. Erika D. Ballou, District Judge.