This includes the right to disclosure of the evidence against the defendant, the right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, and the conditional right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Swackhammer v. State, 808 P.2d 219, 221-22 (Wyo. 1991); Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 1981). "The determination of whether the defendant violated his release agreement must be based on verified facts."
Probation revocation procedures are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and by Wyoming statutory and case law. Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 1981). In Mason, 631 P.2d at 1055, this court established a two-part probation revocation procedure based on the United States Supreme Court's rulings in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2603-04, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (due process in parole revocation procedures) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 791, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760, 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (applying Morrissey to probation revocation procedures).
THE GENERAL LAW OF PROBATION REVOCATION In Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 1981), this court examined the controlling principles governing probation revocation: The law governing probation revocation is controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process under the law, as well as by Wyoming statute and case law.
The protections articulated in § 7-13-408, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.), are intended to apply in administrative revocation proceedings but, by decisions of this court, they have been extended, with the exception of the separate preliminary hearing requirement, to proceedings in which the court acts on a petition for revocation filed by a county attorney or the Board of Probation and Parole. Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051 (Wyo. 1981); Weisser v. State, 600 P.2d 1320 (Wyo. 1979); Knobel v. State, 576 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1978).See Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1990).
He was unable, however, to effectively rebut the hearsay allegations because he could not question witnesses to determine which behavior they deemed threatening or to ascertain when he had violated rules. See Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 1981) (noting that it is impossible for the defendant to test the accuracy of statements made by state's witnesses if they are not available to testify and finding plain error where defendant was unable to demonstrate alternative theory). Thus, in considering these factors, we conclude that none demonstrate that the evidence was reliable.
To qualify as plain error, there must be (1) a clear record of what happened at the hearing, (2) a clear and unequivocal rule of law shown to exist, and (3) the facts of the case must clearly and obviously transgress such rule. Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1057 (Wyo. 1981); Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 1984). We have here a clear record of what happened procedurally (part of such clear record is the fact that the occurrence was not made a part of the trial record).
The procedures governing probation revocation are now outlined in substantially greater detail by Wyo.R.Crim.P. 39. While the process due a probationer does not necessarily include both a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, it does include the right to reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Swackhammer v. State, 808 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1991); Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051 (Wyo. 1981). In this case, appellant was notified of the probation violations alleged against him.
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), no doubt exists that a parolee's conditional liberty is subject to certain due process protections. See Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 1981), and Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-408 (1987). We have recognized that the right to judicial review of an administrative decision is entirely statutory.
Thus, defending counsel had only the weekend to travel to Torrington and to prepare to present his client's case to the court — only a weekend to prepare to represent an appellant who was facing action which could result in penitentiary confinement of between eight and 14 years. Appellant now properly claims that the trial court, by failing to give counsel adequate time to prepare for the revocation hearing, denied due process guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mason v. State, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1051, 1055 (1981). The utilized process also requires review under the due-process provision, Art. 1, § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution, and the right to defend guaranteed by Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution.
[¶23] Our precedent recognizes that probation revocations are not criminal prosecutions subject to the "full panoply of rights available under the Sixth Amendment[.]" Robinson v. State, 2016 WY 90, ¶ 34, 378 P.3d 599, 608 (Wyo. 2016) (citing Mason v. State, 631 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 1981)); Counts v. State, 2008 WY 156, ¶ 13, 197 P.3d 1280, 1284 (Wyo. 2008) (citations omitted); see also Peterson v. State, 2024 WY 107, ¶ 8, -P.3d- (Wyo. 2024) (citations omitted). We have stated a probation revocation hearing is "simply an extension of the sentencing procedure resulting from the conviction of the basic charge" rather than a "trial on a new criminal charge."