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explaining differences in two concepts
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Case No. 02-3323-CV-S-RED
May 8, 2003
ORDER
Plaintiff Vickie Mason has filed a product liability suit against Defendant Mooney Aircraft Corp. ("Mooney") arising from injuries allegedly suffered from an aircraft accident in August 1999. Her complaint states claims for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. Mooney moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2).
I. BACKGROUND
Mason is an Arkansas resident. She alleges that on August 9, 1999 she was a passenger in a small aircraft that crashed in southern Missouri. According to the complaint, filed July 30, 2002, a fire erupted during the crash beneath Mason's seat. The complaint alleges that following the crash, Mason became trapped when the passenger door failed to open, causing her to sustain severe injuries.
Mooney is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. The company has manufactured, marketed, and sold single engine, four-seat airplanes since 1973. Mooney is not registered to do business in Missouri, and has no offices, property, or employees in Missouri. However, according to Mason, Mooney has derived substantial revenue from business transacted within the State of Missouri through aircraft sales to its authorized dealer, Midwest Mooney, a company located in the State of Kansas. Mason alleges that Mooney operated through a network of authorized dealers located in various parts of the country who had assigned territories for the sales of Mooney aircraft. According to Mason, Midwest Mooney's assigned territory included Missouri. Mooney does not deny these allegations nor does it argue that Midwest Mooney was an independent dealer.
In addition to Mooney's aircraft sales to Missouri residents through Midwest Mooney, Mason also alleges the following additional facts to support personal jurisdiction: Mooney has conducted business with authorized service centers in Missouri who perform maintenance work on Mooney aircraft; Mooney advertises in certain trade publications which are circulated in a number of states including Missouri; and 116 Mooney aircraft are registered in Missouri. Again, Mooney does not deny any of these allegations.
Mooney states that it filed for federal bankruptcy protection in July 2001 and that, with the approval of the bankruptcy court, the company's operating assets were sold to another entity in April 2002. Following the sale of its assets, Mooney states that the company ceased all of its business operations. Thus, Mooney contends that it had no contacts with Missouri as of July 30, 2002, the date Mason filed her lawsuit.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard for 12(b)(2) Motion
In a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of setting forth a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. See Scullin Steel Co. v. National Ry. Utilization Corp., 676 F.2d 309 (8th Cir. 1982). Despite the plaintiffs burden, the Court views all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party. See Digi-Tel Holdings v. Proteq Telecomm. Ltd., 89 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1996); Radaszewski by Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 310 (8th Cir. 1992); Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1991).
B. Personal Jurisdiction
In a diversity case, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state, and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 1994). It is well established that Missouri's long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the due process clause. Deere Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. bane 1970). Therefore, the often used two-part analysis in diversity cases — whether the forum state's long-arm statute is satisfied and, if so, whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process — collapses into the single question of whether due process would be met by exercising personal jurisdiction over Mooney. See Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks, 25 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
A state may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident consistent with due process where there are "certain minimum contacts" between the non-resident defendant and the forum state such that "maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The Supreme Court has held that "it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). It should be noted that although purposeful availment is a necessary requirement, it is not always sufficient. See Falkirk Min. Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 374 (8th Cir. 1990). In certain rare cases, the "minimum requirements inherent in the concept of `fair play and substantial justice' may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities." Falkirk, 906 F.2d at 374 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985)).
Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific. Specific personal jurisdiction is proper where (1) the defendant purposefully directed or availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws; (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of a defendant's contacts with the forum; and (3) these contacts are reasonable in light of the assertion that personal jurisdiction must agree with fair play and substantial justice. Minnesota Min. and Mfg. Co. v. Nippon Carbide Industries Co., Inc., 63 F.3d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 1995).
General personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, arises from a defendant's contacts with the forum that are unrelated to the cause of action being litigated. The due process requirements for general personal jurisdiction require a showing of continuous and systematic contacts between the defendant and the forum state, as opposed to the minimum contact standard required in specific jurisdiction cases. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412-13, 414 nn. 8 9 (1984). Where general personal jurisdiction exists, the defendant may be sued in the state on any claim, arising anywhere. See id. at 409.
Mason relies on both specific and general personal jurisdiction to support her contention that Mooney is subject to personal jurisdiction in the State of Missouri. Because the facts support a finding of specific personal jurisdiction, the Court need not address whether jurisdiction over Mooney is also proper under the general personal jurisdiction theory.
1. Time Period for Evaluating Minimum Contacts
Before addressing the sufficiency of Mooney's contacts, it is first necessary to discuss the applicable time period for assessing a defendant's contacts with the forum state. Mooney insists that the relevant time period is at the time Mason filed her complaint, which was July 30, 2002. Mooney argues that because it effectively ceased doing business in April 2002, the company had no contacts whatsoever with Missouri in July 2002, let alone with any other state except for New Jersey and Texas, Mooney's home states.
This issue has not been explicitly addressed by the Eighth Circuit. However, a review of decisions issued by the Supreme Court and other circuit courts reveals that contacts are commonly assessed over a period of time before the plaintiff filed the complaint. For instance, in Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 409-11, the Supreme Court considered the defendant's contacts with the forum state over a seven-year period to determine whether sufficient contacts existed. Similarly, other circuits have examined minimum contacts over a reasonable period of years in assessing whether the defendant had the necessary minimum contacts with the forum state. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 1996) (examining defendant's contact's with forum state over a six-year period prior to plaintiffs filing of the complaint) (citing Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 650-51 (5th Cir.) (examining defendant's contacts with forum state over five-year period), cert denied, 513 U.S. 930 (1994); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 372, 376 (analyzing defendant's contacts with forum state over five-year period); Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1329, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1984) (examining defendant's contacts over three-year period)); see also Wallkill 5 Assocs. II v. Tectonic Engineering, P. C., 1997 WL 452252 at *3 (D.N.J. July 25, 1997) (noting that a court, in evaluating whether certain contacts are sufficient, should examine the defendant's contacts over "a reasonable period" of time) (citing Modern Mailers, Inc. v. Johnson Quin, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1048, 1052-53 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (same).
One of the few decisions to directly address the time period issue is Metropolitan Life, supra. There, the Second Circuit rejected the idea that a court should only consider those contacts in existence at the time suit was filed. See Metropolitan Life, 84 F.3d at 569. According to the court, the appropriate time period for assessing minimum contacts requires that courts evaluate the defendant's contact with the forum state "over a period that is reasonable under the circumstances," which the court found in this instance to be six years before suit was filed. See id. at 569-70. Accordingly, in light of these rulings and the lack of any authority to the contrary, the Court should examine Mooney's contacts with Missouri over a reasonable period of time. Consequently, the fact that Mooney filed for bankruptcy and eventually ceased its business operations almost two years after Mason allegedly suffered injuries but only a few months before she filed suit will have limited significance for the minimum contact analysis employed in this decision.
2. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
As noted above, specific personal jurisdiction is proper where (1) the defendant purposefully directed or availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws; (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of a defendant's contacts with the forum; and (3) these contacts are reasonable in light of the assertion that personal jurisdiction must agree with fair play and substantial justice. Minnesota Min. and Mfg. Co. v. Nippon Carbide Industries Co., Inc., 63 F.3d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 1995). a. Minimum Contacts I Purposeful Availment
In support of her allegation that Mooney has sufficient contacts with the forum, Mason points to an affidavit prepared by Paul Czysz, an aeronautical engineer retained by Mason to offer opinions regarding the design of Mooney's model M2OJ aircraft. In that affidavit, Mr. Czysz states that Mooney was a principle manufacturer of general aviation in the United States that sold airplanes throughout the country without geographic limitation. Mr. Czysz further states that Mooney advertised in major aircraft publications that were distributed nationally, including Missouri and that the company conducted business with a dealer located in Kansas whose territory included Missouri. Lastly, Mr. Czysz notes that 116 aircraft manufactured by Mooney are now registered in Missouri.
Before commenting on whether these contacts are sufficient under the due process clause, the Court addresses Mooney's argument concerning the admissibility of Mr. Czysz's affidavit. Although the affidavit does not state whether the facts stated therein are based on Mr. Czysz's personal knowledge, the Court need not rule on the affidavit's admissibility at this point because Mason alleges the same jurisdictional facts in her pleadings. Thus, due to the early posture of this case and the lack of any affidavits by Mooney that such allegations are false, the Court accepts as true Mason's jurisdictional allegations in considering Mooney's pending motion to dismiss.
Aside from Mr. Czysz's affidavit, Mason has tendered the deposition transcript of Greg Murray, Mooney's former chief financial officer and the company's current bankruptcy estate representative. This deposition was taken by leave of the Court for the sole purpose of determining the nature and extent of Mooney's relationship with Missouri. In his deposition, Murray testified that Mooney did in fact advertise in general aviation magazines that were distributed throughout the country, including Missouri, and that Mooney did, prior to entering into bankruptcy, sell general aviation aircraft and aircraft parts to Midwest Mooney, a designated dealer located in the State of Kansas, who had an assigned territory that included Missouri. Murray was unable to deny that the company dealt with authorized service centers in Missouri or that 116 Mooney aircraft are currently registered in Missouri.
Based on the above stated contacts, Mason argues that the Court can exercise jurisdiction over Mooney pursuant to the stream of commerce theory. This concept provides an "analytical tool useful in cases in which the defendant's contacts are the result of establishing a distribution network in the forum State for the sale of defendant's products. . . ." Viam Corp. v. Iowa Expoert-Import Trading Co., 84 F.3d 424, 427 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court addressed the stream of commerce theory in World-Wide Volkswagen. There, the Court ruled that an Oklahoma state court did not have jurisdiction over a nonresident automobile retailer and its wholesale distributor in a products liability action asserted against them. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299. The Court found that the only connection between Oklahoma and the defendants was the fortuitous circumstance that the automobile at issue happened to become involved in an accident while passing through Oklahoma. See id. at 295. The vehicle had been sold by the retailer in New York, the place where the retailer and wholesaler were incorporated and conducted their business, to New York residents, who were involved in the accident while driving to Arizona. Th Court noted that the defendants conducted no business in Oklahoma, nor did they solicit any business, close any sales, employ any persons, or perform any services in the state. Further, no evidence was presented that the defendants routinely sold cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or residents or that they indirectly served or sought to serve the market in the forum state.
The plaintiffs in World-Wide had argued that because an automobile retailer and wholesaler had sold a product mobile by design and purpose, it was foreseeable that the product might find its way into the forum state. The Court, however, rejected this argument stating:
the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.Id. at 297.
The Court went on to explain that a forum state could lawfully exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation who "delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state." Id. at 297-298.
The Supreme Court revisited the stream of commerce theory in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1986). Asahi involved a product liability action brought by a plaintiff who suffered severe injuries from a motorcycle accident. The complaint, filed in California state court, alleged that the accident was caused by a sudden loss of air and an explosion in the rear tire of the plaintiffs motorcycle. One of the defendants named was Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., Ltd. ("Cheng Shin"), a tire manufacturer located in Taiwan. Cheng Shin, in turn, filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnification from Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. ("Asahi"), a Japanese corporation that routinely manufactured tire valve assemblies for Cheng Shin. The California Supreme Court concluded that personal jurisdiction existed over Asahi because it knew that one of the buyers of the valves, in this case Cheng Shin, would incorporate them into tire tubes and sell them in California. According to the state supreme court, Asahi's placing of the valves into the stream of commerce coupled with its awareness that it would end up in California provided a sufficient basis for jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. In Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion (for four Justices), she rejected the idea that a defendant's mere knowledge of the product's entry into the forum state is sufficient to create personal jurisdiction. The plurality opinion states:
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State. But a defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor, J.).
All members of the Asahi court did agree that even if Asahi had the necessary minimum contacts with California, the due process requirement would still not have been met, According to the Court, this was one of those rare types of cases when the substantial burden on the non-resident defendant, when weighed against the plaintiff and forum state's interest, precluded the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with due process. The Court noted that Asahi did no business in California, nor did it have an office, employees, or property there. It manufactured its component parts in Japan and delivered them to Cheng Shin in Taiwan. The Court further noted that the plaintiff had settled his claims for personal injuries, and thus, the only case pending was the indemnification suit brought by the Taiwanese corporation against the non-resident defendant. Because the third-party plaintiff, like the Asahi, was a non-resident, the Court found that the forum and the third-party plaintiffs interest in litigating the case in California were significantly diminished.
While some circuit courts have chosen to adopt Asahi's narrowing of the stream of commerce rule, other circuits have not, including the Eighth Circuit. In Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks, 25 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 1994), the Eighth Circuit noted that the Asahi court was split four-to-four on the broad question of whether introducing products into the "stream of commerce" satisfies the due process requirement of minimum contacts in a product liability case. Thus, the Barone court stated that Asahi was not binding and did not alter Eighth Circuit precedent. See id. at 614.
According to the Barone court, "Asahi stands for no more than that it is unreasonable to adjudicate third-party litigation between two foreign companies in this country absent consent by the nonresident defendant." 25 F.3d at 614.
Barone involved a product liability action brought by a plaintiff who was injured by a fireworks display. The plaintiff sued the non-resident distributor who had sold the fireworks and the manufacturer of the fireworks, a Japanese corporation named Hosoya Fireworks Co. of Japan ("Hosoya"). Hosoya sought dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction, which the district court granted. The Eighth Circuit reversed. While noting that Hosoya had no agent for service in Nebraska, no office in Nebraska, no distributor in Nebraska, that it did not advertise in Nebraska, and that it did not directly send any products to Nebraska, the court nonetheless found that Hosoya had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business within Nebraska. The court noted that Hosoya sold its fireworks throughout the United States via a network of nine distributors in six states. The distributor whose territory included Nebraska was located in South Dakota. This distributor, upon receiving the fireworks from Hosoya, then sold the fireworks through six regional salespeople, one of whom was located in Nebraska. The Eighth Circuit concluded:
Hosoya has reaped the benefits of its network of distributors, and it is only reasonable that it should now be held accountable in the forum of plaintiff's choice. . . . More than reasonable foreseeability is at stake here, as it must be under existing law, for Hosoya has purposefully reaped the benefits . . . of Nebraska's [laws].Id. at 615.
It is noteworthy that Barone opted not to follow Asahi's more limited view of the stream of commerce doctrine. Instead, the court, in finding personal jurisdiction, adopted the Seventh Circuit's rationale set forth in Giotis v. Apollo of the Ozarks, Inc., 800 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1986). In Giotis, the court determined that a Wisconsin court would have jurisdiction over Missouri defendants in their role as heads of a distribution network. 800 F.2d at 662, 667-668. Giotis explained that when a foreign seller heads a distribution network, thus "realiz[ing] the much greater economic benefit of multiple sales in distant forums, of which the purchase by the particular buyer who has brought suit is merely one example," its activities in that role may "satisfy the purposeful availment test." Id. at 667.
Barone controls the personal jurisdiction issue raised in this case. Although Mooney is a foreign corporation having no office, agents, employees, or property in the State of Missouri, Mooney is, like the non-resident company in Barone, a manufacturer that has established a distribution system for its product across numerous states. The location of these distributors suggests an effort to reach much of the country through a limited number of regional distributors. One of its authorized dealers, Midwest Mooney, is located in Kansas City, Kansas and has been assigned a specific geographical location in which to sell Mooney aircraft. Included in its assigned territory is the State of Missouri. According to Mason, Midwest Mooney, after having received aircraft from Mooney, then sold such aircraft to buyers in its assigned territory, including Missouri. Mason also alleges that 116 Mooney aircraft are currently registered in Missouri. Mooney does not deny any of these allegations. Accordingly, Mooney has certainly benefitted from the distribution efforts of its distributor, and therefore, Mooney has had not only the "expectation," but actual knowledge that its products would be purchased by consumers in Missouri. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98. Thus, having reaped the benefits of its network of distributors, it was foreseeable to Mooney that its product, upon being delivered into the stream of commerce, would be purchased by consumers in Missouri. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that Mooney has "purposefully availed" itself of the privileges of conducting business in Missouri.
Mooney attempts to analogize this case to World-Wide Volkswagen. However, the only contact with the forum state in that case was the fortuitous circumstance of a car manufactured by the defendant being driven through Oklahoma by the plaintiff. Unlike the present case, there was no evidence that the defendant manufacturer sold products to the forum state's consumers through a distribution network.
Further distinguishing the instant case from World-Wide Volkswagen are the additional contacts alleged by Mason. According to Mason, Mooney has conducted business with authorized service repair centers located in Missouri and, as established during Murray's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, Mooney has advertised its aircraft nationwide, including Missouri. Mooney's advertising was calculated to reach buyers in distant forums, which is considered an important favor in determining whether Mooney has purposefully availed itself of the benefits of doing business in the forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295; Giotis, 800 F.2d at 667-668. Thus, in light of these contacts, it appears that Mason has made a prima facie showing that Mooney has sufficient contacts with Missouri to the level that it should have "reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court [in Missouri].'" See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 295).
(b) "Related To" Requirement
As stated above, specific personal jurisdiction can only be exercised where the litigation results from injuries arising out of or relating to those activities. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). In products liability cases, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the stream of commerce theory as being sufficient to establish minimum contacts regardless of the result of an "arising under" analysis. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108-13, 107 S.Ct. at 1030-33 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at 116-21, 107 S.Ct. at 1034-37 (opinion of Brennan, J.); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-98, 100 S.Ct. at 566-68; Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1992) ("The United States Supreme Court has suggested two modes of analyzing the question of whether minimum contacts are present: the `arising out of test and the `stream of commerce' test."). The basic theory of the stream of commerce analysis is one of foreseeability: One who puts a product into the stream of commerce in such a fashion as to reasonably foresee its sale in a certain jurisdiction cannot complain of having to defend against claims in that jurisdiction arising out of the product's presence there.
In Giotis, supra, the case relied heavily on by the Eighth Circuit in Barone, supra, the defendant pointed out that plaintiff had purchased the fireworks in Minnesota and unilaterally brought them into Wisconsin, the forum state, where the injury occurred. Giotis, 800 F.2d at 668. The Seventh Circuit found this fact to be of no legal significance as both Wisconsin and Minnesota were within the area into which the defendant purposefully directed its sales efforts. See id.
The Court finds that Mooney's placement of its product into the stream of commerce sufficiently relates to Mason's cause of action. Although the aircraft alleged to have caused Mason's injuries was actually sold in Arkansas rather than in Missouri, the plane was of the same type of aircraft that Mooney sold into Missouri via its distribution network and the crash did in fact occur in Missouri.
(c) Reasonableness
The next question is whether requiring Mooney to defend this suit in Missouri comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. In other words, is it reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case to require Mooney to defend against Mason's lawsuit in Missouri. In determining this question, the Supreme Court has held that courts must evaluate the following factors: (1) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy; (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; and (5) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies.
The exercise of jurisdiction is favored where the plaintiff has made a threshold showing of minimum contacts at the first stage of the inquiry. In fact, it is rare that jurisdiction is defeated solely by the above factors. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (defendant must present a "compelling case" of unreasonableness in such cases); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774-75 (1984) (stating that purposeful minimum contacts are typically sufficient). Generally, this will only occur where "the plaintiffs interest and the state's interest in adjudicating the dispute in the forum are so attenuated that they are clearly outweighed by the burden of subjecting the defendant to litigation within the forum." Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1994). That is not the case here. Factors (1), (2), and (3) favor jurisdiction. Missouri is the locus of the alleged airplane crash and subsequent alleged injuries. Thus, there are likely to be witnesses and other types of evidence located in Missouri. Furthermore, Missouri has an interest in providing a forum to persons such as Mason who are injured within its borders as well as ensuring that products sold there are safe. Factor (4), it should be noted, does disfavor jurisdiction as Mooney will likely be inconvenienced by having to defend against an action outside of its home state. However, such a burden does not defeat jurisdiction, particularly where Mooney has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within Missouri. Finally, factor (5) is for all practical purposes neutral. Accordingly, the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Mooney comports with fairness and justice.
HI. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that it does have authority to exercise jurisdiction over Mooney. Accordingly, Mooney's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.