Opinion
FSTCV195021013
09-19-2019
Douglas MASON et al. v. Barbara MASON
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Hon. Edward T. Krumeich, II, Judge
Defendant Barbara Mason has moved to dismiss this action brought by her late husband’s children on the ground that they lack standing to maintain the action which alleges she used a power of attorney to misappropriate their father’s income, savings, and other assets. Defendant argues that the only one who has standing to raise these claims is the Executor of her husband’s estate being probated in Simsbury. Plaintiffs respond that the Executor, Glenn Knierim, has a long-term attorney-client relationship with defendant and has conflicts of interest in pursuing claims against her relating to misuse of the power of attorney.
The Standards for Deciding a Motion to Dismiss.
"A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court ... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction ..." Weiner v. Clinton, 100 Conn.App. 753, 756-57 (2007), quoting Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005).
"Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute ... (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse ... (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power ... and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant ..." Weiner, 100 Conn.App. at 757, quoting Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, 271 Conn. 540, 569 (2004). "When assessing the existence of those four elements, our Supreme Court has advised courts to examine whether the case ‘present[s] a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire’ "Weiner, 100 Conn.App. at 760 quoting Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc., 263 Conn. 616, 626, 822 A.2d 196 (2003)." "The rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements ..." Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, 271 Conn. at 570. "Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." Cadle v. D’Addario, 111 Conn.App. 80, 82 (2008).
"In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court ‘must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ... including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations ...’ ‘... A trial court considering a motion to dismiss may, however, ‘encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case ...’ ’[I]f the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts ... the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint ... Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] ... Conversely, ‘where a jurisdictional determination is dependent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional facts ... Likewise, if the question of jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits of the case, a court cannot resolve the jurisdictional question without a hearing to evaluate those merits ... An evidentiary hearing is necessary because a court cannot make a critical factual [jurisdictional] finding based on memoranda and documents submitted by the parties ... The trial court ‘may [also] in its discretion choose to postpone resolution of the jurisdictional question until the parties complete further discovery or, if necessary, a full trial on the merits has occurred.’" Giannoni v. Commissioner of Transportation, 322 Conn. 344, 349-50 (2016) (citations omitted).
Requirements for Standing
Standing implicates the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction: "It is well established that [a] party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim ... Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy ... [T]he court has a duty to dismiss, even on its own initiative, any appeal that it lacks jurisdiction to hear ... Where a party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause ..." Warren v. Cuseo Family, LLC, 165 Conn.App. 230, 235 (2016) (citations omitted). "The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss ... [l]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute ... It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." Citimortgage, Inc. v. Tanasi, 176 Conn.App. 829, 837 (2017) (citations omitted).
"[S]tanding is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.’ ...‘Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory ... Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share ... Second, the party must also show that the [party’s] decision has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest ... Aggrievement does not demand certainty, only the possibility of an adverse effect on a legally protected interest ... Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation.’ "Canty v. Otto, 304 Conn. 546, 556 (2012) (citations omitted).
In Geremia v. Geremia, 159 Conn.App. 751, 754 (2015), the Appellate Court addressed standing by family members to pursue tort claims against other family members for alleged abuse of a power of attorney to loot decedent’s estate. The Geremia Court divided the claims into two categories: "[t]he causes of action contained in the operative complaint fall into two classes- those alleging direct injury to the plaintiffs as a result of the defendants’ conduct, and those alleging that the defendants’ conduct adversely impacted Margaret’s estate, to the detriment of the plaintiffs as its beneficiaries." Id. at 781. With respect to claims of direct injury plaintiffs need only show a colorable claim to have standing. Id. at 781.
" ‘[S]tanding is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy ... Nevertheless, [s]tanding is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented ... These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy ... provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy ... Standing [however] requires no more than a colorable claim of injury ...’" Gerimia, 159 Conn.App. at 779-80.
With respect to claims relating to the dissipation of estate assets, typically heirs at law lack standing to pursue those claims, which must be pursued by the Executor or Administrator:
We reach a different result with respect to those causes of action alleging harm to Margaret’s estate ... Under Connecticut law, ‘legal title to personal property passes to the executor or administrator, and such property is to be used for the payment of debts and the remainder distributed to the heirs’ under a will ... As our Supreme Court has observed, ‘[t]he rule of law is well established, that the legal title to all personal property of the deceased, vests in his legal representatives. They can dispose of it at pleasure, being responsible for the faithful execution of the trust; and can institute actions at law for the recovery of debts, as well as for the recovery of personal property.’ ...
Accordingly, as a general rule, ‘[t]he proper suit, upon a cause of action arising in favor of ... the decedent during [his or her] lifetime, is in the name of the fiduciary rather than of the heirs or other beneficiaries of the estate ... Actions designed to recover personalty belonging to the estate or for its use, conversion, or injury are brought by the fiduciary rather than by the beneficiaries.’ ... The power of administrators or executors to litigate on behalf of an estate is codified in General Statutes § 45a-234(18), 18 which provides in relevant part that they may ‘sue on or defend, abandon, or otherwise deal with and settle claims in favor of or against the estate ...’ In turn, the administrator or executor, as the designated fiduciary of the estate, ‘is the representative of all beneficiaries under [a] decedent’s will.’ ... The administrator or executor thus ‘has a fiduciary duty to bargain for the rights of all decedent’s beneficiaries and to turn over to them their appropriate share of any proceeds. The personal representative has a mandatory duty to seek out and collect every asset and to collect all debts due the estate, including debts due from heirs.’ 159 Conn.App. at 781-82.
There is an important exception to this rule: "an exception exists to the general rule precluding civil actions by heirs and beneficiaries on behalf of an estate. ‘[W]here the executor or administrator has been guilty of fraud or collusion with the party to be sued, or ... where the interests of the personal representative are antagonistic to those of the heirs or distributees, the heirs or distributees may maintain actions relating to the personalty of the estate in their own names. Similarly, when the legal representative has failed or refused to act, the heir may maintain an action to recover assets for the benefit of the estate." 159 Conn.App. at 784.
Plaintiffs have asserted facts that call into serious question Executor Knierim’s ability and willingness to pursue the estate’s interests, and their interests as heirs at law, in pursuing claims against Attorney Knierim’s client, Barbara Mason. Among the facts asserted by plaintiffs is that Attorney Knierim refused to draft a codicil for decedent that removed Barbara Mason’s life estate in certain family heirlooms to preserve them for his children. Attorney Knierim declined to do so because it would disadvantage his client Barbara Mason. Another attorney drafted the Second Codicil. After decedent’s death Attorney Knierim acted both as Executor and Barbara Mason’s counsel. He filed the Will and First Codicil with the Probate Court, but refused to submit the Second Codicil until plaintiffs moved to disqualify him as Executor. As Executor plaintiffs assert Attorney Knierim refused to inventory the assets of the estate, required plaintiffs to advance expenses that should have been paid by the Executor and failed to pursue missing property that had been possessed by Barbara Mason or to investigate assets of decedent at the time of his death.
Defendant disputes the assertions of plaintiffs and offers alternative facts. Without a hearing as to the Executor’s conflicts the Court is unable to determine plaintiffs’ standing to pursue their claims against defendant on behalf of the estate and to ascertain those claims asserting a direct injury. Therefore, the Court will schedule a hearing on the motion dismiss at 10:00 a.m. on December 6, 2019. At that hearing the Court will also hear evidence relating to defendant’s assertion the case is moot and arguments on defendant’s motion to stay this action.