Mason v. Catherine L. Mason, Joseph E. Mason, Sr., Kathy St. Blanchard, Mason Holding Co.

8 Citing cases

  1. Andrews v. Broom

    No. 2022-UP-022 (S.C. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2022)

    25, 2005; Judy v. Martin, 381 S.C. 455, 458, 674 S.E.2d 151, 153 (2009) ("Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, a party is precluded from relitigating, after an appeal, matters that were either not raised on appeal, but should have been, or raised on appeal, but expressly rejected by the appellate court."); Mason v. Mason, 412 S.C. 28, 48, 770 S.E.2d 405, 415 (Ct. App. 2015) ("[A]n unappealed ruling, right or wrong, is the law of the case." (quoting Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 329, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012))); Ross v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 328 S.C. 51, 62, 492 S.E.2d 62, 68 (1997)

  2. Lindblad v. J&L Servs., Inc.

    Civil Action No.: 4:18-cv-1336-RBH-TER (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2019)   Cited 1 times

    This court has previously noted that "there is no reported case in South Carolina which allows a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy in which the claimant has been constructively discharged." Moore v. Reintjes of the South, Inc., Civil Action No.2:00-2224-DCN, ECF No. 17, p. 13, n.1 (D.S.C. February 28, 2001) (Report and Recommendation) adopted by 2001 WL 876222 (D.S.C. May 1, 2001); see also Mason v. Mason, 412 S.C. 28, 63, 770 S.E.2d 405, 423 (Ct. App. 2015) (affirming special referee's denial of wrongful discharge claim where the plaintiff stopped working voluntarily). 3. Negligent Supervision and Retention

  3. Doosan Mach. Tools Am. Corp. v. Mach. Sols., Inc.

    Civil Action No.: 3:17-cv-00876-JMC (D.S.C. Mar. 19, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    (citation omitted); Mason v. Mason, 770 S.E.2d 405, 419 (S.C. 2015) ("The doctrine of unclean hands precludes a plaintiff from recovering in equity if he acted unfairly in a matter that is the subject of the litigation to the prejudice of the defendant.") (citation omitted); Glover v. Lockheed Corp., 772 F. Supp. 898, 907 (D.S.C. 1991) ("Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine which provides that 'an estoppel may arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sustain the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice.'")

  4. Ashmore v. Fowler

    Civil Action No. 8:14-cv-04449-JMC (D.S.C. Aug. 2, 2016)

    "The doctrine of unclean hands precludes a plaintiff from recovering in equity if he acted unfairly in a matter that is the subject of the litigation to the prejudice of the defendant." Mason v. Mason, 770 S.E.2d 405, 419 (S.C. 2015) (citation omitted). "He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.

  5. Maybank 2754 v. Zurlo

    444 S.C. 47 (S.C. Ct. App. 2024)

    Maybank had a right to a jury trial on all three causes of action and explicitly invoked that right in its complaint. See Murrells Inlet Corp. v. Ward, 378 S.C. 225, 231, 662 S.E.2d 452, 454 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The determination of the existence of an easement is a question of fact in a law action …."); Seabrook Island Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Marshland Trust, Inc., 358 S.C. 655, 661, 596 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that restrictive covenants are voluntary contracts); McGill v. Moore, 381 S.C. 179, 185, 672 S.E.2d 571, 574 (2009) ("An action to construe a contract is an action at law."); Mason v. Mason, 412 S.C. 28, 61, 770 S.E.2d 405, 422 (Ct. App. 2015) (holding a civil conspiracy action is generally an action at law).

  6. Maybank 2754, LLC v. Zurlo

    No. 6081 (S.C. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2024)

    Maybank had a right to a jury trial on all three causes of action and explicitly invoked that right in its complaint. See Murrells Inlet Corp. v. Ward, 378 S.C. 225, 231, 662 S.E.2d 452, 454 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The determination of the existence of an easement is a question of fact in a law action . . . ."); Seabrook Island Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Marshland Trust, Inc., 358 S.C. 655, 661, 596 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that restrictive covenants are voluntary contracts); McGill v. Moore, 381 S.C. 179, 185, 672 S.E.2d 571, 574 (2009) ("An action to construe a contract is an action at law."); Mason v. Mason, 412 S.C. 28, 61, 770 S.E.2d 405, 422 (Ct. App. 2015) (holding a civil conspiracy action is generally an action at law).

  7. Keitt v. City of Columbia

    2016-UP-059 (S.C. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2016)

    sue 1: Turner v. Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 122, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011) ("Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and discovery on file show there is no genuine issue of material fact such that the moving party must prevail as a matter of law"); McLendon v S.C. Dep't of Highways & Pub Transp, 313 S.C. 525, 526 n2, 443 S.E.2d 539, 540 n2 (1994) (noting "the denial of a motion to dismiss does not establish the law of the case and the issue raised by the motion can be raised again at a later stage of the proceedings"); Barron v Labor Finders of SC, 393 S.C. 609, 614, 713 S.E.2d 634, 636 (2011) ("An at-will employee may be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason, with or without cause"); Taghivand v Rite Aid Corp, 411 S.C. 240, 243, 768 S.E.2d 385, 387 (2015) ("However, our adherence to the at-will employment doctrine is not without limits"); Mason v Mason, 412 S.C. 28, 63, 770 S.E.2d 405, 423 (Ct App 2015), cert dismissed (July 31, 2015) ("Where the retaliatory discharge of an at-will employee constitutes violation of a clear mandate of public policy, a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge arises"); Stiles v Am Gen Life Ins Co, 335 S.C. 222, 228, 516 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1999) (explaining the public policy "exception [to the at-will employment doctrine] is not designed to overlap an employee's statutory or contractual rights to challenge a discharge, but rather to provide a remedy for a clear violation of public policy where no other reasonable means of redress exists" (Toal, J, concurring)); § 8-27-20(A) ("No public body may dismiss . . . an employee . . . because the employee files a report with an appropriate authority of wrongdoing."); § 8-27-30(A) (providing an employee is entitled to bring an action against his employer under the Whistleblower Act when he is terminated within one

  8. Keitt v. City of Columbia

    Appellate Case No. 2014-000961 (S.C. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2016)

    We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: As to Issue 1: Turner v. Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 122, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011). ("Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and discovery on file show there is no genuine issue of material fact such that the moving party must prevail as a matter of law."); McLendon v. S.C. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 313 S.C. 525, 526 n.2, 443 S.E.2d 539, 540 n.2 (1994) (noting "the denial of a motion to dismiss does not establish the law of the case and the issue raised by the motion can be raised again at a later stage of the proceedings"); Barron v. Labor Finders of S.C., 393 S.C. 609, 614, 713 S.E.2d 634, 636 (2011) ("An at-will employee may be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason, with or without cause."); Taghivand v. Rite Aid Corp., 411 S.C. 240, 243, 768 S.E.2d 385, 387 (2015) ("However, our adherence to the at-will employment doctrine is not without limits."); Mason v. Mason, 412 S.C. 28, 63, 770 S.E.2d 405, 423 (Ct. App. 2015), cert. dismissed (July 31, 2015) ("Where the retaliatory discharge of an at-will employee constitutes violation of a clear mandate of public policy, a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge arises."); Stiles v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 335 S.C. 222, 228, 516 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1999) (explaining the public policy "exception [to the at-will employment doctrine] is not designed to overlap an employee's statutory or contractual rights to challenge a discharge, but rather to provide a remedy for a clear violation of public policy where no other reasonable means of redress exists" (Toal, J., concurring)); § 8-27-20(A) ("No public body may dismiss . . . an employee . . . because the employee files a report with an appropriate authority of wrongdoing."); § 8-27-30(A) (providing an employee is entitled to bring an action against his employer under the Whistleblower Act when he is terminated within one year of reporting alleged wrongdoing); Lawson v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 340 S.C. 346, 350,