Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4426-14T3
09-12-2016
LINNEA MASKA, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, HEARTLAND EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, INC., and LIFE CHOICE HOSPICE, Respondents.
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Elizabeth A. Davies, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondents Heartland Employment Services, Inc. and Life Choice Hospice have not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Hoffman and Currier. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 401,220. Berg & Pearson, P.C., attorneys for appellant (Michael H. Berg, on the brief). Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Elizabeth A. Davies, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondents Heartland Employment Services, Inc. and Life Choice Hospice have not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Claimant Linnea Maska appeals from a final decision of the Board of Review (Board) denying her request for a waiver of refund of unemployment benefits. In its determination, the Board reversed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) which had found claimant eligible for a waiver. Because we find claimant established her eligibility for a waiver under N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2(a)(2), the Board erred in its decision and we, therefore, reverse.
The pertinent portions of the statute are:
(a) Upon request of the claimant . . . the Director may grant the claimant a full waiver of recovery of an overpayment of benefits only after the Director has determined that the claimant has not misrepresented or withheld any material fact in obtaining benefits and only under the following circumstances:
1. Where the claimant is deceased;
2. Where the claimant is disabled and no longer able to work; or
3. Where the recovery of the overpayment . . . would be patently contrary to the principles of equity.
[N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2(a)]
After claimant received unemployment benefits for a period of time, it was determined in 2012 that she was disqualified for those benefits and, therefore, liable for a refund in the amount of $14,142. A tortured history of agency proceedings ensued. Claimant appealed the waiver determination, and after participating in a telephonic hearing, the Tribunal ruled in May 2013 that she was entitled to a waiver of the refund under N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2. The Tribunal noted claimant had submitted a medical certification that she was "unable to work due to several, chronic, medical conditions."
Claimant was sixty-five years old when she first applied for a waiver from the refund. --------
The Department of Labor (Department) appealed the decision and the Board ruled it to be a nullity in July 2013 as the matter had already been ruled upon by a prior Tribunal and Board under a different docket number. The Board remanded to the Tribunal for a new hearing and decision.
After a second telephonic hearing, in August, 2013, the Tribunal found claimant not eligible for a waiver of a refund stating she had not proven she was permanently disabled as required under N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2. After appeal, the Board determined there was "need for additional testimony from the claimant and the Director, as to whether the claimant met the requirements under the statute for the Director to waive the right to recover the overpayment of benefits paid to the claimant on [her] unemployment claim." The matter was remanded to a new Tribunal.
In April 2014, following a third telephonic hearing, the Tribunal found claimant to be currently disabled and unable to work. In its decision the Tribunal stated: "The claimant has [a] medical certification, that she is currently unable to work due to several, chronic medical conditions. She has provided medical evidence that[] she is permanently disabled." The Tribunal ruled claimant was eligible for a waiver under N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2 as she "has shown sufficient cause to waive this refund as she is permanently disabled."
After the Department appealed this latest decision, the Board found there to be a "need for additional testimony from the [Department] and the claimant as to whether the claimant met all the requirements under the regulation for a waiver of recovery of an overpayment of benefits." The matter was remanded to a new Tribunal for a hearing and decision.
A fourth telephonic hearing took place in October 2014. In the decision rendered October 21, 2014, the Tribunal analyzed N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2 and the extensive financial records claimant had provided in support of her argument that she was entitled to a waiver of the refund due to financial hardship. See N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2(a)(3); see also N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2(d). The Tribunal found (1) there was no evidence that claimant had misrepresented a material fact, and (2) claimant had shown sufficient evidence of a financial hardship to be entitled to a waiver under N.J.A.C. 17:14.2(a)(3).
The Department appealed, and the Board reversed on May 26, 2015. While the Board agreed that claimant had not withheld a material fact, it disagreed with the Tribunal's decision that claimant had a financial hardship severe enough to grant a waiver under equitable principles. The waiver was denied. It is the final decision of this protracted litigation that is the subject of this appeal.
We are mindful that the scope of our review of a determination of an administrative agency is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). The findings of the administrative agency should be affirmed if they "'could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record,' considering 'the proofs as a whole,' . . . with due regard also to the agency's expertise." Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). For those reasons, "[i]f the factual findings of an administrative agency are supported by sufficient credible evidence, [we] are obliged to accept them." Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982). "Unless . . . the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the agency's ruling should not be disturbed." Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997).
In applying this standard, we are compelled to find that the Board's conclusion was not supported by the credible evidence. Although a claimant is liable for a refund under N.J.A.C. 43:21-16(d) following a determination that unemployment benefits were wrongfully received, the Director may waive the refund under N.J.A.C. 43:17-14.2 if a claimant meets certain qualifications. Pertinent to this appeal is the exception applicable to a disabled person who is no longer able to work and who has not misrepresented information or withheld a material fact in obtaining benefits. N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2(a)(2); N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2(b).
The statute sets forth the requisite proofs for meeting this exception. It states: "For purposes of determining under (a)2 above, whether a claimant is 'disabled and no longer able to work', a claimant's current receipt of Social Security disability benefits may be deemed evidence of current permanent disability. The Director may also accept a diagnosis of permanent disability from the claimant's physician." N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2(c).
There is no dispute that claimant satisfied the first prong of the applicable statute. The Board acknowledged that claimant did not withhold any material fact. She, therefore, is entitled to a waiver if she is "disabled and no longer able to work." In its decision, the Board found claimant did not fall within the (a)(2) exception as she was not receiving permanent disability benefits. We find that the Board erred in this basis for its denial of the waiver.
The statute provides that claimant either may show proof of Social Security disability benefits or a diagnosis of a permanent disability from her physician. Claimant provided an uncontroverted medical note from her physician in August 2013 advising that at age sixty-seven, she had multiple physical limitations resulting in her inability to work. Her medical conditions were listed as: chronic back pain with stenosis and nerve involvement; depression; osteoarthritis of both knees, urinary incontinence, and a chronic cough due to asthma and allergies. The physician concluded: "[Claimant] will not be able to return to work due to her long standing and constant condition which we have been treating." This was sufficient evidence to meet the requirements of the statute.
Claimant's medical documentation entitled her to a waiver. It was not necessary for the Board to also consider claimant's financial circumstances. As the Board clearly erred in reaching its conclusion, we find it acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably. We, therefore, reverse its decision and affirm the Tribunal's finding that claimant is entitled to a waiver of the refund under N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2(a)(2).
Reversed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION