Summary
In Masetta v. National Bronze Aluminum Foundry Co., Ohio App., 107 N.E.2d 243, 249, which was a class suit by a group of employees against the employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, it was contended that the Federal Act deprived the court of jurisdiction.
Summary of this case from Russell v. International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement WorkersOpinion
No. 33203
Decided April 29, 1953.
Labor contracts — Negotiated between employer and union representing employees — Class action to enforce — Specific performance by mandatory injunction — Denied where seniority rights involved — Employer not required to continue in service or rehire — Employees' suit for damages for alleged wrongful discharge — Parties plaintiff — Section 11257, General Code — Virtual representation — Joinder of plaintiffs denied, when.
1. A court of equity will not in a class action, by means of mandatory injunction, decree specific performance of an employment contract negotiated between an employer and a union representing its employees, where the issue involves the respective rights of seniority of the employees.
2. A court of equity will not, by means of mandatory injunction, decree specific performance of a labor contract exisiting between an employer and its employees so as to require the employer to continue any such employee in its service or to rehire such employee if discharged.
3. The fact that a labor contract was negotiated by a labor union on behalf of the employees does not give rise to a right in one or more of such employees to maintain a class action for equitable relief because of discharge of one or more of such employees in alleged violation of the seniority or other provisions of such contract.
4. Employees who claim to have been discharged by their common employer in violation of a labor agreement, negotiated with their employer in their behalf by a labor union, can not be joined as plaintiffs under Section 11257, General Code, or be made plaintiffs under the rule of virtual representation, in an action against such employer for damages resulting to each from such discharge, where the damages suffered by such employees vary because of differences in rights of seniority, rates of pay, rights to vacation pay, overtime, premium time or other incidents of their employment.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga county.
This action arose in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County. In the amended petition filed May 8, 1950, it is alleged that the plaintiff is a member and an officer of the International Union, United Auto Workers of America, A.F. of L., Local No. 714; that said union, through said local, is the sole collective bargaining unit agreed upon between the defendant and said union; that the plaintiff was, at all times referred to, an employee of defendant, which is a manufacturing corporation engaged in the business of casting aluminum and other metal molds, in Cleveland, Ohio; that this action is brought "in his own behalf and for and in behalf of other employees, members of said local union, and within said bargaining unit"; and "that said employees are too numerous to bring in court and that it would be impracticable to do so and that he and such other employees have a common interest in the subject matter of this cause of action."
The petition quotes several provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between the defendant and its employees, dated December 16, 1946, relating to seniority rights and privileges of employees. It is charged that on or about January 23, 1948, while said agreement was in force, the defendant, in violation of said agreement, "laid off from its employ plaintiff and its entire complement of maintenance and production employees who constitute said bargaining unit; that less than three weeks thereafter * * * it hired new workers and members of its supervisory staff to replace and take the jobs of plaintiff and said other employees."
Plaintiff says that he and said other employees have suffered serious damages, irreparable injuries and great loss of wages and will continue to suffer loss of wages, bonuses, vacation pay and seniority rights, and that no adequate remedy at law exists.
The prayer which is by plaintiff "in his own behalf and in behalf of other such employees having a common interest herein" makes five requests. The first is that the defendant be required to answer five interrogatories attached to the petition. Those interrogatories call for statements covering the period of January 23, 1948, to April 30, 1949 (the approximate date of filing of the original petition), as to the number of men employed in maintenance and production, the number of new employees hired, work assigned to supervisory employees, and overtime and premium time of production and maintenance employees.
The second and third branches of the prayer are as follows:
"(2) That it permanently enjoin defendant corporation from the further retention and/or employment of its present complement of maintenance and production employees.
"(3) That defendant corporation be enjoined to forthwith restore plaintiff and other said employees who constitute the said bargaining unit and who qualify pursuant to the seniority provisions of said agreement as quoted above, to their jobs as employees of defendant with full seniority benefits and other rights as would have accrued to them under the aforesaid agreement between defendant and said union but for the above described unlawful breach thereof by defendant corporation."
The fourth asks an accounting for all wages, bonuses, piecework earnings and vacation monies which would have been due plaintiff and said other employees for the period since January 23, 1948.
Then follows a prayer for damages in the sum of $60,000.
The petition does not state the name of anyone of the "other employees" in whose behalf the action purports to be brought.
Defendant's amended answer, filed February 6, 1951, as a first defense, avers "that this court has no jurisdiction over the action herein and the subject matter thereof." The answer then denies that defendant "is engaged in the business of casting aluminum and other material molds and says that from the period of January 23, 1948, to July 1, 1950, it was engaged in the development of a frozen mercury precision casting process and that since July 1, 1950, it is no longer engaged in the active development of said mercury process and says that since said date it no longer has any employees of any kind."
The answer denies that the union named was the sole collective bargaining agent for defendant's employees; that plaintiff is a member in good standing and an officer of said union; that plaintiff and other employees of defendant have a common interest in the subject matter of this action; that the collective bargaining agreement was in effect after November 1, 1947, or that it was in effect after defendant went out of the sand-casting business and shut down its plant on January 23, 1948; and that any new workers or supervisory staff members were hired to take the jobs of plaintiff and other members of his union after January 23, 1948, or that after that date any maintenance or production jobs were available for the type of work which plaintiff and other members of the union performed when defendant was engaged in producing aluminum castings. The answer alleges that from January 23, 1948, to July 1, 1950, the defendant was engaged solely in experimental and development work on a frozen mercury precision casting process known as the Mercast process in which work it employed only laboratory technicians, metallurgists and employees having educational and technical requirements far in excess of the requirements for the type of jobs included in the alleged agreement; that the plaintiff and the members of the bargaining unit of said local union are not qualified by education or experience to handle such technical development and research work; that since July 1, 1950, defendant is not engaged in any active business and has no employees of any kind; and that plaintiff is entitled to no equitable relief or damages.
The pleadings do not reveal the number of employees claimed to be involved in the issues, but in argument it was stated that prior to January 23, 1948, the defendant employed approximately 500 persons in 58 classifications, and that subsequent to that date it employed only 20 persons.
On May 1, 1951, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition for the reason that the court does not have jurisdiction over the action and the subject matter thereof.
Upon argument, no evidence having been heard, the motion of defendant to dismiss was sustained. The plaintiff not desiring to plead further, judgment was rendered for the defendant.
Upon appeal on questions of law, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Thereupon the defendant (appellant) filed its motion in this court for an order to certify the record and that motion was granted. For convenience the parties will be referred to herein as they were designated in the trial court.
Mr. Morton D. Barrisch and Mr. Edward Mamrack, for appellee.
Mr. Donald W. Hornbeck and Mr. John H. Ritter, for appellant.
The plaintiff asserts that he brings this action not for himself alone but for himself and others (unidentified) having a common interest in the subject matter of the cause of action. We must, therefore, consider the petition as an effort to institute and maintain a class action.
By way of equitable relief plaintiff seeks to enforce an employment contract by injunctive order directing the defendant to discharge its maintenance and production employees and to re-employ plaintiff and "other said employees." This amounts to an effort to procure specific performance.
The rendering of unique services is not involved and enforcement of negative covenants of an employment contract is not sought. The contract has no unusual features which distinguish it from an ordinary employment contract and this is true even though it may have been negotiated by the union on behalf of a group of employees. Whether it be a contract between the defendant and one employee or a large group of employees it is still an employment contract and must be construed and enforced in accordance with the well established law relating to employment contracts.
It has long been settled law that a court of equity will not decree specific performance of a contract for personal services. This court has recognized this principle of law whenever occasion arose. See Port Clinton Rd. Co. v. Cleveland Toledo Rd. Co., 13 Ohio St. 544; New York Central Rd. Co. v. City of Bucyrus, 126 Ohio St. 558, 186 N.E. 450; Hoffman Candy Ice Cream Co. v. Department of Liquor Control, 154 Ohio St. 357, 96 N.E.2d 203.
The Supreme Court of Michigan made a clear and concise statement in Mosshamer v. Wabash Ry. Co., 221 Mich. 407, 191 N.W. 210, with which we fully agree. It is:
"* * * it is not the function of the courts to say to the employer by mandatory injunction, you must employ A and discharge B. If A has a contract with the employer which is breached the court of law is always open to him to recover the damages occasioned him by its breach, but a court of equity may not by mandatory injunction thus interfere with the running of the employer's business."
The general rule is well stated in 28 American Jurisprudence, 285, Section 93, as follows:
"It may be stated that as a general rule an employee whose employment is not coupled with an interest in the business is not ordinarily entitled to injunctive relief to prevent his employer from discharging him * * *. The remedy at law in such cases is generally adequate to furnish relief, and besides there is a lack of mutuality of equitable remedy, since the employer would not be entitled to similar relief in case the employee left his employment."
In support of the rule so stated, the following decisions, among many others, may be cited: Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F., 310; Hewitt v. Magic City Furniture Mfg. Co., 214 Ala. 265, 107 So. 745; Greer v. Austin, 40 Okla. 113, 136 P. 590, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.), 336.
The absence of mutuality of equitable remedy in the instant case is manifest. It is not, and could not be, argued that the defendant could force the plaintiff to continue in the service of defendant against plaintiff's will. On that subject it is stated in 135 A.L.R., 282: "Specific performance of a contract for services will of course be denied when there is no mutuality of obligation."
In recent years the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements has been the subject of many decisions by American courts, important among which are Beatty v. Chicago, B. O. Rd. Co., 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P.2d 404, and Chambers v. Davis, 128 Miss. 613, 91 So. 346. Based upon those and other similar decisions, the following statement appears in 31 American Jurisprudence, 879, Section 177:
"Since equity will not decree the specific performance of contracts for personal services, it will not decree specific performance of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement as to seniority rights."
Additional pertinent statements and decisions may be found by reference to 49 American Jurisprudence, 160, Section 137; 44 A.L.R., 1444; and 95 A.L.R., 45.
It is clear that equity will not specifically enforce the employment contract in question by way of mandatory injunction merely because the contract was made as a result of collective bargaining and effort is made to maintain the action as a class action. The plaintiff must seek his remedy in an action at law.
It is maintained by plaintiff that he is specifically authorized to bring this action on behalf of himself and other employees by Section 11257, General Code, which reads:
"When the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or the parties are very numerous, and is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all."
In construing that section of the Code, consideration must be given to Sections 11254 and 11256, which are as follows:
Section 11254: "All persons having an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs except as otherwise provided."
Section 11256: "Parties who are united in interest must be joined, as plaintiffs or defendants. * * *"
If this be considered an action at law, the only remedy sought is money damages — the amount which each of the group lost by way of wages, bonuses, overtime, premium time and vacation pay and damages due to loss of seniority. Whether all these items are included in the lump sum of $60,000 is not made clear. If such damages were recoverable it is obvious that no two employees would be entitled to the same amount. Each employee would have his individual seniority rights and no two would be the same. There is no question common to them and no issue which affects all of them alike. It is clear that the plaintiff and "other employees" are not united in interest and that there is no question of common or general interest among them which could be established by the same evidence. Joint trial of their several causes of action is not possible. Hence no right to maintain this action arises under Section 11257. Trustees v. Thoman, 51 Ohio St. 285, 37 N.E. 523; Stevens v. Cincinnati Times-Star Co., 72 Ohio St. 112, 154, 73 N.E. 1058, 106 Am. St. Rep., 586; Davies v. Columbia Gas Electric Corp., 151 Ohio St. 417, 86 N.E.2d 603.
We do not say that a situation could not exist where a large group of employees would have a common interest in an alleged violation of an employment contract, which contract was the result of collective bargaining, so that they could be joined as plaintiffs or be included under the rule of virtual representation. We merely say this is not such a case.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., TAFT, MATTHIAS, HART, ZIMMERMAN and STEWART, JJ., concur.