Opinion
Case No. 5:05CV2339.
August 11, 2006
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER [Resolving Doc.18]
I. Introduction
This matter is before the Court on motion by Defendant Continental Tire North America ("Continental Tire") for summary judgment on Plaintiff Rocco Marzuola's claims. In his complaint, Mr. Marzuola names two defendants: Continental Tire and Continental Tire North America Employee Benefit Plan (the "Plan"). (ECF 1). Mr. Marzoula brought his first claim pursuant to Section 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132. In his second claim for relief, Plaintiff asks the Court for a declaratory judgment that the release he was asked to sign in connection with his severance pay was invalid and unenforceable. The Court has been advised, having reviewed the parties' pleadings, motions, memoranda of law, exhibits, and applicable law. For the reasons that follow, the Court hereby grants defendant Continental Tire's motion and dismisses Mr. Marzoula's claims against the Plan pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. Facts Procedure
Mr. Marzoula was employed as a salaried employee of Continental Tire since his initial hire date of February 17, 1976. Continental Tire had a severance policy in place (the "1994 Policy") that provided for severance pay of "one month of pay or one week's pay per year of service or partial year of service, whichever is greater." The 1994 Policy also permitted eligible employees to continue their healthcare for a period of twelve months following termination. In his complaint, Mr. Marzoula alleges that the 1994 Policy entitled him to the greater of one week of pay per year of service or one month of pay per year of service, a reading that Continental Tire argues is "fundamentally flawed."In January 2005, Continental Tire changed its severance policy (the "2005 Policy") and reduced the amount of severance to "[t]wo (2) weeks of base pay for the first year of service and one (1) week for each additional or partial year of service, up to a maximum of twenty-six (26) weeks." The 2005 Policy also eliminated the ability of eligible employees to continue their healthcare for a period of twelve months following termination.
In February 2005, Continental Tire announced that it was closing its Akron Test Center and that Plaintiff, along with others, would be terminated. Plaintiff and the other employees were provided with a confidential severance agreement and release (the "Release"). Employees seeking to take advantage of the severance terms in the 2005 Policy were required to sign the Release. They were, however, allowed forty-five days in which to consult with counsel. Mr. Marzoula, who chose to consult counsel, claims to have signed the release, but his counsel admittedly modified the terms. Continental Tire rejected the modification. Mr. Marzoula then commenced this litigation, which was originally filed in state court and subsequently removed by Defendant.
Mr. Marzoula did not provide the Court with a copy of the signed and modified Release. Rather, he provided the Court only with an affidavit from his attorney that the Release had been signed and modifed.
As previously stated, Mr. Marzoula filed a claim for relief under ERISA that he was entitled to the severance pay (as he read it) from the 1994 Policy and that he had a right to twelve months of continued healthcare. According to Mr. Marzoula, his rights under the 1994 Policy were vested rights that could not be changed or modified by the 2005 Policy. In his claim for declaratory relief, Mr. Marzoula requested that the Court declare the terms of the Release invalid and unenforceable because, if he signed it, he would not receive benefits under the 1994 Policy that he deemed "vested benefits." Plaintiff also requested that the Court declare the Release invalid and unenforceable because it was overbroad, unduly burdensome, and sought to evade liability to such an extent and degree that it violated matters of public policy.
III. Legal Standard
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court is to determine "whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Importantly, the court views the evidence of record and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir. 1993).
Summary judgment is appropriate if the party that bears the burden of proof at trial does not establish an essential element of its case. Tolton v. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original). In order for there to be a genuine issue for trial, there must be sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 249. Having discussed the Rule 56 standard of review, the Court now turns to the merits of Continental Tire's motion.
IV. Law Analysis
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Continental Tire argues that Mr. Marzoula's ERISA claim fails as a matter of law because his rights under the 1994 Policy were not vested and because his reading of the 1994 Policy is flawed. Continental Tire also argues that Mr. Marzoula was not entitled to declaratory relief because he never signed the Release and therefore lacks standing to challenge it. Alternatively, Continental argues that even if Mr. Marzoula had standing to challenge the Release, it was valid and enforceable as a matter of law because it was a "garden variety" release of claims.
In responding to Continental Tire's Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Marzoula has abandoned his ERISA claim as it was initially pled because he chooses to reference only his "second claim for relief" in his Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF 19, at 2 (stating that "[a]ll further relief alleged in the amended complaint is not being sought by the plaintiff and is otherwise withdrawn from this action")).
Mr. Marzoula's "second claim for relief" is the declaratory judgment claim. Admittedly, Mr. Marzoula does argue later in his Opposition that he is indeed entitled to benefits under ERISA. His argument, however, is premised on a new theory he asserts for the first time in opposition to summary judgment.
Rather than provide legal and factual support for the ERISA claim set forth in his Complaint, Mr. Marzoula requests for the first time in his Opposition that he is seeking "other relief" for the unfair denial of separation benefits due and owing to him under an "Employment Termination Benefits Policy." In support of his new request, Mr. Marzoula, makes no reference to either the 1994 Policy or the 2005 Policy in his Opposition. Rather, he cryptically claims entitlement to benefits offered under the so-called "Employment Termination Benefits Policy" and claims that salary continuation is a benefit to which he has always been entitled. Mr. Marzoula also claims that Continental Tire has refused to pay him these "benefits." He also argues that the Release, which he alleges is invalid on numerous unrelated grounds, supports his claim for benefits.
As Continental Tire notes, however, Mr. Marzoula cannot prevail on the theory set forth in his Opposition because it was not pled in his Complaint. Federal Rule 8 requires that a complaint give a defendant fair notice of a claim and its supporting facts. EEOC v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 854 (6th Cir. 2001). It is well-established that a plaintiff cannot argue new legal theories in opposition to a defendant's motion for summary judgment. See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that the district court did not err in failing to consider a cause of action alleged for first time in response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment); see also Welch v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 978 F.Supp. 1133, 1138 (N.D. Ga. 1997) ("Plaintiff cannot change its theory of the case (in an effort to avoid summary judgment) after Defendant moves for summary judgment.") (emphasis in original).
Here, the Amended Complaint only puts Defendants on notice that Mr. Marzoula was seeking the benefits offered under the 1994 Policy, i.e., the benefits that he claimed were "vested" benefits under ERISA. Because Mr. Marzoula has abandoned his theory that he is entitled to benefits under the 1994 Policy, the only claim remaining before the Court is his declaratory judgment claim, which does not specifically contemplate monetary relief. Rather, the primary relief Mr. Marzoula requests in that claim is that the Court render the release invalid and unenforceable. Furthermore, although Mr. Marzoula requests "other relief" for the "unfair denial of separation benefits due and owing to him under the Policy," this "other relief" amounts to no more than an unpled claim for breach of contract.
Even if the Court decided to allow Mr. Marzoula to seek benefits on a breach of contract theory under the guise of a declaratory judgment claim, Mr. Marzoula would not be successful on such a claim because by modifying the terms of the Release, Mr. Marzoula made a counteroffer that was rejected by Continental Tire. See Kirkland v. St. Elizabeth Hospital Medical Center, 34 Fed. Appx. 174, 179 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment on a breach of contract claim over a severance agreement that the plaintiff had modified and holding that the modification operated as a rejected offer and unaccepted counteroffer).
With respect to Mr. Marzoula's declaratory judgment claim, the Court declines to find that the Release is invalid and unenforceable for the reasons stated in Continental Tire's well-reasoned Memoranda of Law in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF 18 20). Namely, that Mr. Marzoula lacks standing to challenge the Release. Specifically, Mr. Marzoula has not shown that there is a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress or prevent his injury. See generally Coyne v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that in order to have standing a plaintiff must have suffered an actual or threatened injury that is "fairly traceable" to the challenged action and there must be a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress or prevent the plaintiff's injury). Even if the Court declared the Release invalid, Mr. Marzoula makes no claims under the statutes that he claims the Release violates. For instance, even if the Court agreed with Mr. Marzoula and found that the Release violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 626 et seq., Mr. Marzoula makes no claim under the ADEA. He only claims that he was denied his severance pay. Accordingly, any ruling by the Court that the Release violated the ADEA would not redress or prevent Mr. Marzoula's alleged injury — that he was denied his severance pay.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Continental Tire's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Further, because the record is devoid of proof that the Plan was served with Mr. Marzoula's Complaint as required by Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Marzoula's claims against the Plan are dismissed. Judgment shall be entered in favor of the Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.