See also Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 487, 24 S.Ct. 505, 509, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904). The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Fant, 181 Tenn. 492, 181 S.W.2d 753, 754 (1944) observed that: "`the conversion or embezzlement by an insurance agent of the balance of premiums collected by him after deduction of his commissions and expenses has been held to be willful and malicious injury to property within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.' Remington, 5th Ed., On Bankruptcy, Vol. 7, sec. 3552, p. 816." In the instant matter, the weight of the evidence establishes that the defendant's conversion of premiums was intentional.

" To the same effect see Smith v. Ladrie, 98 Vt. 429, 129 A. 302; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Fant, 181 Tenn. 492, 181 S.W.2d 753; Weeks v. Streicher, 74 Ohio App. 253, 58 N.E.2d 415; Frangos v. Frangos, 157 Pa. Super. 87, 41 A.2d 416; Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co. 293 U.S. 328, 55 Sup. Ct. 151, 79 L. Ed. 393. Likewise as to the adjudication that appellant is liable for $16,800 because of the credit allowance of that amount, which appellant and Alex Weil as officers of Hercules gave to the Dorilton Arms Company on indebtedness which it owed to Hercules, the basis of that adjudication is the court's findings that —

To this action of the judge, Woelfle excepted, prayed an appeal and the case is now here for our disposition. The case of Maryland Casualty Company, etc., v. Fant, decided by this Court on July 1, 1944, and reported in 181 Tenn. 492, 181 S.W.2d 753, has evidently escaped the attention of counsel for both parties. Many of the questions presented by the briefs of counsel here were decided in that opinion and its holdings are reaffirmed.

In re Best, 109 Fed. App'x 1, 5, 2004 WL 1544066, at *4 (6th Cir. (Ky.) 2004). However, conversion may be "innocent and technical," and its judgment dischargeable, or it may be "willful and malicious," and not dischargeable. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Fant, 181 Tenn. 492, 496, 181 S.W .2d 753, 754-55 (Tenn. 1944) (citing Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 55 S.Ct. 151, 79 L.Ed. 393, 397). The Sixth Circuit has held that a breach of contract cannot constitute the willful and malicious injury required to trigger § 523(a)(6).