Opinion
F052429
5-23-2007
MARY R., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN COUNTY, Respondent, KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Real Party In Interest.
Mary R., in pro. per., for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. B.C. Barmann, Sr., County Counsel, and Susan M. Gill, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party In Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Gomes, J., and Kane, J.
Petitioner, in pro. per., seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450-8.452) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her son T. We will deny the petition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
In December 2005, the Kern County Department of Human Services (department) removed then newborn T. from petitioners custody and filed a dependency petition alleging petitioners untreated mental illness and violent relationships placed T. at risk of harm. The petition also alleged that T.s four older siblings were permanently removed from petitioners custody for the same reasons. When T. was removed, petitioner had just completed a 52-week domestic violence program.
The juvenile court sustained the petition and ordered petitioner to participate in psychotherapy and substance abuse counseling. The court did not order services for petitioners husband, T.s presumed father. The department placed T. with paternal relatives.
After 12 months of services, petitioner was in technical compliance with her case plan but had not resolved her propensity for domestic violence or established stable housing. Sometime during the latter half of the reunification period, she moved in with a boyfriend with whom she was expecting a child. This boyfriend also has a history of domestic violence and by January 2007, the police had been called to their residence on two separate occasions for assault. Given petitioners unchanged circumstances and T.s caretakers commitment to adopt him, the department recommended the court terminate petitioners reunification services and set a hearing to consider a permanent plan of adoption.
In March 2007, the juvenile court conducted a contested hearing on the departments recommendation. Petitioners attorney did not offer any evidence but argued the court should either extend services or order T. placed with petitioner under family maintenance because petitioner complied with her court-ordered services, severed her relationship with her boyfriend and established a suitable residence.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found there was not a substantial probability T. could be returned to petitioners custody following an extended period of services. Consequently, the court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. This petition ensued.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner seeks relief from the section 366.26 hearing, claiming simply she "completed all case plan components and has safe and appropriate housing." We construe her statement as a challenge to the courts order terminating reunification services, which we review for substantial evidence, resolving all conflicts in favor of the court and indulging in all legitimate inferences to uphold the courts finding. (In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1378-1379.) On review of the record as summarized above, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts order.
Real party in interest argues the petition should be dismissed as facially deficient because it fails to comport with the content requirements set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (rule) (i.e. summary of facts and points and authorities). While we recognize the petition does not meet the technical requirements of rule 8.452(a) & (b), we are equally mindful that the rule also directs us to liberally construe petitions in favor of their sufficiency. (Rule 8.452(a)(2).) In this case, we conclude petitioners statement in its broadest terms challenges the basis for the courts order terminating reunification services. Thus, we decline to dismiss the petition on technical grounds and will address the issue on its merits.
When, as in this case, a child cannot be safely returned to parental custody by the 12-month review hearing despite the provision of reasonable services, the juvenile court is required to set a section 366.26 hearing unless it finds there is a substantial probability the child will be returned to the parents physical custody and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of reunification. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) A substantial probability of return exists when all three of the following circumstances are present: (1) the parent regularly visited the child; (2) the parent made significant progress in resolving the problem(s) prompting removal of the child; and (3) the parent demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the objective(s) of the case plan and provide for the childs safety, protection and well-being. (Ibid.)
In this case, the court properly concluded based on petitioners continued involvement in domestic violence that she neither made significant progress in resolving the problem that prompted T.s removal or demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the objectives of her case plan. Consequently, we affirm the courts orders terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing and will deny the petition.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is dismissed. This opinion is final forthwith as to this court.